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Abstract 
 
My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of 
intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship and friendship by developing 
my own version of a virtue-ethical approach.  
In Chapter 1, I critically examine important contemporary Western theories of 
filial piety and argue that they do not adequately capture the nature of a desirable 
parent-child relationship and filial piety. 
In Chapter 2, I show why the duty-centered approach to filial piety is 
inadequate focusing on why it fails to make sense of filial love and argue that filial 
piety is better understood as a virtue by showing how it can do justice to the normative 
significance of filial love.  
In Chapter 3, I introduce what I call ‘gratitude for being’ to capture the 
distinctive type of gratitude we owe to people who have consistent and particularized 
care for us, especially our parents. I argue that the idea of gratitude for being can best 
make sense of deep gratitude typically found among intimates who care for each other.  
In Chapter 4, I introduce what I call ‘relational virtues,’ which are virtues 
required for the participants of a given type of personal relationship and argue that it 
offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate 
personal relationships. Next, I propose my own relational virtue theory of filial piety.  
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In Chapter 5, I discuss several aspects of the Confucian conception of filial 
piety—early filial piety, the close connection between self-cultivation and filial piety, 
and postmortem filial piety—and show how my relational virtue theory can defend 
and make sense of them. Lastly, I show how my view of filial piety is different from 
the Confucian view, or at least a version of it. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue and show 
how it can make sense of the nature and value of friendship. In particular, I show why 
the virtue of friendship is distinct from general virtues such as benevolence or 
generosity and why it is morally important to have this virtue.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, I propose what I call ‘relational activity view’ on 
partiality. After critically examining existing views on partiality, I suggest a picture of 
how special values are transformed, delivered, and created within intimate 
relationships.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to Sandri with love 
 
  
vii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iv 
Acknowledgements ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x 
Introduction -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Chapter 1. Theories of Filial Piety ---------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
1.1. Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
1.2. Theories of Filial Piety ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
1.2.1. The Debt Theory ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
1.2.2. The Gratitude Theory ------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
1.2.3. The Friendship Theory ----------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
1.2.4. The Special Goods Theory ------------------------------------------------------------ 22 
1.3. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28 
Chapter 2. Duty, Virtue, and Filial Love ------------------------------------------------------ 29 
2.1. Introduction ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29 
2.2. The Value of Filial Love --------------------------------------------------------------------- 30 
2.3. Filial Love and Duty ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42 
2.4. Filial Love and the Virtue of Filial Piety ------------------------------------------------ 50 
2.5. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 63 
Chapter 3. Gratitude for Being------------------------------------------------------------------- 64 
3.1. Introduction ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64 
3.2. Personal Gratitude and Impersonal Gratitude ---------------------------------------- 65 
3.3. What is Gratitude for Being? -------------------------------------------------------------- 68 
3.4. Possible Objections -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 80 
3.4.1. Gratitude for Being vs. Impersonal Gratitude ------------------------------------ 80 
3.4.2. Gratitude for Being vs. Gratitude for Doing -------------------------------------- 82 
3.5. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 85 
Chapter 4. Relational Virtue and Filial Piety ------------------------------------------------ 87 
4.1. Introduction ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 87 
viii 
 
 
4.2. What is a Relational Virtue? --------------------------------------------------------------- 87 
4.2.1. Is it a Virtue? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89 
4.2.2. Is it a Distinctive Kind of Virtue? ---------------------------------------------------- 92 
4.2.3. Characteristic Features of Relational Virtue -------------------------------------- 95 
4.2.4. Possible Objections Against the Idea of Relational Virtue -------------------- 100 
4.3. Filial Piety as a Relational Virtue -------------------------------------------------------- 103 
4.3.1. Parental Virtue and Filial Piety ----------------------------------------------------- 103 
4.3.2. Avoiding Difficulties ------------------------------------------------------------------ 107 
4.4. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 111 
Chapter 5. Confucian Filial Piety and Relational Virtue -------------------------------- 113 
5.1. Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 113 
5.2. Confucian Filial Piety ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 113 
5.2.1. Early Filial Piety ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 115 
5.2.2. Self-Cultivation and Filial Piety ----------------------------------------------------- 119 
5.2.3. Postmortem Filial Piety --------------------------------------------------------------- 124 
5.3. Confucianism vs. The Relational Virtue Theory ------------------------------------- 129 
5.4. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 132 
Chapter 6. Friendship and Relational Virtue ----------------------------------------------- 134 
6.1. Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 134 
6.2. Friendship vs. Parent-Child Relationship --------------------------------------------- 135 
6.3. Friendship and Virtue ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 139 
6.3.1. Being Generally Virtuous is Not Necessary for Being Virtuous as a Friend
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 141 
6.3.2. Being Generally Virtuous is Not Sufficient for Being Virtuous as a Friend
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 148 
6.4. Friendship and Morality ------------------------------------------------------------------- 152 
6.5. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 157 
Chapter 7. Relational Activity View on Partiality ----------------------------------------- 158 
7.1. Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 158 
7.2. The Projects View --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 159 
7.3. The Relationships View -------------------------------------------------------------------- 161 
ix 
 
 
7.4. The Individuals View ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 166 
7.5. Response to Keller’s Individuals View ------------------------------------------------- 168 
7.6. The Relational Activity View ------------------------------------------------------------- 175 
7.7. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 181 
Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 182 
References -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 184 
Biography -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 191 
 
   
x 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Modesty and gratitude are the two greatest things I learned through the 
writing of this dissertation. Although my name appears on its cover as the sole author, 
this dissertation is a product of many people who humbled me with their generosity.  
I would first like to express the deepest gratitude to my co-supervisors, Owen 
Flanagan and Gopal Sreenivasan. Owen always gave me insightful suggestions and 
showed profound belief in my work, which raised both the quality of the drafts and 
my self-confidence. Gopal gave me the hardest philosophical challenges based on the 
deepest personal care, which helped me the most in growing as a philosopher and as 
a person. I believe I had the best supervisors possible, without whom my dissertation 
would have been impossible. 
I’m also deeply indebted to other dissertation committee members, David 
Wong and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. I’m extremely grateful to David for giving 
constructive criticism and insights from Chinese philosophy, as well as for his deep 
care and concern for me. I’d like to thank Walter for offering helpful comments from 
the outside of my comfort zone, which allowed me to broaden my horizon.  
I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the other faculty members at the 
Philosophy Department for helping me to become a better philosopher. Although I 
was helped by almost every one of them, I am especially grateful to Wayne Norman 
and Felipe De Brigard, who gave me invaluable lessons and advice on multiple 
xi 
 
 
occasions. Thanks also to my fellow graduate students for their friendship and 
academic supports.  
I owe special thanks regarding this dissertation to all those who have given 
valuable comments on the earlier drafts of the chapters, which include Hannah (H) 
Bondurant, Katherine Brading, Robert Brandon, Tim Burkhart, Ewan Kingston, 
Wooram Lee, S. Matthew Liao, Tony Manela, Songyao Ren, Andrew Smith, Gus 
Skorburg, and Wenqing Zhao. 
I owe special gratitude to my father and mother for being such great parents 
and my role models. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Sandri for her endless 
support, devotion, and love.  
 
 
  
1 
 
Introduction 
 
It is very important for our flourishing life to have good relationships with 
our intimates such as family members and close friends. My aim here is to shed 
light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relationships by 
developing my own version of a virtue-ethical approach. For this purpose, I analyze 
ideal intimate relationships in terms of what I call ‘relational virtues,’ which are 
virtues required for the participants of such relationships. The paradigmatic 
examples of relational virtue include filial piety (i.e., a good child’s virtue) and the 
virtue of friendship (i.e., a good friend’s virtue).  
Many philosophers have attempted to capture the ethical value and 
normative significance of intimate relationships (at least ‘healthy’ ones) in terms of 
duty. I argue that the theories based on duty fail to capture appropriate inner 
attitudes that are partly constitutive of filial piety such as love and gratitude toward 
our parents. I then argue that the idea of a duty to love fails to capture the value 
and normative significance of our love for our loving parents (or ‘filial’ love) and 
show how a virtue-ethical approach can make better sense of it.  
Then I introduce what I call ‘gratitude for being’ to capture the distinctive 
type of gratitude we owe to people who have consistent and particularized care for 
us such as our parents. I first distinguish personal gratitude from impersonal 
gratitude and introduce the idea of gratitude for being as a subcategory of the 
former. I then argue that the gratitude we owe to those who have long-term care 
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particularized for us can be best understood in terms of gratitude for being, rather 
than gratitude for doing.  
To improve on existing theories of filial piety, I introduce my relational 
virtue approach to filial piety. First, a relational virtue involves a special attitude 
toward particular individuals, which is distinguished from love for humanity in 
general. Second, a relational virtue is reciprocal because its content may vary with 
the degree to which the other member is relationally virtuous. Third, a relational 
virtue is dependent in the sense that its internal goal of engaging in a good intimate 
relationship cannot be achieved unless the other member is relationally virtuous as 
well.  
I proceed to show how my relational virtue theory can explain some 
important features of filial piety suggested by Confucianism: filial piety in early 
childhood, the close relationship between self-cultivation and filial piety, and filial 
piety after parents’ decease. I then show how my relational approach to filial piety 
differs from the traditional Confucian role-based approach.  
Next, I argue that the virtue of friendship understood as a relational virtue 
can make sense of the nature and value of friendship. In particular, I argue that the 
virtue of friendship as a relational virtue is distinguished from general virtues like 
benevolence or generosity. I also show how my relational view can help us better 
understand friendship. 
Finally, I develop a view on partiality towards our intimates in general, 
which I call the ‘relational activity view,’ to solve the puzzle of partiality: “Why 
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should the fact that we share some relationship with someone permits or even 
directs us to treat her in a partial way?” After critically examining previous views 
on partiality, I introduce and argue for my own relational activity view as an 
alternative.   
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Chapter 1. Theories of Filial Piety 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
We all have parents or at least someone who has played a parent’s role for us. 
They are very important people in our lives. Fortunate children receive the nurture, 
support, education, and love from their parents and usually there exists an intimate 
relationship between parents and children. As P. J. Ivanhoe points out, “While 
traditional beliefs about filial piety may be out of date, the fact that humans have an 
enduring, distinctive, and emotionally charged relationship with their parents remains 
as true today as it was in the past and as true in the West as it is in the East” (Ivanhoe 
2007, 297). If so, the following are important ethical questions: What does it take to be 
a good child to one’s parents? What is the normative ground for being filial? These are 
central questions of filial piety.1 
In the Confucian tradition in East Asia, such questions of filial piety have been 
at the center of ethical inquiries. According to the Classic of Filial Piety, for example, the 
virtue of filial piety is “the root of virtue and all [ethical] teaching grows out of it” 
(Legge 2004, Ch.1).2 Chenyang Li thus argues, “one cannot understand traditional 
Chinese culture without understanding the role of filial morality” (Li 1997, 219). 
                                           
1 Just like the case of ‘honesty’ or ‘benevolence,’ the term ‘filial piety (or filiality; xiao; 孝)’ may 
refer either to the moral norms concerning being a good child to her parents or to the virtue that 
the good child has, depending on the context. 
2 In citing the Classic of Filial Piety, I used James Legge’s translation as the base and made some 
modification of my own when necessary. 
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Although the issue of filial piety has been relatively neglected in the Western tradition, 
the idea of good children’s morality itself is not new in this tradition either. In Plato’s 
Crito, for example, Socrates suggests that parents bestow benefits such as birth, nurture, 
and education, and thus children owe gratitude to their parents. This idea is also found 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition. One of the Judeo-Christian Ten Commandments 
enjoins, “Honor thy father and thy mother,” and Thomas Aquinas also argued in 
Summa Theologica that we owe not only respect but also reverence to our parents, 
saying that they are, next to God, the “closest sources of our existence and 
development” (Aquinas 1947, Question 101, Article 1). Moreover, in his Treatise of 
Human Nature, David Hume emphasized the importance of having gratitude to one’s 
parents: “Of all the crimes that human creatures are capable of committing, the most 
horrid and unnatural is ingratitude, especially when it is committed against parents” 
(Hume 1978, 1, Bk. III, sec.1). 
Recently, there have been revived interests in the issue of filial piety among 
contemporary Western philosophers. The theories of filial piety in contemporary 
Western literature, however, do not seem to fully capture the characteristic features of 
a filial child in a desirable parent-child relationship.3 Most of those theories attempt 
to explicate what sorts of filial duties (or obligations or responsibilities) we have in 
relation to our parents and to explain their grounds, most of them have been narrowly 
focused on the question, “What kind of duties do adult children have to their aged 
                                           
3 The main focus of this chapter will be the virtue of filial piety. In this dissertation, parental 
virtue, the counterpart virtue of a good parent, will be discussed briefly only in relation to the 
discussion of filial piety.  
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parents?”  
This question is inadequate at least for two reasons, however. First, the 
normativity of being filial is not confined to adult children’s filial duties to their aged 
parents. It is also ethically important to discuss the filial piety before the ‘children’ 
become adults and after their parents pass away. Second, more importantly, the duty-
centered approach tends to distort or miss important features of a desirable parent-
child relationship and the nature of being filial. This is mainly because appropriate 
inner attitudes, not just appropriate external behaviors, is crucial for filial piety. I 
suggest that we should instead ask “What does the virtue of filial piety demand?” 
Before starting the discussion of filial piety, I should first clarify what I mean 
by ‘parent,’ ‘child,’ and ‘parent-child relationship.’ I do not require a certain biological 
or legal relationship for a parent-child relationship; what I require is a de facto parent-
child relationship. Many people would find it unreasonable, for example, if someone 
claims that a person should love and support her biological parents even if, say, she 
has not even met them for several decades since her birth or they have been extremely 
abusive to her.4 Thus, if someone roughly qualifies as what Amy Mullin calls the 
‘social parent’ for another individual, I would assume that it suffices to say that they 
share a parent-child relationship:  
 
A social parent (1) has repeated interactions over a long time horizon with a 
child; (2) takes him or herself and is taken by others to have significant 
                                           
4 The importance of biological relationship for filial piety is less emphasized in contemporary 
societies, especially due to the advancement of biotechnology and diversity of family forms. 
For a convincing argument against the ethical significance of begetting for filial piety, see 
Ivanhoe (2007). 
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responsibility for the child’s health, safety, and overall physical, emotional, 
intellectual, and moral development; (3) and aims his or her interactions with 
the child at least in part at the ongoing care and development of the child. 
(Mullin 2010, 16) 
 
Therefore, in my discussion, people like foster parents or caregivers in an orphanage 
may appropriately be regarded as parents in the sense relevant to filial piety, while 
some biological or legal parents may not be qualified to expect any filial actions or 
attitudes from their merely biological or legal children.5   
To have a concrete image of what a filial child would be like, let me begin with 
a story of Chung, who I suggest as an exemplar of filial piety:  
 
Since her birth, Chung has been raised by her single father, Hak. Although Hak 
was very poor, he did his best to nurture, support, and educate her with love 
and care. He put efforts into her education and worked days and nights to send 
her to a good school. While growing up, Chung largely obeyed what he told her 
to do and she developed a loving and caring relationship with him. She felt deep 
gratitude l not only for what he has done or given to her but also for his having 
been such a caring father. Later Chung became a famous lawyer, which pleased 
Hak and made him proud of her. In her social life, Chung did her best to become 
and act as a virtuous person, partly to satisfy Hak’s wish that she grows up to 
be a person who is not only socially successful but also morally exemplary. She 
always treated Hak with special reverence and courtesy, as well as earnest 
consideration for him. Especially when he became old and infirm, she gave him 
all the possible support to him both emotionally and materially. When he was 
in the hospital, she visited him every day with his favorite dish and took charge 
of all the hospital expenses. She did all these from special love and care for Hak 
as his daughter, and neither from a sense of duty nor from a mere general 
benevolence. After Hak passed away, Chung mourned for months and did not 
spend time in any amusement for a long period as a tribute to her father. In 
addition, she annually had a formal dinner with her family as a memorial 
ceremony for her father. 
                                           
5 I do not deny that there are some cases where people can be properly called ‘parents’ even if 
they do not qualify for being social parents. For instance, a mother who died protecting her 
infant child can be properly called a ‘parent’, although she does not have the chance to be the 
‘social’ parent. I am grateful to Wenqing Zhao for making this point.  
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Perhaps not all of Chung’s features described in this story would be accepted as an 
essential part of being filial, since the details of what can be legitimately expected from 
a filial child heavily depend on cultural and other contingent backgrounds. However, 
I believe most people would agree that, if there is an exemplary filial child, she would 
share many of Chung’s characteristics described here. The point of this story is to give 
a general sense of what a filial child would be like and to list main desiderata for any 
plausible theory of filial piety.  
To focus on behavioral aspects first, a filial child would largely follow the lead 
of her parents when she is young, and materially and financially protect, take care of, 
and support them when she grows up. In the Confucian tradition, other important 
filial behaviors include producing heirs to continue the ‘family line,’ bringing honor 
and glory to the parents and the ancestors (e.g., by becoming a respectable government 
official), cultivating and exercising one’s moral character, and offering a mourning 
ceremony after the parents’ death. A filial child would also be expected to have 
appropriate inner attitudes toward her parents, such as gratitude, love, and care. 
Especially in the Confucian culture, reverence (jing; 敬) toward one’s parents is 
heavily emphasized as a necessary part of filial piety.  
Let me give an empirical example of South Korea—a country deeply 
influenced by Confucianism—to show how filial piety is actually practiced in a 
cultural area that heavily emphasizes it as a precious cultural heritage as well as an 
important ethical norm. An exploratory study by Kyu-Taik Sung (1998) suggests ten 
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categories of paradigmatic filial actions based on the analysis of the stories of the 
recipients of the annual Filial Piety Prize which has been awarded by the South Korean 
government since 1973.6 Some important types of filial actions recommended and 
practiced in South Korea involves the following: showing respect for parents (e.g. 
using honorific language or serving parents first, memorial services to the ancestors); 
supporting parents physically and materially (e.g., adult children’s assuming parent 
care and meeting the financial needs of aged parents); harmonizing family (e.g., 
combining family members, especially siblings, into a good relationship so that they 
can coordinate with each other in taking care of their parents); and showing love and 
affection (e.g., visiting frequently and delivering warm messages verbally or otherwise) 
(Sung 1998).  
Although some aspects of filial piety emphasized in the Confucian culture like 
South Korea may not be regarded as important in other cultures, I believe this list 
includes some important aspects of filial piety that are and should be cherished in most 
cultures. In Chapter 1, I first critically examine some of the existing theories of filial 
piety in contemporary Western literature. The focus will be on the notion of debt, 
gratitude, friendship, and special goods, respectively.  
 
                                           
6 The ten categories actually used in the analysis are as follow (in the order of frequency): 
Showing Respect for Parents; Fulfilling Filial Responsibility; Repaying Debts to Parents; 
Harmonizing the Family; Making Filial Sacrifice; Expressing Love and Affection; Expressing 
Filial Sympathy; Maintaining Family Continuity; Compensating Care; Showing Respect for 
Other Elders. (See Sung 1998, Table 1) 
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1.2. Theories of Filial Piety 
 1.2.1. The Debt Theory 
 
The debt theory offers a relatively simple account for the ground of filial piety. 
According to this theory, since our parents have given us many good things in raising 
us—including life, nurture, and education—we should somehow pay back those goods 
to them. Like many other contemporary Western theories of filial piety, the debt theory 
focuses on establishing the ground for adult children’s filial responsibility to assume 
parent care and meet the needs of aged parents. The underlying idea is that, just as a 
debtor owes the money she loaned to the creditor, we owe the goods that our parents 
have provided to us. This theory takes the idea of making repayment as central to filial 
piety.  
Many theories of filial piety involve the idea of ‘debt’ or ‘owing’ in some form. 
Some philosophers find similarity between Confucianism and the debt theory because 
both require the child to repay her debt to her parents in a specified manner regardless 
of the child’s character or her attitude toward her parents.7 One explicit support for 
the debt theory can be found in William Blackstone’s following remark:  
 
The duties of children to their parents arise from a principle of natural justice and 
retribution. For to those who gave us existence we naturally owe subjection and 
obedience during our minority, and honor and reverence ever after; they who 
protected the weakness of our infancy and entitled to our protection in the 
infirmity of their age; they who by sustenance and education have enabled their 
                                           
7 For this interpretation of Confucian conception of filial piety, see, for example, Wee (2014, 91-
2). 
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offspring to prosper ought in return to be supported by that offspring in case 
they stand in need of assistance. (Blackstone 1857, bk. 1, ch. 16, section1.; recited 
from Blustein (1982), p. 181); emphasis added) 
 
The apparent appeal of the debt theory comes from the general principle that 
we owe something to those who benefit us and the fact that our parents normally 
provide us with enormous amounts of goods. Then, it does not seem difficult for this 
theory to show us the reason why we should do something good for our parents, 
assuming that they are at least reasonably good parents. According to this theory, the 
reason Chung ought to take care of her father Hak when he becomes old and infirm is 
that she has a duty to repay what she has received from him since when she was 
young—such as protection, nurturance, material support, and education.  
However, although the debt theory has long been regarded as a plausible view 
of filial piety, it has serious difficulties. First, unlike the case of a creditor-debtor 
relationship, what we owe to our parents is not entirely determined by the kind and 
amount of goods we received from our parents (see Keller 2006, English 1992 for 
criticisms to this effect). While what we owe to our parents seem to vary with 
considerations such as their needs, our ability and situation, and the relationship 
between us, what the debtor owes to the creditor is typically not influenced by such 
external considerations. As Simon Keller points out, things you should do for your 
parents  
 
do not seem to differ in nature or weightiness depending upon the exact amount 
of effort and energy contributed by parents; you may have been a healthy and 
angelic child, undemanding and a delight to nurture, but that does not mean 
12 
 
that you have any less of an obligation to respect and help your parents than 
you would have had if you had been sickly and temperamental and very 
difficult to raise. (Keller 2006, 256) 
 
P. J. Ivanhoe also criticizes the debt theory on the grounds that there is 
unavoidable asymmetry in the parent-child relationship that makes it unrealistic for 
the children to repay what they have received from their parents. This asymmetry 
partly comes from the fact that one’s parents “play a central role in the formation of 
one’s character and the development of one’s capabilities to live well as a human being” 
(Ivanhoe 2007, 304). Since we cannot play a comparable role in our parents' lives—
such as forming their identity or developing their abilities—there are at least some 
important goods that we cannot pay back to our parents.  
More fundamentally, I share Ivanhoe’s concern that “conceiving of the parent-
child relationship strictly in terms of bartering is to miss its essential character” 
(Ivanhoe 2007, 305, note 19). A parent-child relationship, at least a reasonably good 
one, is based on mutual love and care rather than prudential calculation. I believe the 
idea of seeing an intimate relationship8 like the parent-child relationship as something 
analogous to the relationship of bartering or creditor-debtor relationship stems from 
an economic exchange view based on an overly individualistic perspective on human 
beings. In a normal bargaining situation, each party is regarded as a rational agent 
who can calculate what is good for herself and what is good for the other party, as 
something totally different from each other. What is presupposed here is the prudence 
                                           
8 I use ‘intimate personal relationship,’ ‘personal relationship,’ ‘intimate relationship,’ and 
‘special relationship’ interchangeably, unless noted otherwise.  
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about what is good for oneself and the ability to see what would be good for the other 
party. An agent who lacks any of these abilities cannot participate in bartering in an 
appropriate way.  
However, in a ‘healthy’ intimate relationship, what would be good for one 
party should be at least part of what would be good for the other party. In the case of 
a parent-children relationship, good parents would believe that benefiting their child 
also constitute part of their own well-being. For example, children’s development or 
improvement may give the parents a sense of satisfaction or pride. If certain parents 
offer these benefits with the self-interested intention to receive external rewards from 
the children in the future, and not out of concern for the children’s well-being, that 
would evidence defects as good parents in some important respect. Likewise, from the 
children’s perspective, although it is appropriate to have gratitude to their parents for 
what their parents have done or given to them, it is a mistake to conceive it as a sort of 
‘debt’ understood in a bartering sense.  
 
1.2.2. The Gratitude Theory 
 
 Let us move on to the gratitude theory, which is perhaps most popular among 
contemporary Western philosophers (see, e.g., McConnell 1993, esp. Ch. VII). The 
gratitude theory is based on the general idea that we owe gratitude to those who do 
good things to us out of care (or benevolence or goodwill). Thus, this theory says that 
a filial child should express gratitude through appropriate acts in response to what her 
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parents have done to her from benevolence. It is distinct from the main idea in the debt 
theory. Jeffrey Blustein points out that the language of “owing” makes us confuse 
gratitude with indebtedness (see Blustein 1985, 176f.). It suggests that we should feel 
grateful, rather than indebted, to our parents for what they have done to us and that 
the gratitude toward one’s parents “is not to be thought of as the price of parental 
benefits” (Blustein 1985, 184).  
 The gratitude theory has an advantage over the debt theory. As Keller puts, 
the “point of demonstrations of gratitude is to acknowledge acts of benevolence 
appropriately, not to provide repayment” (Keller 2006, 260-1). In our story, Chung is 
grateful to her father Hak not only for the goods he offered but even more for the love 
and care underlying his acts. Unlike the debt theory, the content of the appropriate 
expression of gratitude may vary according to considerations like the parents’ needs, 
children’s ability and situations, and their relationship. For example, if you are in a 
financially difficult situation, you don’t have to express your gratitude to a person who 
bought you a luxurious gift by giving something equally expensive.  
 Another advantage of the gratitude theory is that it does justice to the 
importance of the motivational aspect in filial piety. In contrast to the debt theory, the 
gratitude theory holds that we ‘owe’ gratitude to our benefactors only when they have 
done good things to us out of care, and our benefiting them should be an expression 
of a grateful attitude. For example, if someone lends you $1,000 only to gain a good 
reputation, you owe her $1,000, but not necessarily gratitude. In this case, even if you 
repay $1,000 to your creditor, it does not have to be an expression of gratitude. Being 
15 
 
filial to good parents involves more than such a ‘cold’ attitude of a debtor to the 
creditor; it does involve having a grateful attitude to what our parents have done for 
our own sake. In this respect, the gratitude theory is in a better position to explain the 
appropriate motivation of a filial person.  
There are serious challenges to the gratitude theory, however. First, it is hard 
to make sense of why we ought to be grateful for what our parents did for us when we 
were very young (English 1992, Archard 1996). It is undeniable that most parents put 
an enormous amount of time and efforts in raising their children. However, given that 
our gratitude to our parents is largely based on what our parents have done to us when 
we were too young to make autonomous choices about whether to accept them, it is 
hard to make sense of this basis in terms of the duty of gratitude. This is because, being 
too young, we did not request our parents to do those good things to us, and we were 
not in a position to choose whether to accept them. Michael Slote shares this worry 
when he says, “it is difficult to believe that one has any moral duty to show gratitude 
for benefits one has not requested” (Slote 1979, 320; emphasis original).  
Another challenge is that, if what our parents did is just a way of carrying out 
their parental duties, it seems hard to explain why we ought to be grateful to someone 
for merely fulfilling her own duties. If it is not fitting for us to be grateful for what 
another person has a duty to provide for us, then this seems to pose a challenge to the 
gratitude theory (see, e.g., Walker 1980 for this view). Blustein responds to this 
challenge by suggesting two kinds of cases in which one may have “a duty to show 
gratitude, even though those who provided me with benefits were fulfilling duties that 
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did not arise out of any express or tacit agreement between us” (Blustein 1985, 179). 
First, even if someone had a duty to benefit us, we have the duty to show gratitude to 
her insofar as she benefited me not solely or primarily from a sense of duty but from 
love and care for us; second, we may have to express gratitude to the benefactor even 
if it is her duty to benefit us, if fulfilling that duty has been particularly onerous and 
demanding.  
Although I agree that we ought to express gratitude in the cases Blustein 
mentions, I do not think he adequately justified the claim that we sometimes should 
express gratitude to someone for fulfilling her own duties. His first case suggests that we 
owe gratitude to someone for fulfilling her duties if she does so from a particular kind 
of motivation—in his example, love and care. Strictly speaking, however, the duty in 
question here is to benefit, not to benefit from a particular sort of motivation. If we owe 
gratitude to someone who benefits us partly because she did so out of love or care for 
us, then it would be gratitude at least partly for what goes beyond the call of duty, 
rather than just for fulfilling her own duty.  
A similar point can be made about the second kind of case, where the 
fulfillment of duty in question is unusually onerous and demanding. For example, we 
say a beach lifeguard has a duty to save people from drowning. However, this ‘duty’ 
may not be imposed on a lifeguard if the situation is such that saving the drowning 
person in question is exceedingly onerous and dangerous. If man-eating sharks appear 
next to the drowning person, for example, it is not clear whether saving that person in 
the given circumstance is the lifeguard’s duty in a strict sense. As Gregory Mellema 
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points out, “as the level of personal sacrifice becomes greater, it is increasingly unlikely 
that the act is obligatory for the agent to perform” (Mellema 1991, 197). If the lifeguard 
does save the drowning person despite the threat, she would rightly be admired for 
her action and the person rescued would owe gratitude to her. In this case, however, 
the lifeguard’s particular saving seems better described as a supererogatory action that 
goes beyond the call of duty than as an action that merely fulfills her duty.  
Keller poses another challenge to the gratitude theory, saying, “the extent of 
duties of gratitude depends upon how much discomfort, exertion, and sacrifice is 
involved in the provision of the relevant benefit” (Keller 2006, 259; emphasis added). 
Consider two friends helping you move. One enjoys packing and moving and had 
nothing else to do at the time of moving; the other hates packing and moving but 
canceled an important meeting just to help you. It seems reasonable, according to 
Keller, to say that you have more duty of gratitude to the latter, the ‘sacrificing’ mover, 
than to the former, the ‘effortless’ mover, even if they offer an equal amount of benefits 
to you. If this holds analogously in the case of parent-child relationship, a child would 
have more duty of gratitude toward a ‘sacrificing’ parent, who sacrificed a great deal 
and put a lot of efforts in raising her, than an ‘effortless’ parent, who did not sacrifice 
as much and even enjoyed much in raising her. It implies that, in our story, if Hak were 
rich and raised Chung without much difficulties or sacrifices, it would make sense for 
her to owe less gratitude to this ‘effortless’ Hak than to the ‘sacrificing’ Hak. However, 
as Keller suggests, Chung’s filial duties to look after Hak when he becomes old and 
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infirm does not seem to be mitigated just because he has enjoyed parenting or has 
made less sacrifice.  
 
1.2.3. The Friendship Theory 
 
 The proponents of the friendship theory argue that it can avoid the difficulties 
of the debt theory and the gratitude theory. According to Jane English’s version, the 
source of filial duties is the current relationship between parents and children, rather 
than what parents have done for the children in the past (see English 1992). Thus, what 
requires children to take care of and benefit their parents is the on-going friendship 
between them. Her theory finds its appeal in the fact that “friendship ought to be 
characterized by mutuality rather than reciprocity: friends offer what they can give and 
accept what they need, without regard for the total amounts of benefits exchanged, 
and friends are motivated by love rather than by the prospect of repayment” (English 
1992, 150; emphasis original). Thus, it is claimed, the friendship theory can make sense 
of the flexibility in the amounts of goods exchanges and the motivation of love in a 
desirable parent-child relationship. It can also explain why filial duties generally do 
not vary with the amount of parental sacrifice, as well as why such duties cannot be 
discharged once and for all. In addition, the friendship theory also captures mutuality, 
as opposed to mere reciprocity, in the parent-child relationship, since this theory 
focuses on the relationship itself, rather than the benefits exchanged within that 
relationship.  
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The friendship theory also seems to be in a better position to account for the 
emotional and affective aspects in a desirable parent-child relationship, which is 
characterized by feelings of love and affection. In a parent-child relationship, the 
appropriate motivation in exchanges of goods seems to be special love and affection, 
rather than general or impartial benevolence. Suppose, for example, that Chung takes 
care of aged Hak from a general benevolence, as if she were taking care of a stranger 
in need, rather than from a special kind of emotional and motivational attitudes 
toward him, such as love and affection for him as his daughter. Then, though 
benevolent she may be in a general sense, she would not be a particularly filial 
daughter. Similarly, if you treat your friend with the sort of inner attitude with which 
you would treat strangers, it seems reasonable to claim that you are defective as a 
friend in some important aspect, if you are a friend at all.  
Thus, when it comes to explaining the appropriate motivation of a filial child, 
the friendship theory seems to fare even better than the gratitude theory. Admittedly, 
it is reasonable to assume that part of the appropriate motivation in benefiting one’s 
parents is a grateful attitude to them. However, you can act out of gratitude to any 
benevolent benefactors (e.g., an impartial philanthropist), not just to those who share 
a special relationship with you (e.g., your parents). Moreover, although a sense of 
gratitude may sometimes be part of an appropriate motivation in helping or benefiting 
one’s parents, it is at best inadequate. The response most parents hope to receive from 
their children—who they have raised with love and care—would be comparable love 
and care, not just gratitude. In general, when someone loves and cares for you, your 
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feeling grateful may not be an ideal response from her perspective; rather, the response 
desired the most by the lover would be for the beloved to love back. Imagine someone 
saying “I love you” to you and all your response is, “Thank you. I appreciate it.” That 
wouldn’t be ideal from the lover’s perspective.9                               
The friendship theory has its own difficulties, however. The first concerns 
English’s claim that filial duties would diminish or disappear when the friendship 
between the parent and the child is gone (e.g., McConnell 1993, 216-217). The problem 
with this theory is that it allows the children to avoid the requirement of filial piety 
too easily by choosing to leave the ‘friendship’ between the parent and the child. In 
Keller’s words, “[y]ou are stuck with your filial duties, in a way that you are not stuck 
with your duties of friendship” (Keller 2006, 264). Aristotle even says, “a son is not free 
to disown his father,…[because] a debtor should return what he owes, and since, no 
matter what a son has done, he has not made a worthy return for what his father has 
done for him, he is always the debtor” (Aristotle 1999, 1163b20-23).  
To meet this challenge, Nicholas Dixon offers a revised version of the 
friendship theory, according to which duties of friendship can outlive the relationship 
itself. He calls the duties to one’s former friend’s residual duties and claims that its 
moral basis is “respect for our former friendships, our former friends and ourselves” 
(Dixon 1995, 79; emphasis original). If we stop treating someone as a friend as soon as 
                                           
9 This is not to say that the love in question is conditional on the beloved’s loving back. It is 
just to say that it would be better for the lover to be loved back than not. Also, it is plausible that 
loving parents may say to their children something like, “I don't need you to take care of me 
when I become old. I just want you to become a really good person and give all the love and 
help to other people around the world.” Again, what I am saying is just that it would be better 
for the parents to be loved back by their children, other things being equal.  
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the friendship is gone, he says, this failure to respect our relationship makes us doubt 
the genuineness of the former friendship in the first place.  
I am not sure Dixon’s response is adequate, however. Of course, if someone 
changes the attitudes to a (former) friend as soon as she breaks off the friendship, it 
would give us a good reason to question the depth of friendship. But if enough time 
passes, even the residual duties will diminish or disappear someday. Moreover, we 
usually receive an enormous amount of benefits from our parents—including 
protection, nurturance, and education—which is almost incomparable to the benefits 
we receive from our ordinary friends. This fact, rather than respect for the former 
friendship, seems to explain why we would still be ‘stuck with’ our filial duties even 
when the friendship disappears. For example, suppose that Chung disconnected her 
‘friendly relationship’ with her father Hak, say, due to the difference in their political 
views. It seems that she would still have reasons to provide life-saving medical 
treatment if he desperately needs it and she can provide it without too great a cost 
from her side. It seems implausible to argue that all those reasons stem from her 
respect for the former friendship between them. We do not seem to have comparable 
reasons to provide the same medical treatment when our former friends are in a 
similar situation. Those reasons seem to have something to do with what Hak has 
given to Chung in some sense. 
The second difficulty concerns the disanalogy between parent-child 
relationship and friendship. The main issue is that the parent-child relationship is 
different from friendship in morally significant respects. It is true that, like in 
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friendship, there usually exist affection and intimacy between parents and children, 
and it seems to constitute a desirable parent-child relationship that parents and 
children have positive emotional attitudes toward each other. However, the criticism 
goes, unlike friends, a parent and a child are not equal within their relationships in 
important aspects (See, e.g, Kupfer 1990, Ivanhoe 2007).  
As Ivanhoe points out, at least until the children fully grow up, parents are 
normally superior in their status, power, and abilities. This asymmetry tends to limit 
the children’s autonomy and independence, which are crucial for a healthy friendship 
between those who are similar in their status, power, and abilities. Even if they become 
adults, it “does not erase their earlier history, which should and does inform even the 
nature of their later friendly activities and relationship” (Ivanhoe 2007, 307). It is the 
dramatic asymmetry in power, he says, that gives the parent’s love and care for the 
child a special ethical significance, since “acts of parental love express the priority of 
care and sacrifice over power and prerogative” (ibid.). Joseph Kupfer (1990) goes far 
enough to claim that the lack of friendship between a parent and a child is a constitutive 
feature of a desirable parent-child relationship, rather than an undermining one.10  
 
 1.2.4. The Special Goods Theory 
 
Let us now examine Keller’s special goods theory, which he proposes as an 
                                           
10 Both Ivanhoe and Kupfer believe that the main ground for the asymmetry is the fact that 
parents heavily influence the formation of who the children will become.  
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alternative to the theories discussed above. He claims that these accounts fail mainly 
because they try to explain the parent-child relationship and filial piety by analogy to 
other moral relationships. This is not surprising, he says, given that the “kind of 
relationship that you have with your parents—how you think about them and the 
place they have in your life—does not have much in common with relationships that 
you are likely to have with anyone else” (Keller 2006, 265). Although I have a more 
reserved opinion about whether filial piety should be treated as a sui generis moral 
issue, I agree at least that adequate account of filial piety would require more careful 
examination of the parent-child relationship itself, rather than appeal to some other 
kind of moral relationships.  
Keller’s special goods theory focuses on the ‘special goods’ that arise within a 
desirable parent-child relationship. He says that the goods of parenting or those of 
having a healthy relationship with a parent are special in that they are “unique in kind, 
meaning that there are no other sources, or not many easily accessible other sources, 
from which they can be gained” (Keller 2006, 265). Thus, he says, there are two kinds 
of goods that can come from a healthy parent-child relationship: “generic goods, 
which could in principle be received from anyone, and special goods, which the parent 
can receive from no one (or almost no one) but the child, or the child can receive from 
no one (or almost no one) but the parent” (Keller 2006, 266).  
On this taxonomy, the examples of generic goods include medical care, 
financial support, or physical help, since these goods can also be provided by someone 
other than your parent or child. In contrast, special goods in a parent-child relationship 
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are something you can receive (almost) exclusively from your parent or child. For 
example, special goods you can get from your child include “the good of having your 
child, the one you raised, love and care about, make an effort to keep in touch. 
Similarly, there is, beyond the good of having people around for Christmas, the good 
of having your children around for Christmas” (Keller 2006, 266). According to Keller, 
having someone who has such a special concern for your well-being and needs is a 
good that is special to the parent-child relationship, since it occurs naturally within 
such a relationship while is hardly found in other relationships.  
Keller argues that the ground for your filial duties to your parents is the fact 
that you share a relationship with them in which they have provided you with special 
goods as your parents, and that you are now uniquely placed to provide them 
important special goods as their child. On this view, you ought to provide special 
goods to your parents when the following conditions are met: your parents have 
provided or continue to provide special goods to you, they need some special goods 
from you, and you can provide those special goods.  
The special goods theory, Keller argues, can avoid the main difficulties of the 
theories discussed above. First, this theory can avoid the problems of the debt theory, 
since, according to this theory, filial duties are not discharged once and for all because 
what matters for filial piety is not whether the ‘debt’ is paid back but whether the three 
conditions mentioned above are met. Moreover, you do not have to worry that there 
are goods that we would almost never be able to return to your parents. For example, 
on this theory, even though you can neither give birth to your parents nor contribute 
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to the formation of their identity in a comparable way, what you are required to do for 
your parents is not to give them back what they gave to you, but to give them the 
goods you are uniquely placed to give them. Thus, instead of, say, trying to educate or 
nurture your parents as they did to you, you are required, say, to contact and visit 
them frequently—given that they want it—and make them proud to have you as their 
child.  
The special goods theory can also avoid the difficulty of the gratitude theory. 
For example, whether your parents raised you effortlessly or laboriously does not 
directly influence the content of what you are required to do to your parents. Even if 
your parents raised you effortlessly with great enjoyment, they would deserve to 
receive special goods from you insofar as they have provided (or keep providing) 
special goods to you as parents. The nurture, support, and love your parents have 
provided you do not become less of goods just because it was relatively easy and 
enjoyable for them to give those goods to you.  
Moreover, unlike the friendship theory, the special goods theory can explain 
why we cannot avoid the requirement of filial piety simply by choosing to leave the 
parent-child relationship. This is because the theory claims that you ought to provide 
them special goods, insofar as you can do so, your parents need them, and they have 
provided special goods to you, and whether these conditions are met is not simply up 
to your choice.  
I find Keller’s special goods theory insightful in pointing out that the goods 
given by one’s intimates are special so that even the same generic goods offered by, 
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say, strangers cannot be comparable to those offered by intimates. Hugs and kisses 
from your parents, for example, cannot be the same kind of good as those from a 
stranger. I also agree that the parent-child relationship is the source of various special 
goods that uniquely contribute to our well-being.  
However, the special goods theory has its own difficulties. The first difficulty 
concerns Keller’s claim that filial duties are “duties to provide the special goods to 
your parents, within the context of the reciprocal relationship that you and your parents 
share” (Keller 2006, 268; emphasis added). As Brynn F. Welch points out, Keller’s 
requirement of the ‘reciprocal relationship’ has some problems (see Welch 2012, 727-9, 
and Welch 2015). If this requirement means only that the parent-child relationship is 
or was mutually beneficial, then it may entail that the current state of the relationship 
is not directly relevant to filial obligation insofar as the parent has provided the 
benefits to the child already. But this would be inconsistent with Keller’s claim he 
made in the context of criticizing the debt theory that “[y]our duties to your parents 
also vary according to the state of your relationship with them” (Keller 2006, 256). If, 
on the other, the requirement demands an on-going parent-child relationship of mutual 
benefit, it may imply that your filial duties cease to exist when your parents become 
unable to maintain the relationship by providing special goods to you. Either 
interpretation seems to have counterintuitive implications.  
Moreover, it is not clearly explicated how the specialness of the special goods 
is supposed to be related to the relationship in question. I agree with Keller that the 
goods exchanged in a healthy parent-child relationship are special in the sense that 
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there hardly is any other kind of source for such goods. However, the way he 
distinguishes special from generic goods seems misleading. In my view, what he calls 
‘special goods’ are special not because they themselves form a distinctive category of 
goods, but because they are exchanged within a special relationship. In other words, the 
special goods are special not because it happens to be such that only the child is in a 
position to provide certain goods that could have been provided by other people; 
rather, they are special because its specialness is based on the intimate relationship 
itself.  
In principle, for example, a sick old lady can receive physical care from 
professional caregivers, not just from her own child. However, even if the treatments 
and materials—which Keller would describe as generic goods—the caregiver and her 
own child provide to the lady by the caregiver and the son are the same, those that are 
provided by her own child is something special to her. That is, the fact that they are 
given by the child makes a difference and renders it hardly replaceable. The sources 
of the specialness are the history of their relationship and the attitude the child has 
when giving the care. In this sense, the medical treatment itself is not special goods 
even if it happens so that the child is the only one who is in a position to provide it to 
her parents. For it could well have been provided by the government if the policy was 
made in that direction.  
  
28 
 
1.3. Conclusion 
 
 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to show the limits of the existing theories of 
filial piety in contemporary Western literature. I have argued that, although the debt, 
gratitude, friendship, and special goods theories have their own strengths, they do not 
address various issues related to filial piety adequately. One common feature shared 
by these theories is that they adopt a duty-centered approach in understanding filial 
piety, where being filial is understood as doing what ‘filial duties’ requires to do. I 
believe this duty-centered approach is at least partly responsible for the inadequacy of 
the theories examined above. In the next chapter, I examine the problems in 
understanding filial piety—solely or mainly—in terms of duty and argue that it is 
better understood in terms of virtue.  
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Chapter 2. Duty, Virtue, and Filial Love 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Many, if not most, of contemporary Western philosophers who worked on 
filial piety have attempted to understand it in terms of duties (or obligations or 
responsibilities).11 That is, their attempts have focused on explicating the nature and 
ground of filial duties we have in relation to our parents. On the other hand, some 
inner attitudes, such as love for one’s parents (henceforth, ‘filial love’), are an 
important part of being a filial child. It seems hard to do justice to the normative 
significance of such inner attitudes if we understand them as an object of duty.  
The aim of this chapter is to argue that the normative significance of the inner 
aspects of filial piety—in particular, filial love—is better captured when we 
understand it as a part of the virtue of filial piety rather than as an object of duty. First, 
I examine the valuable aspects of filial love, comparing it with other altruistic emotions. 
Next, I argue that the idea of a duty to love one’s loving parents faces serious 
difficulties in making sense of the normative significance of filial love. Finally, I show 
why the virtue-ethical approach to filial love, which views filial love as a constitutive 
part of filial piety understood as a virtue, can do justice to the normative significance 
while avoiding the difficulties.  
                                           
11 See, for example, Blustein (1985), Sommers (1986), Jecker (1989), English (1992), Dixon (1995), 
Archard (1996), Keller (2006), Welch (2012), and Wee (2014). 
30 
 
2.2. The Value of Filial Love 
 
There is little doubt in the claim that a certain kind of outer behaviors—e.g., 
taking care of one’s parents when they are old and infirm, visiting them frequently, 
and offering financial support if necessary—are important components filial piety. 
However, having appropriate inner attitudes (i.e., emotional and motivational states) 
toward one’s parents also seem to be an important component of filial piety. Although 
people may disagree over the specific contents of appropriate filial inner attitudes, I 
believe it can be largely agreed that filial piety involves more than outer behaviors.12 
We can find an emphasis on the importance of appropriate inner attitudes in 
filial piety in Confucius’s famous passage in the Analects 2.7:  
 
Ziyou asked about filial piety. The Master said, “Nowadays ‘filial’ means 
simply being able to provide one’s parents with nourishment. But even dogs 
and horses are provided with nourishment. If you are not respectful (reverent; 
jing; 敬), wherein lies the difference?” (Confucius 2003; emphasis added)13 
 
As Edward Slingerland interprets, the “focus here is upon the importance of 
internal involvement when it comes to virtuous behavior, ‘respect’ (jing) encompassing 
both a manner of behaving and an emotional attitude” (Confucius 2003, 10; emphasis 
added). Consider a person who regularly gives a great deal of money to her parents 
from a mere sense of duty but has neither gratitude nor love for them. We may 
                                           
12 For an interesting recent work on the importance of the inner life, independently considered, 
in evaluating a person’s character, see Bommarito (2017). 
13 In citing Confucius’s Analects, I used Slingerland’s translation as the base and made some 
modifications of my own.  
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legitimately say that this person is defective as a filial child in at least some aspect.  
It seems reasonable to think that being filial constitutively involves having 
appropriate inner attitudes as well as appropriate outer behaviors. Then what would 
be the candidate for such filial inner attitudes? P. J. Ivanhoe claims that the true basis 
of filial piety is “the sense of gratitude, reverence, and love that children naturally feel 
when they are nurtured, supported, and cared for by people who do so out of loving 
concern for the child’s well-being” (Ivanhoe 2007, 299; emphasis added). The intuition 
that love for one’s parents is required for being filial is supported by the proponents 
of the friendship theory (see, e.g., English 1992, Dixon 1995). That gratitude is an 
important part of filial piety is the intuition that the proponents of the gratitude theory 
endeavored to capture (see, e.g., Blustein 1985 part II, ch. 3, Sommers 1986, Jecker 1989, 
Wicclair 1990, and McConnell 1993, esp. Ch. VII). I assume that filial inner attitudes 
include at least love and gratitude for one’s parents, broadly construed.  
 Love for one’s parents, or ‘filial’ love, is valuable in several different senses. 
Let us examine its multi-layered value. In analyzing filial love, I take inspiration from 
Lawrence Blum’s view on the intrinsic value of altruistic emotions (Blum 1980, Ch. 7). 
After clarifying what I mean by filial love, I elaborate on Blum’s distinctions to better 
understand the different aspects of the value of altruistic emotions. I then argue that 
we need to distinguish two different senses of ‘intrinsic value’ of altruistic emotions 
according to whether the given emotion is expressed or unexpressed to the recipient. 
Next, I examine the intrinsic value of filial love when it is sufficiently expressed to 
one’s parents. I also explore the distinctive value of a particularized altruistic emotion 
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such as filial love, as opposed to general altruistic emotions such as human sympathy 
and compassion. Then I examine the sense in which filial love as a particularized 
altruistic emotion has value even when it neither motivates beneficent actions nor is 
expressed to its recipients, namely, the parents.  
Blum analyzes the value of various altruistic emotions including both general 
human sympathy and compassion and more particularized ones such as love and 
friendship. Among different kinds of altruistic emotion, I focus on the distinctive value 
of the special emotions among intimates—filial love in particular—as opposed to the 
value of general altruistic emotions such as human sympathy and compassion. I 
roughly understand filial love as involving care and concern for the well-being of one’s 
parents for their own sake, as well as a range of relevant emotional states (e.g., warmth 
and favorable affection for them or joy with their weal and sadness with their woe). It 
is important to note that filial love is a version of altruistic emotion directed at 
particular individuals, namely, one’s parents, not at people in general. Love of this kind 
involves a special sort of care and concern for those we love that we do not have for 
strangers or mere acquaintances.  
With the given understanding of filial love at hand, let me examine the 
different aspects of its value. First of all, filial love has conative value in the sense that 
it disposes or motivates a person to engage in behavioral acts of helping and benefiting 
her parents. For example, other things being equal, a person who loves her parents is 
more likely to offer them financial and material support than one who does not. Insofar 
as such beneficent actions for one’s parents are morally valuable, filial love, which 
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involves the care and concern for the parents’ well-being for their own sake, has a 
value as a stable source of motivation to perform those actions. Given that care and 
concern for the parents’ interests, it is also likely to perform such filial actions in the 
future as well.  
This conative value, however, does not capture the distinctive value of filial 
love. This is because some other motivational states, such as a sense of duty, can be 
equally stable and effective in giving rise to beneficent actions for one’s parents. 
Consider the act of offering sufficient amount of financial support to one’s sick parents 
to cover their medical expenses. Other things being equal, the external good of such 
financial support for the parents remains the same whether it is offered from a sense 
of duty or from love for the parents. That is, the parents will be financially benefited 
by their child to the same degree regardless of which motivation underlies the 
beneficent action.  
The value of filial love—just as that of altruistic emotions in general—goes 
beyond its conative value of motivating beneficent actions to one’s parents. As Blum 
aptly points out, “the emotion itself is often part of what makes the act the morally 
right or appropriate one in a given situation” (Blum 1980, 142). He emphasizes that the 
role of altruistic emotions goes beyond causing morally valuable actions:  
 
the motive of the action cannot be separated from the action itself, when one 
is considering the act as the morally appropriate act of beneficence which it 
is….For the beneficence which is appropriate to the situation will require 
more than an overt act, externally described; it will also require certain 
emotions accompanying the act, or, rather, emotions as integral parts of the 
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action as a whole. (Blum 1980, 143; emphasis added)14 
 
Blum’s point is that, at least in some cases, the same outer behavior can convey greater 
good to the recipient when it is performed from a particular kind of emotion and 
expressive of that emotion because the emotion itself is part of the good which the 
actions brings about to her.  
When it comes to an intimate relationship like a parent-child relationship, the 
role of appropriate emotion for each other is particularly important. Consider 
someone’s caring behaviors toward her parents such as visiting them on a regular basis. 
A visit from a sense of duty cannot provide the good that a visit from filial love can 
provide. In this sense, a person is not giving the ‘full package’ of the good to her 
parents if she acts to benefit them while lacking appropriate emotions.  
Harry Frankfurt makes an insightful point that clarifies the difference between 
one who acts out of duty and one who acts out of love: 
 
This is part of what essentially constitutes loving: namely, a lover takes the fact 
that an action would be helpful to his beloved as being ipso facto a reason for 
performing the action….His taking it as a reason is a constitutive aspect of his 
loving: to love a person is essentially (in part) to take the fact that a certain action 
                                           
14 Walter E. Schaller makes a similar point: “[W]hat is required in such circumstances is not 
some external good or service—which could be supplied by persons acting from duty, or even 
from self-interest—but sympathy itself (or love, compassion, or some other altruistic emotion)” 
(Schaller 1990, 200). He adds, “To speak of the motive as distinct from the action is in these 
cases misleading, for the action confers a good only because it is done from that motive. If 
carried out from, say, the motive of duty, the good to the recipient would be far less” (Schaller 
1990, 206). See also Nancy Sherman’s remark: “the emotional tone of conduct morally matters. 
So, for example, we value the emotional dimensions of altruism—for example, expressions of 
sorrow and joy in others' lives, assistance conveyed to others in a way that is warm and caring—
not simply as optional trim, but as partial constituents of the altruistic acts themselves” (Sherman 
1999, 297; emphasis added) 
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would be helpful to that person as a reason for performing it. (Frankfurt 1998, 9; 
emphasis in the original) 
 
This is the feature, according to him, that distinguishes a loving person from a merely 
dutiful person. Chung, a loving daughter, would be motivated to help her father Hak 
whenever he needs, just because he needs it. In contrast, Gil, a (merely) dutiful child, 
the fact that an action would be helpful to his mother would count as a reason for him 
to perform the action because he considers himself as having a duty to help her (see 
Frankfurt 1998, 8-9).  
It seems reasonable to say that, other things being equal, a loving child is more 
filial—i.e., better as a child—than a (merely) dutiful one. When it comes to Gil the 
dutiful child, the fact that helping his mother in need is his duty serves partly as a 
reason that accounts for his readiness to respond to her need by attempting to alleviate 
it. In contrast, Chung the loving child’s readiness to try to alleviate her father in need 
is accounted for by her love for him, not by any further mediating reason. Benefiting 
and helping our parents because they are duties would be at best a second-best 
motivating reason.  
Blum takes a step further to claim that “altruistic emotions can be of value to—
can convey good to—their recipient even when they do not lead to any act towards that 
person” (Blum 1980, 146; emphasis added). To illustrate his point, he gives an example 
of Joan the astronaut. (Blum 1980, 146-149). One day, Joan finds a problem with her 
life support system and she reports it to the control headquarters. As her friends 
Manny and Dave learn about the situation, they both explore every possible way to 
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save her life. But they are finally convinced that there is no way to save her. While 
there is no difference in their outer behaviors, they show different emotional responses. 
Manny acts from a sense of duty, and when he finds that it is impossible to save her, 
he “feels that he has done what he could and so has lived up to his obligation to his 
friend” and “turns his energies and attention to other matters” (Blum 1980, 146). In 
contrast, Dave has deep care and concern for Joan, and he “continues to be taken up 
with thoughts and feelings for Joan” (Blum 1980, 147), even when he reaches the 
conclusion that there is nothing he can do to save her. Blum’s point in this example is 
that, although both performed the same behavioral acts, Dave’s response to the 
situation has more value because it “involves a certain good to Joan which Manny does 
not, namely the good of the emotions of care and concern from a friend” (Blum 1980, 
147). 
Blum seems to successfully distinguish the value of altruistic emotions from 
their conative value by showing how it can be valuable even when they fail to lead to 
any beneficent actions. But note that Blum calls the moral value of altruistic emotions 
considered independently of their conative value their ‘intrinsic’ value (Blum 1980, 
148), even if it seems to rely on the good effect of the given emotion to the recipient when 
he appeals to the good that will be conveyed to the target of the emotion. In his example, 
the value of Dave’s emotional response still seems to rely on the good effects it brings 
about to Joan at least to some extent. To see this point, note that Blum adds the 
assumption that “Joan, in her last hour, is able to think about some of her friends, and 
that because Manny’s and Dave’s reactions in the situation are so characteristic of them, 
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Joan believes, even knows, that they are reacting in the way they in fact are” (Blum 1980, 
147; emphasis added).  
Here we can see that Blum’s argument relies on the fact that Joan somehow 
“believes, even knows” that Dave has such care and concern for her. I think we can 
reasonably admit the fact that it is “a great benefit just to know that you are loved and 
that you matter to someone in this way” (Richards 2010, 232). For example, Joan would 
have felt warmth or a sense of satisfaction thanks to his care and concern that she felt. 
However, suppose that Joan did not know that Dave has such care and concern for her. 
Would his emotional response still have the ‘intrinsic’ value that Blum is discussing 
here? To explain the intrinsic value—or value in itself—of such care and concern in a 
strict sense, it should be shown how this altruistic emotion would still be valuable even 
when it fails to be expressed or conveyed to Joan, thereby failing to bring about good 
effect in Joan’s heart. Labeling such value as ‘intrinsic value’ may hide another 
important value of altruistic emotion that is valuable independently of its effect on its 
intentional object. Thus, we need to distinguish the value of an altruistic emotion when 
it is expressed or conveyed to the recipient and its value when it is not.15 
With the distinction between the value of expressed emotions and that of 
                                           
15 Here I’m not dealing with the issue whether any well-pretended love can do the trick and 
give the good to the recipient that genuine love would give. First, I believe it is extremely hard, 
if not impossible, to consistently give the impression of love over a long period of time: 
“Genuine love cannot be feigned over the long haul of a parent-child relationship; neither can 
the emotional tone of love be manufactured in the absence of love” (Solheim 1999, 7); “The 
language of facial expression, body language, tone of voice, availability, and comfort with 
physical contact is communication enough for even the youngest of children to read emotions” 
(Sherman 1999, 299). Second, what is at issue here is not the actual effect but what emotional 
attitude is expected or hoped for by the recipient. Third, when it comes to the unexpressed 
intrinsic value, the actual effect on the recipient is not considered anyway.  
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unexpressed emotions, we can now examine in more detail the value of filial love when 
it is expressed to one’s parents. First, we can say that filial love is valuable even when 
it fails to motivate or be part of an action that benefits the parents, insofar as the 
genuine loving emotion is somehow expressed or conveyed to them. Many (good) 
parents would be satisfied with their child’s attitude even if she is not in a position to 
actually benefit them insofar as her attitude toward them expresses genuine filial love. 
For example, suppose that we fail to send money to our parents or visit them due to 
some circumstantial reasons—e.g., our own financial difficulty or an emergency. Even 
in such a case, a phone call to explain the situation and say “I love you” may suffice to 
communicate our loving emotion toward them. Parents would not feel that their child 
does not love them or feel grateful to them insofar as the loving emotion is successfully 
expressed to the parents. When properly expressed, some emotional attitudes that do 
not lead to any beneficent act towards that person can deliver distinctive goods to them 
without external goods such as money. 
Moreover, filial love as a particularized altruistic emotion can elevate the 
parent’s sense of self-worth when it is successfully expressed. As Blum points out, “it is 
a good to us simply that someone else care about our welfare, be sympathetic to us, 
have compassion for us when we are suffering. Concern from another is an affirmation 
that one’s well-being matters to that person, and that therefore one has some kind of 
importance to him” (Blum 1980, 150). The sense that I matter to someone else elevates 
my sense of self-worth. The value of intimate feeling such as filial love goes beyond 
this good of general altruistic emotion. Special care and concern directed at particular 
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individuals give a special sense of ‘mattering’ that goes beyond the sense that one is 
valuable as a member of humanity. It gives the sense that one is of special importance 
at least to some particular individuals. Other things being equal, a person who is loved 
by someone—e.g., family members, friends, or lovers—in this way would a higher 
sense of self-worth than a person who is not. In this sense, the parents would have an 
elevated sense of self-worth by knowing their child’s concern and care for them.16  
Filial love, when properly expressed, can also contribute to the alleviation of 
the parents’ loneliness, which can be best achieved within a loving relationship. 
Generally speaking, the fact that someone cares about me and is concerned about my 
weal and woe would alleviate my loneliness to some extent. For example, if a saint is 
in my neighborhood and she will also care about me on top of all other people, that 
would be better than the case in which no one really cares about me at all. However, 
this kind of human sympathy and compassion is different from care and concern from 
a special kind of love. As Barbara P. Solheim points out, “Intimacy in relationships 
tends to hold loneliness and isolation at bay” (Solheim 1999, 3), and love from one’s 
child is an important source of intimacy. It is when we realize that someone we love 
regards us as someone special and loves us that our loneliness is alleviated to the 
greatest degree. This good does not follow from its conative value as a stable 
disposition to help and benefit one’s parents when they are in need. The parents’ 
loneliness would not be alleviated that much, if at all, even if they know that a person 
                                           
16 There can be a debate about whether love is appreciation of the existing value of the beloved 
or a bestowal of value to her. But my point does not depend on this issue. This is because, either 
way, the beloved would have the sense of ‘special’ mattering through someone else’s love for 
her, either by recognizing one’s existing value or by receiving the value by the lover. 
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dispatched form an insurance company will reliably help and benefit them from a 
sense of obligation whenever they are in need. Unless that person has any personal 
care or concern for them, they wouldn’t feel less lonely although they may feel more 
secure.  
If an altruistic emotion like filial love can have value even if it fails to be 
expressed or conveyed to the recipient, what kind of value would that be? I would like 
to argue that such care and concern for other people is intrinsically valuable as part of 
a good character, or virtue. That is, independently of its role of motivating beneficent 
actions and of its role of giving rise to positive feelings in the recipient’s heart when 
expressed properly, love for someone else has value as a constituent of the agent’s 
virtuous character. 
Having appropriate emotions is an important part of being virtuous and 
loving one’s parents—at least insofar as they are loving parents—seems to be an 
appropriate emotion to have as a filial child. Let us examine how filial love instantiates 
virtuousness even when it cannot be expressed. First, insofar as “it is morally good to 
be concerned with the good of others” (Blum 1980, 164), filial love is morally valuable 
as a particularized version of an altruistic emotion since parents are ‘others,’ strictly 
speaking, and not literally identified with oneself. If, as Nicolas Bommarito points out, 
emotions “are virtuous or vicious when they manifest morally important cares or 
concerns (or a lack of such concerns)” (Bommarito 2017, 91), and if care and concern 
for one’s parents are morally important, then it would be plausible to say that filial 
love is virtuous.  
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Both Blum and Bommarito find the intrinsic value of one’s special emotional 
attitude such as filial love in their care and concern for other people, that is, its being 
altruistic.17 However, I believe there is a distinctive moral value in the special care and 
concern one has to one’s intimate, which even the most genuine altruistic emotion for 
a human being as such cannot generate. Although some might claim that special love 
is not as morally admirable as a general altruistic emotion, the former has a special 
value that constitutes a good human life, the value that differs from the value of the 
latter. 
My point is that such a special emotional attitude constitutes a valuable 
intimate relationship, the value of which is hard to be found elsewhere. Aristotle says 
that friendship is “most necessary for our life” and that “no one would choose to live 
without friends even if he had all the other goods” (Aristotle 1999, 1155a4-6).18 If this 
is right, we can say that the special emotional attitude has some value that is not 
replaceable even by the impartial general altruistic emotions. Visiting one’s friend in 
the hospital has a special significance because it is done out of special care and concern 
as a friend, rather than out of general human sympathy and compassion. A saint’s visit 
out of such general sympathy and compassion, although meaningful in its own right, 
would not have a special significance that a friend’s visit has.  
Note that I’m not saying that such a special emotional attitude as filial love is 
                                           
17 Aaron Ben-Ze’ev also makes a similar point: “In the moral context, the personal emotional 
perspective addresses, among other things, the concern for the well-being of others.” (Ben-
Ze'ev 2001, 257) 
18 By ‘friendship,’ Aristotle means to cover a wide range of intimate relationship including 
parent-child relationship. 
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more valuable than general altruistic emotion. At least in some cases, helping someone 
in need out of general human sympathy and compassion may have more value than 
helping one’s beloved because one loves her. It might be more admirable in the sense 
that it is a sign of being generally virtuous to help a person even if she does not share 
any personal relationship to oneself. My claim is just that it may not always be morally 
better for someone to help someone purely out of human sympathy and compassion 
than to help someone out of love and friendship. 
 
2.3. Filial Love and Duty 
 
I have shown various aspects of value that filial love has. If I am right, filial 
love has moral value and is an important part of filial piety. As Keller says, a filial child 
would “do things for the parent willingly, out of love, not out of a motive of duty” 
(Keller 2006, 255). Being filial involves not just performing filial actions motivated by 
such ‘filial’ emotional attitude as love, but also having those emotions toward the 
parents considered independently of their motivational role. Other things being equal, 
a person who performs filial actions motivated by love for her parents would be more 
filial—that is, better as their child in some sense—than one who does the same from a 
sense of duty, and a person who have filial love would be more filial than one who 
lacks it.  
Love for one’s parents has special normative significance at least insofar as the 
parents have loved one and one has accepted and encouraged it in some sense. Of 
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course, if the parents have been consistently unloving—e.g., abusive, cruel, or 
indifferent—it seems to generate a good excuse for the child not to love them, no 
matter how great a good filial love is for the parents.19 However, if one has received 
and accepted the parents’ love, one seems to have an extra normative reason to love 
them. In a similar vein, P. J. Ivanhoe also says, that the “only appropriate response [to 
the parents’ love] is to keep in mind the nature of their love and, in the warmth of this 
light, to cultivate reciprocal—yet distinctive—feelings for them” (Ivanhoe 2007, 304-
305). If so, an adequate theory of filial piety needs to make sense of this normative 
significance of filial love. That is, a good theory should offer the normative ground of 
loving one’s (loving) parents to explain why it is morally important for filial piety to 
have filial love and to be motivated by such love in acting for them.  
 To do justice to the moral importance of filial love, some philosophers make 
an appeal to the idea of duty to love. They claim that a child loved by her parents and 
accepted it has a duty to love them. They list this duty among the filial duties. Norvin 
Richards has a view along this line. According to him, if we have “accepted a place in 
our parents’ affections and encouraged them to continue to love us, when we were 
young and under their care,” then we have a duty “to give our parents a roughly 
similar place in our own affections” (Richards 2010, 240). If you have met this condition, 
he says, then “you do owe some degree of affection in return, partly because to have a 
central place that you welcome in the affections of another person is so great a good” 
                                           
19 For more discussion on this point, see Ivanhoe (2007): “Parents who are consistently and 
uniformly bad do not perform the kinds of acts and manifest the love that are the true basis of 
filial piety, and so their children are under no obligation to cultivate reciprocal feelings and 
undertake the care of such parents” (Ivanhoe 2007, 310). 
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(Richards 2010, 236). Simon Keller also seems to support the idea of duty to love when 
he explains how the duty to be loyal to one’s parents involves duties of feeling, 
including a special concern for them (Keller 2007, Ch. 6). S. Matthew Liao is another 
philosopher who argues in favor of the idea of duty to love in his recent works (Liao 
2006, 2015, Ch. 4).20 I will argue that there are serious difficulties in the idea of duty to 
love one’s parents, as well as in the general idea of duty to love.  
 One of the common objections to the idea of duty to love—or the general idea 
of duty to feel a certain kind of emotion—is the commandability objection. According to 
this objection, loving someone cannot be a duty because having emotions like love 
toward a particular person is not sufficiently controllable—i.e., not something we can 
bring about at will—and therefore not commandable. It seems largely agreed that love 
involves feelings that are not under our voluntary control at the given moment and 
that it may also be beyond our power to cultivate over time. The point is that what is 
not sufficiently controllable cannot be a duty at least insofar as the familiar principle 
of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ holds.21 Barbara Solheim, for example, offers a version of the 
commandability objection as follows:  
 
Our ability to love (or to generate love) involves numerous variables, from our 
temperaments and personalities, to the fund of role models and background 
experiences we have (or lack), to our ability (or inability) to be fully attuned to 
others. Although it is true that over time, some who have difficulty loving can 
learn to love, doing so still involves variables that are to some extent beyond our 
control. Because of this, love cannot be required as a duty. (Solheim 1999, 14; 
                                           
20 Since Ch. 4 of Liao (2015) is an updated version of Liao (2006), I will focus on the former in 
the current discussion.  
21 Here I assume, following Liao, that the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle holds. For recent 
attempts to argue against this principle, see Henne et al. (2016) and Henne et al. (2018), for 
example.  
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emphasis added)22 
 
If she is right, it seems to pose a serious challenge on the idea of duty to love.  
There is an additional difficulty related to controllability that is specific to the 
idea of duty to love one’s parents. The difficulty is that whether and to what extent a 
person can love her parents largely depend on how they treated and educated her 
while raising her. That is, it is to a large degree the parents’ responsibility to raise their 
child as someone who can love other people with a genuine heart. Richards even says 
that “it is a parent's obligation to enable his or her child to see that love is to be 
reciprocated” (Richards 2010, 240). When the parents fail to raise their child properly, 
she may become a person who is skeptical about the value of love or lacking emotional 
resources necessary for loving and caring for someone else. If so, she may grow up to 
be a person who cannot love another person, including her own parents, through no 
fault of her own.  
It may be responded that only the parents who do not love their child fail to 
enable their child love other people and that this is not a problem for the idea of duty 
to love one’s parents since a child does not have a duty to love such unloving parents. 
Richards may respond along this line since he claims that whether you have a duty to 
love your parents “turns…on how much they loved you: on how central a place you 
had in their affections….[Filial duties] require us to give our parents a roughly similar 
place in our own affections.” (Richards 2010, 234). However, even if we narrow down 
                                           
22 In a similar vein, Kant also famously says, “[l]ove is a matter of sensation, not of willing; and 
I cannot love because I would, still less because I should (being obligated to love). Hence a duty 
to love is nonexistent” (Kant 1995, 60–61, Sec. 401–402). 
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the scope of the duty to love to loving parents, the worry remains. For example, even 
loving parents may spoil their child so that she grows up as an egoistic person who is 
incapable of loving and caring about someone other than oneself. Therefore, the fact 
that the parents’ way of upbringing has a major impact on the child’s ability to love 
gives us an additional reason to believe that loving is not sufficiently controllable to 
be a duty. 
 Many philosophers, however, hold that we can have control of emotions like 
love at least to a reasonable degree (e.g., Solomon 1973, Sommers 1986, Sherman 1999, 
Keller 2007 Ch. 6, Richards 2010, Ch. 11, Liao 2015, Ch. 4). Although they admit that 
we do not have direct control over our feelings and emotions or the ability to have 
certain feelings of the moment at will, they still reject that we are absolutely passive in 
terms of our emotions and have no control over what we feel. They argue that we can 
have sufficient control over our emotions like love because our efforts can affect our 
emotions over time. We can, according to them, at least indirectly contribute to how 
we feel through our long-term efforts. For this reason, Nancy Sherman argues that we 
have some sort of “emotional agency” in this sense: “We nurture our capacity for 
intimate love in the context of ongoing relationships and a will to love in certain ways; 
we often know how to nip unjustified anger in the bud; we can catch overweening 
pride and curb it” (Sherman 1999, 294).  
Based on this assumption, Liao argues that the affective aspect of love is 
sufficiently controllable, and thus commandable (Liao 2015, 101-113). He suggests 
various ways in which we can intentionally bring about or promote the emotional 
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aspect of love. According to him, there are at least three ways to bring about particular 
emotions: giving ourselves reasons to have those emotions, reflecting on the reasons 
why we tend to have particular emotions in particular circumstances, or deliberately 
placing ourselves in such circumstances. Suppose that, as Liao argues, parents have a 
duty to love their children.23 Then, for example, we may bring about our love for our 
children by giving ourselves a reason to love them, say, that “children need this 
emotional aspect of love in order to develop certain fundamental capacities necessary 
to pursue the basic activities”; we may reflect on the fact that “our antipathy toward 
the child is due to the fact that the child was unplanned and that the child was born at 
a time when we already had too many children”; or we may try to “have enough sleep 
each night so that we would be more loving toward the child” (Liao 2015, 111). In a 
similar vein, Keller presents examples of how we can use our agency to develop a 
particular feeling about our parents:  
 
If I have not spoken to my parents for a long time, or if we have been irritating 
each other or disagreeing about something, then my deciding to call, make 
an effort to be friendly, or organize an enjoyable day out together can not only 
cheer them up, but remind me of the things I love about them and 
reinvigorate my feelings of filial loyalty. By deciding not to make the effort to 
call, or deciding to be surly or let the disagreement fester, I can increase the 
chances that we will become further distanced from each other, and that my 
feelings of love and loyalty will begin to fade. (Keller 2007, 143) 
 
Given the various possible ways to affect our emotional aspect of love, it seems 
                                           
23 In his works, Liao focuses on parents’ duty to love their children rather than children’s duty 
to love their parents. However, since undermining the general idea of duty to love can lend 
support to my argument against duty to love one’s parents, I will discuss his view as well when 
relevant.  
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reasonable to acknowledge that our love is controllable at least in some sense. The 
remaining question to ask is whether love is controllable in the right way to ground 
the alleged duty to love. Solheim denies that it is: “Since our efforts to cultivate an 
emotion do not guarantee our success, to say that we have a responsibility to try to 
cultivate an emotion is plausible, but to say that we have a responsibility to succeed is 
not” (Solheim 1999, 12). In response, Liao first points out that “it is not necessary that 
in order to have a duty to V, V must be something one can bring about with guaranteed 
success, supposing that certain reasonable background conditions obtain” (Liao 2015, 
115). For example, he says, while it seems reasonable to say that professional chefs 
have a duty to make good dishes, no chef can guarantee that their dishes will be good, 
although they are normally good. Similarly, he argues, a duty to love can exist even if 
the efforts to bring about emotional aspects of love do not promise guaranteed success.  
I agree that guaranteed success in bringing about V is not necessary for there 
to be a duty V. However, there is a problem in the attempt to argue in favor of a duty 
to love based on the possibility of raising the likelihood of loving someone. One serious 
problem is that a duty to V is being conflated with a duty to cultivate the ability 
necessary to V. Strictly speaking, the actions aimed at producing an occurrent loving 
emotion or cultivating a disposition of loving someone are not themselves part of 
loving. Rather, the fact that one has to put so much efforts to love that person may be 
a sign that one does not love her, at least not yet. Loving is the end that those effortful 
actions aim at.  
Compare belief. Suppose that there is a duty to believe X. Just like the case of 
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love, since we cannot simply decide to believe something at a given moment, this duty 
cannot be a duty to believe something at a particular moment. On the other hand, we 
can choose a course of actions in ways that affect our beliefs, we may have a duty to 
make choices in ways that are likely to form the belief that the duty requires. For 
example, one can put oneself into a situation under which she is more likely to form 
the required belief and try to expose herself more openly to the evidence in favor of 
that belief.24 If so, if there is such a thing as a duty to believe X, it should mean a duty 
to do things that tend to raise the likelihood of believing it, rather than the duty to 
believe it, period. Putting efforts to believe X, is not part of believing X. Thus, if there 
is a duty to believe X unless one actually forms this belief, one entirely fails to fulfill 
this duty no matter how hard she tried to believe it. Similarly, as we cannot simply 
decide to love our parents, what one can do is just to try to love them, that is, doing 
things that tend to raise the likelihood of loving them—such as visiting and contacting 
them more frequently, reminding herself of good memories they shared, focusing on 
positive qualities of one’s parents, and so on.  
The point is that loving is not an activity that consists of putting one’s efforts 
to generate the emotional state and succeeding in it. It seems to me that the proponents 
of duty to love, including Liao, conflate the alleged duty to love with a duty to produce 
the disposition to feel loving emotion. Loving begins when the efforts to produce loving 
emotion ends. Once such an emotional disposition is formed, then what the subject 
                                           
24 Keller discusses some strategies to manage our beliefs in relation to the duties of beliefs that 
may spring from the norms of friendship (Keller 2007, Ch. 2). 
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does and feels afterward would begin to constitute her loving for the first time. In other 
words, it is only after the success of these efforts to love that loving begins.  Those 
efforts are not part of fulfilling the alleged duty to love at all, regardless of whether 
they succeed in bringing about the targeted emotion. Rather, they are fulfilling the 
duty to produce the disposition to feel love.  
I acknowledge that, in reality, most people’s love has its ups and downs and 
thus it is not so mechanical that first you make the effort and then you love. At least 
sometimes, you love, but you are also making the effort to keep yourself in the position 
to love in the face of changing circumstances and changes in people. Still, the efforts 
to keep loving someone, just like the efforts to cultivate the love for the given person, 
are not themselves part of loving, although they might be important to protect the 
loving relationship.  
 
2.4. Filial Love and the Virtue of Filial Piety 
 
I have argued that the idea of duty to love one’s parents has serious problems. 
In this section, I would like to argue that a virtue-ethical approach to filial love can 
give us a theoretical advantage. I agree with P. J. Ivanhoe that “[s]eeing that what is 
called for is a certain critically informed attitude or state of character shows why filial 
piety is best thought of as a virtue” (Ivanhoe 2007, 305; emphasis added). Virtue involves 
having the right kind of feelings, not just the right kind of actions. A virtuous person 
acts motivated by appropriate inner states rather than acting out of a sense of duty all 
51 
 
the time. From a virtue-ethical perspective, feeling appropriate emotions partly 
constitutes living a good life as a human being, as performing appropriate actions does. 
As virtue ethics advises us to live a good life, feeling and cultivating the disposition to 
feel appropriate emotions have normative significance. Thus, I would like to suggest 
that filial love can be best understood when it is viewed as part of virtue, in particular, 
filial piety.  
I suggest that we understand filial love as partly constitutive of filial piety as 
a virtue. If so, a person who lacks love for her parents for their own sake or other 
constitutive emotional or motivational inner attitudes would lack full virtue of filial 
piety. Other things being equal, if one child loves her parents while the other doesn’t, 
we can say the former is more filial—or more virtuous as a child—than the latter at 
least in that regard. There are two aspects of filial love that need to be explained. On 
the one hand, although there are some ways to raise the probability of producing filial 
love, feeling appropriate emotional states seems to be beyond our direct control. On 
the other, at least insofar as our parents have loved and cared about us, loving them 
does not seem to be just morally optional. That is, it seems that a person who lacks 
filial love for one’s parents deserve at least some sort of negative moral evaluation or 
‘moral criticism.’ As Lawrence Blum says, “what has moral significance goes far 
beyond what can be made an object of duty or obligation” (Blum 1980, 159).25  
                                           
25 Blum further emphasizes the moral importance of emotional and motivational aspects of life: 
“The good which is brought about by altruistic emotion is morally desirable, and sometimes 
even morally appropriate, but it is not therefore morally obligatory…. [T]he moral merit of 
friendship could not be appreciated within moral framework in which the notion of the morally 
obligatory retains a certain place…. [T]he acts stemming from altruistic emotion are not 
generally, and are not regarded by the agent to be, morally binding on him…. [M]oral 
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I believe it should be explained why a person who fails to love her loving 
parents deserves some negative moral evaluation. Let me begin by introducing two 
different kinds of moral evaluation: the evaluation of blameworthiness (or 
praiseworthiness) and that of viciousness (or virtuousness). While one may be 
blameworthy only for something that is under her voluntary control at least to a 
reasonable extent, one can be criticized as being vicious or not being virtuous even for 
what is not under her voluntary control. 26  Based on this distinction, Nicolas 
Bommarito shows how emotions can be subject to the latter kind of moral evaluation:  
 
Even if we cannot be blameworthy for involuntary states, such states can still 
make one a morally worse person. Even if someone with involuntary racist 
emotions is not blameworthy for those emotions, they still reflect poorly on his 
moral character. He would, after all, be a better person if he did not have those 
emotions. Learning that someone feels racial contempt, greed, or envy leads 
us to revise our assessment of their moral character even if we know that they 
can’t help but have such feelings…. Blame and viciousness are distinct moral 
evaluations. If nature has made it so that I cannot help but have sexist 
attitudes, nature has thereby made me vicious. If I truly have no control over 
my attitudes, I may not be responsible for such attitudes. But that is a separate 
question; in any case, such attitudes are a blemish on my moral character, and 
I would be a better person without them. (Bommarito 2017, 90; emphasis 
original)27 
                                           
philosophy needs to be concerned with more than overt actions. It must concern itself with our 
whole human response to situations and to other persons’ weal and woe, which includes an 
emotional dimension.” (Blum 1980, 159-160) 
26 There seems to be a general agreement on that blameworthiness presupposes voluntariness. 
For example, Lawrence Blum holds that “To say that someone is to blame for something, seems 
to [Blum] to imply that he could have brought it about through his will that he did otherwise” 
(Blum 1980, 189). For a possible exception, see, for example, Watson (1996), where Gary Watson 
argues that what he calls aretaic blame consists of evaluation of the agent’s “excellences and 
faults – or virtues and vices – as manifested in thought and action” (Watson 1996, 231). 
However, it may be just a matter of verbal difference, since what he calls aretaic blame seems to 
roughly correspond to what I call the evaluation of viciousness.  
27 Gregory W. Trianosky makes a similar distinction between two different kinds of negative 
judgments: deontic and aretaic (Trianosky 1986, 28-9). Negative deontic judgments are those 
about the wrongness of the agent’s performing or omitting some particular act. On the other 
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According to this view, a certain kind of emotion or lack thereof can be a 
ground for negative moral evaluation of the agent’s character—i.e., the evaluation of 
viciousness—independently of whether her voluntary actions or omissions are 
responsible for having or lacking such emotions. We can apply this point to filial love. 
If the virtue of filial piety involves loving one’s loving parents, then lack of filial love 
would provide us with the ground to judge that the subject in question is at least less 
than fully virtuous—or incompletely virtuous—as their child. (It would sound too harsh 
to say that a child is vicious for lacking filial love.) Inability to love does not always set 
the given agent free from moral evaluation, insofar as the basis of the inability is her 
own character. That is, if the defect in character is the reason for the inability, then the 
character is subject to moral criticism. 
If so, we can explain why it is morally important to have filial love without 
relying on the idea of duty to love one’s loving parents. Filial love is important because 
it serves as a ground for the moral evaluation of one’s character regardless of whether 
having it is within one’s control. Julia Driver also seems to support this point when 
she says, “a child may have not duty to love a parent (as opposed to a duty to feel 
gratitude), but failure to love under some circumstances can reveal something very 
bad about a person’s character that may still warrant negative evaluation” (Driver 2014, 
9).  
                                           
hand, negative aretaic judgments presuppose a “judgment about the viciousness of some 
standing trait is a judgment about a vice, or a general flaw in the agent's moral character” 
(Trianosky 1986, 29).  
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It is true that emotional states unexpressed in actions are hard to detect. I think 
this is why it is relatively hard to observe a case where someone gives a moral criticism 
to another for merely having such emotions. However, moral criticism on having a 
certain kind of emotions is part of our common experience since we often make such 
criticism on ourselves. For example, if we have an emotion that we judge to reflect 
viciousness, we tend to feel shame or even self-disgust. The issue is not necessarily 
about whether they are likely to lead to any wrong actions. The criticism is made just 
on feeling an inappropriate emotion or lacking an appropriate one. For example, one 
may feel ashamed of not feeling grateful to one who has been supporting her both 
financially and materially, while acting as a grateful person would act, though out of 
a sense of duty. Similarly, one may feel ashamed of not feeling the loving emotion for 
one’s parents.  
When we are ashamed about ourselves for feeling or failing to feel a certain 
kind of emotion, the object of shame is not necessarily what I have done (or failed to 
do) to bring about or eliminate that emotion. It is about the fact that the emotion is felt 
out of one’s character, which speaks badly of one’s character. Whether a person is subject 
to moral criticism for X is not entirely determined by what is within her control or 
whether X is voluntary. It only distinguishes whether one is subject to the evaluation 
of blameworthiness or that of viciousness, both of which are moral evaluations. Rather, 
whether a given person is subject to moral criticism for X is determined by whether X 
reflects her value commitment or not. If a person lacks what a virtuous person would 
have due to some factor that has nothing to do with her value commitment, then she 
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would not be subject to moral criticism. For example, if a person fails to feel grateful 
to her benefactor just because she is an ungrateful person, then she is still to be 
criticized for being vicious, in particular, for being ungrateful. In contrast, if the agent 
fails to feel grateful because of her mental illness related to memory loss, then she 
would not be subject to moral criticism.  
It might be argued that filial love’s role as a ground for a negative moral 
evaluation, in particular, that of viciousness, does not adequately capture its normative 
significance. This sort of evaluation, it might be claimed, is not very different from 
merely aesthetic evaluation in its normative force, given that it loses its connection with 
the agent’s voluntary agency, which seems to be central to anything that has normative 
significance. The claim may be that, although both evaluation of blameworthiness and 
that of viciousness are both value judgments, the latter, like purely aesthetic evaluation, 
does not have sufficient normative implication. For example, the judgment that 
someone is not beautiful is a value judgment but does not necessarily imply that the 
agent ought to do something to make some change about it. Similarly, it might be 
argued, the judgment on lack of filial love that someone is less than fully virtuous as a 
child does not necessarily imply that she ought to do something about it, especially in 
the cases where the agent is incapable of loving her parents.  
My first response is that having or lacking a certain kind of emotions is 
relevant to our evaluation of the agent’s moral character, while her appearance is not. 
That is, although neither kind of value judgment presupposes the agent’s voluntary 
control, the evaluation of viciousness seems to fall under the category of moral 
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character while the evaluation of beauty does not. I believe the view that morality only 
concerns the aspects that are under our voluntary control is a myth, given that our life 
and character involve much more than what we do through a voluntary agency.  
Moreover, if filial love is understood as a constitutive part of virtue, in 
particular, of filial piety, there is a sense in which we can say that filial piety demands 
the agent to love her parents. Thus, if the agent fails to respond to this demand of filial 
piety by failing to love her parents, she is subject to a kind of negative moral evaluation. 
I believe this is how the virtue-ethical approach can do justice to the normative 
significance of filial love without relying on the idea of duty to love.  
Let me clarify what I mean by saying a virtue demands something. By saying 
that a virtue V demands an agent A to X in a given situation S, I mean that an agent 
with the full virtue of V would (characteristically) respond to the situation S by X-ing. 
This understanding of a virtue’s demand is inspired by Julia Annas, who understands 
the guidance in terms of virtue as “guidance as demand. That a certain action is the 
brave, or considerate or generous thing to do creates a demand that it be done, and if 
it is the action that I am in a position to do, it creates a demand that I do it” (Annas 
2015, 611). Annas illustrates how a virtue makes a demand as follows:  
 
Suppose, to give an example, that I come across picnic litter in a scenic place. 
I do not want to pick up the litter; I take it that nobody does….[T]o the extent 
that I am a considerate person I will feel that picking up the litter is the right 
thing to do, that I ought to do it, should do it. (Annas 2015, 611) 
 
In this example, according to her, “[the virtue of] considerateness demands that I pick 
up the litter, which is why it is the right thing to do for me to do” (Annas 2015, 614). 
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This is what she calls a “demand of virtue,” and I think it can be extended to cover what 
the agent feels, as well as what she does. Filial piety demands that I feel love and 
gratitude to my loving and caring parents. If I fail to feel these emotions to my parents, 
then I would be less than fully filial to that extent, just like when I fail to act to help 
and benefit them.  
Note that the demand of virtue does not necessarily imply that it is felt as a 
demand by the agent. A fully virtuous person feels it almost as if it were her ‘second 
nature,’ and, as Annas points out, it will “normally be felt as a demand by the learner 
and the incompletely virtuous” (Annas 2015, 612). If an agent fully possesses the virtue 
V, then she would not feel the demand of V as a demand. Then a fully filial person, 
who loves her loving parents already, normally wouldn’t feel loving them as demand 
and wouldn’t even think about the possibility of not loving them.  
One advantage of the virtue-ethical approach to filial love is that we can make 
sense of its normative significance appropriately considering how virtuous the given 
agent is. That is, virtue ethics makes a different command according to the level of the 
virtuousness of the agent in question. Virtue ethics commands the agent to do 
whatever she can to cultivate and exercise her virtue. That is, what it commands the 
agent is to do what one can at the moment to get as close as possible to living 
virtuously. Thus, both a non-loving child who struggles to love her parents and acts 
as if she does and a loving child who acts for her parents out of love are doing their 
best to achieve the ideal of living as a filial child. Given the difference in the ability to 
love their parents at the moment, it is inappropriate to blame the non-loving child for 
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failing to fulfill any duty or for doing anything wrong, insofar as she is doing her best 
under the given condition. This is why I think the virtue-ethical approach to filial love 
can avoid the commandability objection.  
Virtue ethics demands a non-virtuous person to act as a virtuous person 
would act. There two important points in this demand. First, a non-virtuous person 
can become more virtuous by imitating a virtuous person’s act, since, as Aristotle 
famously says, a person becomes virtuous by performing virtuous actions: “we 
become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by 
doing brave actions” (Aristotle 1999, 1103b1-2). In this sense, acting as a loving child 
would act is an effective way for a not-yet-fully-filial-person to cultivate filial love. 
Acting as a loving child would act, unlike actually feeling the emotion of filial love, is 
something even a non-loving child can do.  
Moreover, acting as a loving child would act can count as meeting the minimal 
demand to perform beneficent actions for our parents, although those actions would 
have had more ethical value if they were motivated by filial love. Benefiting or helping 
one’s parents is an important behavioral aspect of filial piety, which has a significance 
that goes beyond mere imitation or cultivation of virtue. For example, actions such as 
offering financial support or medical care to our parents have moral significance 
independently of the underlying motivational state. Thus, for a person who is not able 
to feel love or be motivated by love in benefiting and helping her parents at the 
moment of action, performing those actions from any available motivation for her at 
the moment would be the best she can do to get closer to living as a fully virtuous 
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person would do.  
Thus, from this perspective, virtue ethics can advise even to a non-loving child 
to try to love our parents and act as a loving child would act. This is true regardless of 
whether she can actually love them since she can at least try to love them or act as if 
she does. In the case of a fully virtuous person, virtue ethics tells her to exercise the 
virtue she already has. It is likely that this demand of virtue to feel and act 
appropriately would not even be perceived as a demand since her inclination is 
already in line with what it demands. If a person already has the full virtue of filial 
piety and thus loves her parents, then there is no need for any further normative 
requirement, since all she ought to do is to feel and act from her character.  
Even if there is such a thing as a duty to love, it seems to sit very awkwardly 
with both non-loving and loving children. For a non-loving child, it would be to 
require something she cannot do at least at a given moment, thereby rendering the 
requirement of duty futile. For a loving child, on the other hand, it would be requiring 
something she is already doing or inclined to do (or feel), thereby rendering the 
requirement of duty redundant. It is interesting that neither a non-loving nor a loving 
child can simply decide to love or not to love at will, though in different senses. A non-
loving child cannot simply summon up loving emotion at will. A loving child cannot 
simply remove this emotion at will. In this sense, love is non-voluntary even if 
producing the disposition to love may be voluntary to some extent. 
To do justice to the value of filial love, we need to shift our focus from 
rightness of actions to virtuousness of character. If we approach filial love in terms of 
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the idea of duty to love, we would end up focusing on what we can do to bring about 
filial love. I think the discussion of what a child can do to love her parents is a red 
herring. As mentioned above, whether or not a child loves her parents heavily depends 
on how her parents have raised them. So the discussion of filial love goes up from 
what the child can do to bring it about to what the parents can to bring about it and to 
deserve it. If the parents are abusive and indifferent, for example, it would be hard for 
her to love them even if she tries hard. That is, the way parents raise their child can 
deeply affect the scope of filial piety that can be controlled by the child herself. 
Therefore, to cover the ethics of the wide range of the relevant parties, the discussion 
should focus on the virtuousness of filial love, and then spread out to ask what all the 
relevant agents—which include not just the child herself but also the parents, 
educational institutes, and the government, etc.—can do about it. 
My suggestion has been that lack of filial love deserves negative moral 
evaluation not because it signifies a failure to fulfill one’s duty but because it reflects 
on one’s defective character. In my view, a person is less than fully virtuous as a child 
to the extent that she lacks filial love for her parents. This point can be made 
independently of whether she is capable of loving her parents or not; regardless, it is 
an important part of being filial. I have said that it is inappropriate to blame a child for 
not loving her loving parents insofar as it is through no fault of her own. She has done 
her best to be a filial child but failed because it was beyond her control, and thus she 
is not responsible for the lack of filial love. As she does not have the full virtue of filial 
piety, what she can and ought to do at this moment is to try to love rather than to love 
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her parents.  
Note that I am not claiming that there is no such thing as filial ‘duties’ at all. I 
admit that there can be various kinds of duties and rights involved in a parent-child 
relationship. My view is just that, even if filial duties or parental rights exist, they at 
best serve as ‘fall-backs’ or ‘constant constraints’ as understood in Jeremy Waldron’s 
discussion of the marital relationship (Waldron 1988, 629).28 Waldron admits that love 
and affection are often sufficient enough to generate desired acts between the married 
partners. However, he says, rights, and thus the correlative duties, as spouses are still 
necessary as ‘fall-backs’ in case the relationship collapses. For example, suppose that 
a husband does not love his wife—who has no income—enough to pay for her basic 
living expenses. If he did not have a duty to offer minimal financial support to his wife 
and if she did not have a right to the support, then she would be vulnerable to poverty 
caused by her husband’s whim. In this sense, the relevant duties and rights serve to 
constrain the actions of the spouses to prevent the worst-case scenario in which they 
not only lack love and affection but also omit actions minimally required for legal 
partners.  
A similar point can be applied to a parent-child relationship. Filial duties and 
parental rights are no more than fallbacks in the sense that they come into play only 
when the parents or the child or both lack the desirable emotional and motivational 
attitudes—e.g., love and concern—and thus their intimate relationship collapses. I 
                                           
28 Cowden (2012) also applies Waldron’s idea of ‘fall-backs’ or ‘constant constraints’ to parent-
child relationship.  
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suspect that the majority of contemporary Western theories of filial piety are focused 
on filial duties because the main motivation behind them is to discover what adult 
children owe to their old and infirm parents as the moral basis for legislation and 
public policies related to how the adult children ought to treat their parents. Such a 
duty-centered approach fails to capture the emotional and affective aspects of filial 
piety such as love and gratitude, which are a crucial part of an ideal parent-child 
relationship. It is this kind of inner attitudes that distinguishes a parent-child 
relationship from a mere creditor-debtor relationship or benefactor-beneficiary 
relationship, and that gives the former distinctive kind of value.  
Also, I do not deny that there can be duties somehow related to love. While I 
denied a duty to love, I have admitted that there may be duties such as a duty to try to 
love and a duty to act as a loving child would act. There being such duties is not 
incompatible with my view on filial love. Unlike duty to produce filial love, duty to 
try to love can be fulfilled even if the agent ends up failing to love insofar as she does 
her best to love the object in question. This duty can be understood as a part of the 
duty to pursue the moral ideal of filial piety as a virtue. In general, part of being 
virtuous is to have appropriate emotional and motivational states, in addition to acting 
in an appropriate way. These duties would not be subject to the commandability 
objection, since even a person who does not or even cannot love her parents may still 
try to love them or act as if she does. This point is also compatible with the intuition 
that we could not be blamed for failing to love particular people if we had put our 
utmost efforts to love them. Those duties naturally invite us to view filial love as part 
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of virtue. A virtue-ethical approach normally suggests what an ideally virtuous person 
would be like and sets becoming like them as a goal to pursue. If an ideally filial person 
loves and cares for her loving parents and acts accordingly, then what the agent ought 
to do, according to the virtue-ethical approach, is to do whatever takes to get closer to 
living like them.  
 
2.5. Conclusion  
 
 In this chapter, I have argued that filial love is morally significant and that its 
nature and value are better understood as a part of the virtue of filial piety rather than 
as an object of duty. I believe this lends support to the view that important constituents 
of filial piety are better captured by understanding filial piety as a virtue rather than 
merely as a source of duties to one’s parents. In the next chapter, I will discuss the 
gratitude that a filial child has in relation to her parents or ‘filial’ gratitude. In 
particular, I will introduce a new category of gratitude that captures the characteristic 
gratitude we typically owe to our caring parents.  
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Chapter 3. Gratitude for Being 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 Gratitude, roughly put, is an appropriate attitude to have in response to some 
benefit offered from someone else. We owe gratitude to people for many different 
things. 29  Philosophers have mainly focused on gratitude for specific actions or 
for beneficial objects considered independently of what kind of person the benefactor 
is and how she is related to us. However, the idea of gratitude for specific deeds and 
goods is not adequate to capture the gratitude we owe to people who have consistent 
and particularized care for us such as our parents and friends.30 We sometimes seem 
to express gratitude to our intimates for being who they are to us. On Mother’s Day, 
for example, it is not uncommon to give a card saying, “Thank you for being such a 
caring mother to me!” The gratitude to such people seems to go beyond what they 
have done and given to us and is directed at those people themselves and how they 
are related to us.  
 The aim of this chapter is to argue for a new category of gratitude—which I 
call ‘gratitude for being’—to capture the distinctive type of gratitude we owe to people 
                                           
29  When I say, ‘A owes B gratitude’ or ‘B deserves A’s gratitude,’ I mean ‘gratitude is an 
appropriate attitude for A to have to B’ in the sense that A’s lack of gratitude to B shows some 
defect in A’s moral character. 
30 McConnell (2017) also examines the gratitude in special relationships, especially in parent-
child relationships. However, he focuses mainly on the ground for the gratitude we owe to our 
parents and actions we are required perform and does not focus on the distinctive 
characteristics of gratitude involved in such caring relationships.   
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who have consistent and particularized care for us, especially our parents. In 
considering the grounds of gratitude, I shift the focus from specific actions or beneficial 
objects to the benefactor herself and her relationship to the beneficiary. I first 
distinguish personal gratitude from impersonal gratitude and then introduce the idea 
of gratitude for being as a subcategory of the former. I argue that the gratitude we owe 
to those who have long-term care particularized for us (typically intimates) can be best 
understood in terms of gratitude for being, rather than gratitude for doing. I use 
gratitude we owe to caring parents as a paradigmatic example of gratitude for being.31 
After addressing two possible objections, I conclude that gratitude for being is a 
distinctive type of gratitude that can make the best sense of deep gratitude typically 
found among intimates who care for each other. 
 
3.2. Personal Gratitude and Impersonal Gratitude   
 
Gratitude can be divided into what we can call personal gratitude and 
impersonal gratitude. 32  While the former involves a particular targeted person that 
deserves gratitude, the latter is directed at a state of affairs and does not necessarily 
involve such a person. Personal gratitude is typically expressed as a three-place 
relation: A is grateful to B for x (e.g., “I’m grateful to Ewan for helping me!”). Here B is 
a person and x is some benefit. Personal gratitude is a concept appropriate for making 
                                           
31 Although I use the gratitude to one’s parents as the main example, the gratitude we owe to 
close friends or spouses may also be suitable for the category of gratitude for being. 
32 See, for example, McAleer (2012), Walker (1980), Card (1988), and Roberts (2004) for similar 
distinctions between different kinds of gratitude. 
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sense of the expressive interaction in an interpersonal context since it involves at least 
two persons—the benefactor and the beneficiary. On the other hand, impersonal 
gratitude is typically expressed as a two-place relation: A is grateful that p (e.g., “I’m 
grateful that the weather is good today!”). Since impersonal gratitude does not involve 
a particular targeted person to whom we feel grateful, many philosophers observe that 
this kind of gratitude is better understood as mere appreciation or gladness rather than 
as gratitude in a proper sense. (see, e.g., Carr 2013, Gulliford, Morgan, and 
Kristjánsson 2013, and Manela 2016).33 
I do not seem to owe (personal) gratitude34 to someone unless she benefits me 
out of care directed at me for my own sake. By ‘care,’ I mean a broad range of favorable 
attitudes toward a person such as benevolence, goodwill, sympathy, compassion, and 
concern, as opposed to non-favorable attitudes such as indifference, egoistic 
calculation, and malevolence. To leave open the scope of the favorable attitude that 
merits gratitude, I use ‘care’ as a placeholder for any such favorable attitude. The 
proper target of gratitude, I believe, should be a person or someone capable of caring. 
As Nicolas Bommarito aptly distinguishes, the care for a particular person is not exactly 
the same as the desire for the states of affairs that promote her health or happiness: 
“My care is aimed more directly at her, the person sitting in front of me. Though we 
often care about how the world is, we also care about people in a more direct way” 
(Bommarito 2017, 27). Thus, now we can characterize the gratitude in a proper 
                                           
33 I remain neutral as to the issue of whether impersonal gratitude is identical with appreciation 
or gladness. See Manela (2015a) for more on the taxonomy of gratitude.  
34 Henceforth, unless noted otherwise, I will use ‘gratitude’ to refer to personal gratitude.  
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interpersonal context as an appropriate response to the benefactor for the benefit offered out 
of care for us for our own sake.35  
Now let us turn to the relational aspect of personal gratitude. Any form of 
personal gratitude is relational in the sense that it presupposes at least a certain kind 
of benefiting-out-of-care relationship between the benefactor and the beneficiary. In 
other words, A’s benefit from B should be offered out of care for A to deserve gratitude. 
The condition captures the intuition that, if I owe gratitude to someone, “I must have 
been an object of concern to that person” (Jecker 1989, 74). Compare praise, which does 
not presuppose any such relationship. As Claudia Card observes, “Gratitude…is not 
praise. Anyone—beneficiary or not—can praise an admirable effort or achievement. In 
giving the Good Samaritan credit for helping the stranger, I pay tribute but do not 
acknowledge a debt of gratitude. Only the stranger, if anyone, has such a debt. (If 
others also are grateful, perhaps they identify with the stranger)” (Card 1988, 119).  
In contrast, not everyone is warranted to have gratitude toward someone for 
an action or a quality that deserves gratitude. Only those who are somehow benefited 
from care by that person are in an appropriate position to have gratitude to her. For 
example, when you watch a passerby saves a drowning girl, who is a total stranger to 
you, it would not be ‘fitting’ for you to be grateful to the savior for saving the girl if that 
neither gives you any benefit nor expresses any care for you. I am not saying that there 
is anything ethically inappropriate about an unrelated person’s feeling or expressing 
                                           
35 I acknowledge that one may benefit another from mixed motives. For example, a paid coach 
may teach her students partly to improve them for their own sake and partly to make money 
by doing her job. For simplicity, I will not consider such cases in this paper.  
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gratitude; rather, I’m just saying that the situation would not warrant feeling or 
expressing gratitude, given the relational nature of gratitude. 
 
3.3. What is Gratitude for Being? 
 
In considering gratitude in an interpersonal context, the focus has usually 
been placed on the cases where the benefits offered are specific actions (or omissions36) 
or beneficial objects—e.g., we are grateful to someone for helping us move, saying kind 
words, rescuing from drowning, and so on. Let’s call gratitude appropriate for such 
cases gratitude for doing. However, there are reasons not to limit the ground for 
gratitude on actions or beneficial objects. For example, we may be grateful to someone 
for her failed attempt to benefit us, for her offer of a benefit that we refuse to accept 
(Camenisch 1981), or even for mere “heartfelt benevolence” toward us that is “without 
physical results” (Kant 1999, 573). Norvin Richards also mentions a case in which 
gratitude is owed for something other than actions:  
 
Suppose we ask why a grown child should be grateful to his parents for the place he 
had in their affections. Having that place was a great benefit to him, of course, and not 
only because of what they did for him. It is also a great benefit just to know that you 
are loved and that you matter to someone in this way. (Richards 2010, 232; emphasis added) 
 
Moreover, sometimes we seem to owe gratitude to someone even without 
                                           
36 Saul Smilansky (1997) argues that A may sometimes owe gratitude to B for abstaining from 
harming A, at least if, for example, B’s omission goes beyond the call of duty or involves effort 
and sacrifice. 
69 
 
being able to identify particular actions or beneficial objects we are grateful for, 
especially when it comes to a person very close to us like our parents. As Terrance C. 
McConnell points out, “typically one’s parents have given one so much over so long a 
period of time that it boggles the mind even to ask what a commensurate return might 
be” (McConnell 1993, 230). Indeed, our gratitude to such people seems to go beyond 
the specific actions they have performed for us or beneficial objects they have given to 
us. 
To such people as caring parents, we owe not just gratitude for doing, but also 
what I call gratitude for being, or so I shall argue. Gratitude for being helps to explain 
what distinguishes the gratitude we owe to those who are a caring relationship with 
us from the gratitude we owe to strangers. Gratitude for being is a kind of personal 
gratitude we owe to someone for being a certain kind of person to us (i.e., a caring one) or 
who she is to us, rather than just for specific things she has given or done to us. 
Sometimes, whether someone deserves our gratitude for being is not just a matter of 
her specific beneficial actions or just about the kind of occurrent emotional or 
motivational attitudes she has toward us. Rather, it is about the given person’s stable 
disposition to act, feel, and think in a favorable way in relation to us. In this sense, it is 
about what kind of person she is in relation to us. The category of gratitude for being 
properly keeps gratitude we typically owe to people like caring parents as a case of 
personal gratitude, while showing how it is different from gratitude to a stranger.  
 
 3.3.1. Consistent and Particularized Care 
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Not all cases of benefit out of genuine care warrants gratitude for being. For B 
to deserve A’s gratitude for being, B’s care for A should be sufficiently consistent and 
particularized.37 Let me explain this in more detail. The first condition for A to owe 
gratitude for being to B is that B has and expresses consistent care for A for A’s own 
sake, which is to be distinguished from the cases of episodic or occurrent caring 
attitude for A. In this sense, our gratitude for being owed to someone for her stable 
disposition to care for us for our own sake. Recall the typical format of personal 
gratitude: A is grateful to B for x. In the case of gratitude for being, x is B’s consistent 
care for A as a long-term disposition, as opposed to B’s specific actions, beneficial 
objects, or occurrent attitudes.  
One might wonder how we can owe gratitude to someone for her long-term 
disposition, especially given that personal gratitude presupposes a benefiting-out-of-
care relationship between the benefactor and the beneficiary. With regard to gratitude 
for doing, beneficent actions are gratitude-worthy in the sense that they are expressions 
of the benefactor’s care for the beneficiary. The case of gratitude for being satisfies this 
condition in a different way. B’s favorable disposition in relation to A involves care for 
A in the sense that the disposition itself is the embodiment of care. That is, B deserves 
A’s gratitude for being insofar as B’s stable disposition to act, feel, and think in favor 
of A embodies care for A. Being good parents, for example, involves having a long-
                                           
37 The issue of how consistent and how particularized a given case of care admits of degree. 
However, we can still make a meaningful distinction between the kind of care that warrants 
gratitude for being and the care that does not, just like we can distinguish a person who we can 
properly call a friend from a total stranger despite the vague nature of friendship.  
71 
 
term disposition that embodies care for the child in question, and thus their such 
caring disposition warrants gratitude for being.  
Moreover, B’s consistent care for A should also be sufficiently particularized for 
A. It means that the care involves the attitude of regarding A as an individual person 
who is special and particularly precious to B. It is important to distinguish between 
unparticularized care and particularized one, which roughly corresponds to Fred 
Berger’s distinction between general and specific forms of benevolence: 
 
Someone who cares about humanity (supposing this to be possible) may be 
motivated to act because he wishes to help people. I just happen to be the object of 
his largess by virtue of my humanity. On the other hand, it may be me he cares about, 
independently of any concern for humanity. (Berger 1975, 301, note 4) 
 
Given this distinction, the particularized care condition implies that not all long-term 
dispositions that involve care—such as benevolence or kindness—serve as appropriate 
grounds of gratitude for being.  
Suppose that Ben is a benevolent person who has a stable disposition to care 
for people in general. One day, he happens to encounter a homeless person Holly and 
gives her money out of benevolence. Although his care for her is genuine, it is not 
particularized in the sense that he would have done the same no matter who the person 
in need in front of him would have been. To borrow Nancy Sherman’s expression, 
there is a “kind of anonymity” in Ben’s response to Holly because his sympathy goes 
out to her “because of the circumstances he happens to find himself in, and not because 
of who the specific individual happens to be.” (Sherman 1987, 601). In this case, we do 
not need the idea of gratitude for being to adequately describe the type of gratitude 
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Holly owes to Ben. The idea of gratitude for doing would suffice since the deeper 
source of the care—i.e., whether it is coming from a stable disposition or from a 
whimsical change of mood—is irrelevant to the gratitude appropriate in the situation 
insofar as the care is genuine. In other words, the reference to his being a benevolent 
person is not necessary for the full description of his attitude toward her and of the 
gratitude she owes to him in the given situation. Although we may admire the 
benefactor’s general benevolence and also feel grateful for the benefit-out-of-care, this 
general benevolence does not warrant gratitude for being unless it embodies care for 
us as particular individuals.  
In contrast, when the care is particularized, “We act out of a more specific 
concern for a particular person, and because it is that person who is in need (and not 
another)” (Sherman 1987, 601). Unlike the case above, gratitude appropriate for 
consistent and particularized care is not fully captured in terms of gratitude for doing 
and thus needs the idea of gratitude for being. Take the example of Philly’s gratitude 
to her caring parents. Her parents have taken care of her with love and care for a 
substantial amount of time, consistently treating her as someone very special to them. 
Their care is not just directed at people in general but embodies a special kind of 
concern for her. In this case, what grounds the gratitude Philly owes to her parents is 
their consistent and particularized care for her and who they are to her.38  
                                           
38 I believe there can be indirect gratitude for being, as well as direct one. Suppose that Philly’s 
friend, Aaron, cares for her enough to identify with her in some sense. In this case, it seems fitting 
for him to have gratitude to her parents for being caring parents to her, even if their being so 
provides no direct benefit to him. While the gratitude Philly owes to her parents for being 
caring parents to her is direct one, the gratitude Aaron owes to her parents for being such 
parents to her would be indirect one. 
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It is important to distinguish impartial or fair care from unparticularized care in 
my sense. Particularized care does not imply favoritism. Suppose that Prema is a 
caregiver working at an orphanage. While she has a genuine care for each of the forty-
five children that she is taking care of, she never favors any one particular child over 
others and tries her best to be impartial and fair towards all those children in 
distributing goods and expressing care and concern for them. Still, she feels that every 
single child in the orphanage is very special to her as a particular individual in the way 
that other children she is not familiar with are not. In this sense, impartial and fair care 
does not imply unparticularized care.  
I should also add that, for A’s gratitude for being to B to be warranted B should 
actually have consistent and particularized care for A. Suppose that Patricia puts her 
first son, Mike, for adoption for some unavoidable reasons. A few years later, she gives 
birth to another son, Chris, who she raises herself for a substantial amount of time with 
love and care. On my account, Chris owes gratitude for being to Patricia while Mike 
does not. This is because she is not a caring parent in relation to Mike, no matter how 
caring a parent she is in relation to Chris. This is so even if she, being a generally caring 
person, would have developed consistent and particularized care for Mike if she had 
actually raised him, since no one deserves gratitude for merely hypothetical care.  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to develop such consistent and particularized 
care for one’s child without the actual history of parental activities. Any relationship 
of consistent and particularized caring would require at least a reasonable amount of 
exchanges between the parties. It is through sufficient interactivities between persons 
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that such a relationship—in this case, a parent-child relationship—is established. 
Although those interactivities consist of specific ‘doings’ (e.g., protecting from dangers, 
sharing amusing times together, and offering medical care), once such a relationship 
is established, a child’s gratitude to her parents for being caring parents to her can be 
warranted without relying on specific actions. Again, this form of gratitude would be 
based on who they are to her—i.e., the parents who have consistent and particularized 
care for her. In this sense, the proper ground of A’s gratitude for being is B’s consistent 
and particularized care for A.  
One might claim that B may deserve A’s gratitude for being even if B’s 
consistent care for A is not sufficiently particularized in the sense I described above. 
For example, suppose that Taiji is my favorite musician and he has consistent care for 
his fans. Although his care is not particularized for me, he has provided me joy and 
solace over the years with his music. One might claim that it is appropriate and 
philosophically cogent to say that Taiji’s unparticularized yet consistent care should 
be able to ground my gratitude for being—e.g., for being who he is, for his presence in 
the world and in my life, for who he is to me and for what his music means to me. 
However, I do not think it necessarily requires the idea of gratitude for being 
to capture the grateful attitude I have or owe to Taiji in this example. That is, it can be 
adequately explained in terms of impersonal gratitude, gratitude for doing, and 
personal attachment. First, insofar as his care for me is unparticularized and 
‘anonymous,’ the gratitude I have in relation to him seems to be very close to a kind 
of impersonal gratitude. That is, what is fitting in such a case is the gratitude that he is 
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such a great musician who comforts and pleases me with his music or that such a 
musician exists. Moreover, the gratitude I have to Taiji for what he does can mostly be 
captured in terms of gratitude for doing, as I have shown in the case of Ben and Holly. 
Lastly, a personal attachment (e.g., love or affection) to Taiji may explain why I feel 
like I have gratitude for being to that person. But they are distinct from each other. For 
example, although both cases involve the desire to benefit the targeted person, the 
underlying reasons seem to differ from each other. While gratitude for being involves 
is a desire to return the benefit, a personal attachment does not necessarily involve such 
a desire. Sometimes my personal attachment may also mislead me to believe that the 
given person’s care is particularized for me and thus that my gratitude for being is a 
fitting response. Just as we sometimes personify some inanimate objects—e.g., a doll 
or a game character—as if they are persons capable of caring, so we sometimes mistake 
a person’s unparticularized care for particularized care for us. This is more likely to 
happen when we have a strong personal attachment to that person.  
My point becomes even clearer if we consider whether I would owe gratitude 
for being to Taiji even if his care is not particularized for me. Although the belief that I 
have something close to gratitude for being to him is psychologically understandable, 
it does not seem very plausible to claim that I owe him gratitude for being just like I 
owe it to my caring parents.  
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 3.3.2. Further Considerations 
 
It is important to note that A may not owe gratitude for being to B, despite B’s 
consistent and particularized care for A, unless it counts as beneficial from A’s side. 
Although a person’s long-term disposition to care for us normally counts as a benefit, 
indeed a great one, not all cases of consistent and particularized care are beneficial for 
us. Consider a case of Werther’s unwanted one-sided love for Charlotte. Although he 
has consistent and particularized care for her, it does not benefit her because, being a 
married woman, his such love and care are no more than a burden and a source of 
anxiety for her. Indeed, Charlotte wants him to stop caring for her. In this case, it seems 
inappropriate to say that Werther deserves her gratitude for being, let alone any kind 
of gratitude. As this case shows, for B’s consistent and particularized care to ground 
A’s gratitude for being for B, it should be reciprocated or at least accepted as a benefit 
from A’s side.39 
This is one reason why people to whom we owe gratitude for being are 
typically—though not exclusively—those who share an intimate relationship with us 
(e.g., parents, spouses, or close friends). Consistent and particularized care is usually 
what underlies desirable intimate relationships, one paradigmatic example of which 
is the parent-child relationship. It does not mean, however, that gratitude for being is 
grounded only in a healthy intimate relationship where such care is reciprocated. In 
                                           
39 In a similar vein, Simmons (1979) claims that A does not owe any gratitude to B if the ‘benefit’ 
is forced on A against A’s will. 
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some cases, one may owe gratitude for being to someone else even if one does not desire 
to return the benefit insofar as the consistent and particularized care is a benefit for 
one. For example, Yumi would still owe gratitude for being to her parents if they 
consistently support and care for her, regardless of whether she has corresponding 
care and concern for them or whether she does have gratitude for being to them. In 
this sense, a relationship that grounds gratitude for being can be unilateral, just as 
other benefactor-beneficiary relationships can be. 
One might wonder if deserving gratitude for being is a matter of playing a role 
excellently, as most of the examples I use are role-bound—e.g., parenthood, being a 
daughter or son, etc. However, I do not think gratitude for being can be fully 
understood in terms of roles for the following reasons. First, there are many different 
kinds of roles and playing a given role excellently may not involve consistent and 
particularized care for a person. For example, one can play the role of a mechanic 
excellently without care for any person. It is true that, for example, a parent may 
deserve her son’s gratitude for playing her role as parent excellently. But it would be 
based on the contingent fact that the role of a good parent inherently involves 
consistent and particularized care for one’s own child. This care is what actually 
grounds gratitude for being. It is not clear whether some professional roles—e.g., those 
of a good colleague, a good teacher, or a good physician—involves having consistent 
and particularized care for the people associated with the role (e.g., colleagues, 
students, and patients.). It seems to me an open question and whether a person who 
takes up such a role deserves gratitude for being would depend on whether she has 
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consistent and particularized care for them, regardless of whether it is part of playing 
her role excellently. 
Suppose that a teacher, Hannah, consistently helps her student, Tim, with 
feedback, advice, etc. out of care for him. In this case, whether the student owes 
gratitude for being would depend on what kind of care the teacher has for him. 
Suppose, first, that Hannah’s care for her students is unparticularized and thus the 
way she helps Tim is not very different from the way she donates money to Oxfam to 
help whoever is in need. Her care is not particularized for Tim and he is not regarded as 
someone special to her in any sense. In this case, Tim may well owe gratitude for doing 
to her, but not gratitude for being. Suppose now Hannah takes Tim as someone special 
to her and helps and supports him out of her consistent and particularized care for 
him. In this case, Tim would owe gratitude for being. So I do not exclude the possibility 
that a good professional may deserve gratitude for being from a person who is 
associated with the role.  
Let me finish this section by adding one important feature of gratitude for 
being itself. Since it is to be understood as an appropriate response to such a long-term 
disposition, it should also be a long-term disposition, rather than occurrent emotional 
or motivational attitudes.40 But to say that a child owes gratitude for being to her 
parents for consistent and particularized care for her is not to say that she should have 
the occurrent emotional state of feeling grateful at every moment. Rather, it is to say 
                                           
40 For a general conceptual distinction between gratitude as an episodic emotion and that as a 
long-term disposition, see, for example, Roberts (2004). 
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that she is disposed to act, feel, and think in an appropriate way in relation to her 
parents as the given situation requires. For example, a grateful child would tend to 
buy a thoughtful gift on her parents’ birthdays, write ‘thank you’ cards to them 
occasionally, and take care of them when they become old and infirm out of care and 
grateful feeling. In this sense, gratitude for being is not an occurrent attitude but a kind 
of long-term disposition directed at the targeted person.  
 One might point out some difficulty in understanding gratitude as a long-
term disposition, as opposed to an occurrent emotional or motivational attitude. In 
fact, the attempt to understand gratitude as a virtue, which is a sort of long-term 
disposition, has encountered some theoretical challenges (see, e.g., Wellman 1999). 
One alleged difficulty is that it does not seem natural to characterize gratitude as a 
general and global virtue such as benevolence or temperance, because often “people 
are not grateful or ungrateful tout court, but grateful only vis-à-vis certain people, and 
ungrateful vis-à-vis certain others” (Manela 2015a, see also Carr 2013). My account of 
gratitude for being, however, can avoid this difficulty because of its relational 
character. Gratitude for being is a long-term disposition to act, feel, and think in a 
certain way in relation to the particular person to whom we have this kind of gratitude, 
rather than to people in general. Thus, whether a given person has an appropriate kind 
of gratitude for being to a given individual does not rely on whether it makes sense to 
say that she has gratitude as a general, global virtue.  
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3.4. Possible Objections 
  3.4.1. Gratitude for Being vs. Impersonal Gratitude 
 
I have discussed how to understand gratitude for being and argued that 
consistent and particularized care is required to warrant it. There might be objections 
to my idea of gratitude for being as a distinctive category of personal gratitude. I will 
address two possible objections here. The first is that gratitude for being is a case of 
impersonal gratitude, not personal gratitude. If gratitude for being is a kind of 
impersonal gratitude, it would amount to a response to a state of affairs that just 
happens to involve the particular person (e.g., the caring parent) rather than an 
appropriate response to the person as a proper target of gratitude. If this is right, it 
may imply that gratitude for being fails to capture the gratitude typically found among 
intimates who care for each other 
However, I do not think that gratitude for being is a kind of impersonal 
gratitude for the following reasons. To begin, the target of the gratitude is the person 
herself, not the state of affairs. As Tony Manela rightly points out, it is important not 
to conflate “the focus of some gratitude proposition with an entity to whom gratitude is 
properly due” (Manela 2016, 286). It would be to make such a conflation to claim that 
gratitude to one’s parents for being caring parents is just another kind of impersonal 
gratitude. First, while gratitude for being presupposes that the targeted person cares 
for the beneficiary for her own sake, impersonal gratitude does not presuppose such a 
caring person. Even a state of affairs without any person capable of caring can be an 
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object of impersonal gratitude (e.g., “I’m grateful that the weather is good.”).  
Moreover, while gratitude for being is typically marked by the grateful 
person’s desire to make a return to the targeted person, impersonal gratitude is not.41 Of 
course, unlike the case of gratitude for doing, the desire to make a ‘return’ in the case 
of gratitude for being to the targeted person is embodied as a desire to be or become a 
caring person to her as well. Though the form may differ from gratitude for doing, the 
desire to make a return to the targeted person is a characteristic feature of gratitude 
for being that is not necessarily found in the case of impersonal gratitude.  
Consider the case of Yumi the ungrateful daughter to see the difference 
between impersonal and personal gratitude. While she is grateful that her parents are 
loving and caring, she has no desire to be a good daughter for them and totally 
indifferent to their weal and woe. For example, she never helps them when they are in 
need even if she can easily do so. This seems to be good evidence that she lacks 
personal gratitude to her parents for being caring parents, but it seems compatible 
with her being grateful that she has such parents.42 This impersonal gratitude is not 
directed at her parents but at the state of affairs that happens to involve them. In 
contrast, her parents’ being caring parents to her is embodiment of their consistent and 
                                           
41  See, for example, Walker (1980). There are views that deny the conceptual relationship 
between gratitude and a desire to return the good. Manela (2015b), for example, claims that 
there are some cases in which gratitude requires abstaining from acting, not returning a favor, 
in order to protect the benefactor. Another example is Thomas Scanlon (2009), who holds that 
gratitude is not fundamentally a matter of making a return but of coming to care for the 
benefactor in a broader sense. Even these philosophers, however, would not deny that 
impersonal gratitude is distinct from the gratitude that they are describing.  
42 This example is inspired by the example of Yoshi in Manela (2016, 282). But his example was 
focused on gratitude for doing and my version is modified to show how Yumi lacks gratitude 
for being.  
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particularized care for her, and thus gratitude for being is an appropriate response to 
the persons, i.e., her parents, rather than to the state of affairs involving them. To say, 
“I am grateful to my parents for being such caring parents,” is much more than just to 
say, “I am grateful that my parents are caring parents.” To treat a caring parent (a 
target of gratitude in a proper sense) as if one treats a luckily discovered treasure (a 
target of impersonal gratitude or mere gladness) would not be an appropriate 
response of a person who understands what gratitude to a person is.   
 
3.4.2. Gratitude for Being vs. Gratitude for Doing 
 
The second possible objection is that the concept of gratitude for being is not 
significantly different from that of gratitude for doing or even that the former is 
reducible to the latter. Let me address this concern. First, a large part of my gratitude 
for being I owe to my intimate is directed at how she feels and thinks about me. Who 
you are is hardly reducible to how you tend to act since it also involves how you tend 
to feel and think. Similarly, who a particular person is to me is affected not only by how 
she tends to act in relation to me but also by how she tends to feel and think in relation 
to me. Thus, the object of gratitude for being covers more than actions. For example, 
when I have gratitude to my mother for being a caring parent, my gratitude is largely 
grounded by the care and concern for me in her mind. I am grateful for the way she 
tends to feel and think in relation to me: as a caring parent, she would feel sad about 
my frustration and glad about my success; she would also think about me and wish 
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for my well-being occasionally even if I live far apart.  
Moreover, having a caring emotion and related attitudes toward someone is 
not doing something in the same sense that, say, helping someone move or giving 
financial support is. First, we do not have full control of whether or not to have caring 
emotions in relation to a particular person. When we are in a caring relationship, we 
tend to be grateful to the person in question for being a person who cares for us. It 
does not matter whether she voluntarily feels or thinks in such ways, insofar as those 
feelings and thoughts manifest her consistent and particularized care for me. Even if 
her caring emotions toward us are spontaneous and not out of a rational will or 
intention to care for us, we may be grateful to her all the more for that. Thus, someone’s 
caring for us seems to be a good reason to feel grateful to that person, and caring 
involves much more than actions. The idea of gratitude for being, as opposed to that 
of gratitude for doing, offers a useful conceptual tool to make better sense of such 
phenomena.  
One might still argue against the idea of gratitude for being on the grounds 
that we cannot make sense of someone’s consistent and particularized care for us 
without referring to ‘doings.’ Gratitude for being is not sufficiently distinct from 
gratitude for doing, the objection may continue, because we can find no case 
where gratitude for being is clearly owed even though no gratitude for doing is owed, 
especially in the case that involves caring parents. I do admit that gratitude for being 
relies on gratitude for doing in the sense that it requires a lot of actions to become a 
person who deserves gratitude for being. Gratitude for being is grounded in a 
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relationship of consistent and particularized care, which is typically developed 
through the exchange of such actions.  
However, acknowledging the close connection between gratitude for being 
and past actions in no way diminishes its distinctiveness. The object of gratitude for 
being is distinct from that of gratitude for doing, although ‘being’ relies on ‘doings.’ 
To see the point more clearly, compare the relation between virtue and action. As 
Aristotle says, the cultivation of virtue requires repeated performance of virtuous 
actions: “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, 
brave by doing brave actions” (Aristotle 1999, 1103b1-2). No one is born virtuous. So it 
is hard, if not impossible, to find a case of a person who possesses courage but has 
seldom performed courageous acts in the past. But it does not necessarily render the 
distinction between virtue and virtuous actions meaningless, as virtue is a long-term 
disposition that involves the right kind of feelings and motives, as well as behaviors. 
Similarly, even if we fail to find a case where gratitude for being is owed without 
gratitude for doing is, it does not imply that the distinction between them is not 
significant.  
Moreover, past actions are important to gratitude for being, not just to 
gratitude for doing, since they express and thus evidence the agent’s consistent and 
particularized care. By evidencing such care, those caring actions provide one with 
security and peace of mind, which a benefit that typically comes from intimates such 
as parents, close friends, and spouses. Although those actions themselves are not the 
object of gratitude for being, they do give rise to this kind of gratitude by repeatedly 
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evidencing the agent’s consistent and particularized care. In this way, my introduction 
of gratitude for being does help us to see the difference between gratitude to strangers 
and gratitude to intimates: while the former is principally gratitude for doing, the 
latter is for the consistent and particularised care evidenced by past actions. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
 I have argued for gratitude for being as a new category that can make sense of 
the distinctive sort of gratitude we typically owe to our intimates such as parents and 
close friends. We tend to feel deeply grateful to those who have consistent and 
particularized care for us for being someone who is so disposed in relation to us. They 
do and give many good things for us. But as their care for us becomes sufficiently 
consistent and particularized, our feeling of gratitude seems to be directed at 
something that goes well beyond what they have done and given to us. This is, I have 
argued, how their consistent and particularized care for us itself becomes the ground 
of gratitude. In this sense, we owe gratitude to them for being who they are to us.  
We may not feel or express gratitude for being very often, especially compared 
to how frequently we feel or express gratitude for doing. I believe this is, first, because 
we normally have a limited number of people who have consistent and particularized 
care for us, and second, because we need some particular occasions that remind us of 
the value of the special care they have for us. We often forget how much gratitude we 
owe to those who are close to us for their care because we tend to take their being 
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around us for granted. So we tend to lose numerous opportunities to feel or express 
our gratitude to them for being who they are to us. Perhaps this is why we usually 
express our gratitude for being on special occasions such as Mother’s Day or a friend’s 
birthday (what an appropriate occasion to express gratitude for being!). I believe the 
point of establishing such special days is to give us an opportunity to think about those 
who deserve our gratitude for being and express it to them appropriately. A 
relationship in which each person is grateful to the other for her being who she is 
would be an important source of human flourishing. The idea of gratitude for being, I 
believe, can help us to make better sense of this valuable source.  
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Chapter 4. Relational Virtue and Filial Piety 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I argue that filial piety is to be understood as what I call 
relational virtue. I first introduce the concept of relational virtue and argue that it is an 
important subcategory of virtue. In particular, I argue that it offers a valuable resource 
for answering questions concerning the value of intimate relationships such as parent-
child relationship or friendship. After briefly sketching what I mean by relational 
virtue, I show why it is a virtue and in what sense we can meaningfully distinguish it 
from other sorts of virtue. I then describe some distinctive features of relational virtue 
in more detail and discuss their implications. Next, I show why it is best to understand 
filial piety as a relational virtue by proposing what I call relational virtue theory of 
filial piety. I argue that filial piety is to be understood as a child’s being filial is required 
as an appropriate response to the parent’s being virtuous as a parent. That is, I show 
how filial piety should be understood in relation to its corresponding virtue, parental 
virtue. I then conclude by responding to some possible objections.  
 
4.2. What is a Relational Virtue? 
 
Most of us have people who are near and dear to us. Human lives are woven 
together, and we rarely live in isolation. The relationships with our intimates—such as 
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family members and friends—are an important part of our well-being and living a 
good human life. But not all intimate relationships are equally good. While some 
intimate relationships make our lives more enjoyable and meaningful, others are 
exhausting or even destructive. Still, we can at least say that engaging in ‘healthy’ 
intimate relationships is partly constitutive of human flourishing. Then, what makes 
an intimate relationship a good one of its kind? I suggest that an ideal intimate 
relationship is one in which each participant has the corresponding relational virtue. 
Filial piety is a paradigmatic example of relational virtue. An ideal parent-child 
relationship, for example, is one in which the child is filial, and the parent is parentally 
virtuous. We can call the virtue of a good child ‘filial piety’ and that of a good parent 
‘parental virtue.’ 
So, what is a relational virtue? Roughly put, it is a virtue required for an 
individual as a participant of the given type of intimate relationship. A relational 
virtue cannot be fully understood without reference to the particular type of intimate 
relationship that it presupposes and can be properly cultivated or exercised only 
within that relationship. The examples of relational virtue in my sense include filial 
piety, parental virtue, or the virtue of friendship (i.e., a good friend’s virtue). Filial 
piety, for example, presupposes a parent-child relationship, since one can be filial only 
to one’s parents, not to anyone else. Relational virtues are to be considered centrally 
in evaluating a given intimate relationship since an ideal intimate relationship of a 
kind would be one in which each of those involved in the relationship has the 
corresponding relational virtue. There are various ways in which a relationship can go 
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defective. A parent-child relationship, for example, can be defective in some respect if 
the child is extremely defiant or the parent is abusive or both.   
 
 4.2.1. Is it a Virtue? 
 
One may ask whether what I call relational virtue is a virtue at all. I believe 
relational virtues are virtues because they have features that are typically attributed to 
a virtue. Let me begin with introducing Christine Swanton’s definition of virtue, which 
is intended to be neutral with respect to a wide variety of virtue theories and virtue 
ethics: “A virtue is a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to 
respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good 
enough way” (Swanton 2003, 19). Here the field of a virtue “consists of those items 
which are the sphere(s) of concern of the virtue, and to which the agent should respond 
in line with the virtue's demands” (Swanton 2003, 20). On this definition, a relational 
virtue can be understood as a virtue that has one’s intimates and the relationship with 
them as its field. Just as courage and justice are virtues whose spheres are, respectively, 
fear of important damages and distribution of limited resources, so can filial piety be 
understood as a virtue whose sphere is the relationship with one’s parent.  
P. J. Ivanhoe also argues that filial piety should be seen as a virtue:  
 
If, as some argue, virtues are traits of character that help one fare well in the face of a 
common set of human challenges, defined in terms of particular spheres of activity, then 
filial piety should be a central concern. For in one way or another, as human 
beings, we all have to work our way through the special relationship we have 
with our parents. While traditional beliefs about filial piety may be out of date, 
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the fact that humans have an enduring, distinctive, and emotionally charged 
relationship with their parents remains as true today as it was in the past and as 
true in the West as it is in the East. (Ivanhoe 2007, 297; emphasis added)43 
 
Within the sphere of the parent-child relationship, there are better and worse 
ways to be someone’s child. Being a good child in relation to one’s parent is a matter 
of excellence within the given sphere. This excellence has normative significance 
insofar as it enormously affects one’s own and the parent’s flourishing. A similar point 
can be made about other relational virtues such as parental virtue or the virtue of 
friendship since human beings typically have to deal with various intimate 
relationships such as parent-child relationship and friendship.  
Relational virtue also has other central features of a virtue. First, it is often 
claimed that a virtue should benefit its possessor (e.g. Hursthouse 1999). A relational 
virtue does have a tendency to benefit its possessor at least in some sense. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that having a good relationship with one’s intimates make an 
important contribution to one’s living a flourishing life as a human being. Assuming 
this, if a relationship is good to the extent that each participant is relationally virtuous, 
having the relevant relational virtue would contribute to having a good relationship 
with the given person. In turn, thus formed relationship would contribute to one’s 
own flourishing. Therefore, there is an obvious sense in which relational virtue 
benefits its possessor.   
Moreover, many believe that virtues are supposed to be intrinsically admirable 
                                           
43 Ivanhoe acknowledges that he owes this conception of virtue to Nussbaum (1993). 
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in some sense.44 There are stories about parents who sacrifice themselves to save their 
children or people who trust their friend even in adversity. We tend to admire those 
people and their character traits independently of whether they serve to promote any 
goods that are external to their relationships. We tend to admire a filial daughter or 
trustworthy friends at least partly for their deep commitment to their intimate 
relationship.45 Note that this sort of admiration is distinct from one that we feel in 
relation to skills unrelated to virtue such as excellent athletic abilities. In this sense, the 
intrinsic admirability of a relational virtue is that of a moral virtue. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to believe that a relational virtue has some sort of intrinsic admirability.  
Relational virtue also fits with the claim that virtue is a stable disposition of 
character, as opposed to a short-term attitude, which means that the disposition is 
expressed across a range of different situations, even in adverse conditions. A filial 
child, for example, is one who is stably disposed to feel certain kinds of emotions—
typically love, gratitude, and respect—toward her parents and act in a way that 
expresses such emotions. Those filial attitudes and actions should come from her 
stable character rather than whimsical mood or feeling. If someone has such ‘filial’ 
attitudes only when she is in a pleasant mood or her parents give her valuable gifts, it 
would be inappropriate to attribute the virtue of filial piety to her. In this sense, filial 
piety and other relational virtues seem to be a kind of stable disposition. 
                                           
44 For example, Julia Annas claims that virtues are “dispositions worthy of a distinct kind of 
admiration, which inspire us to aspire to them as ideals” (Annas 2011, 6). 
45  Of course, on the assumption that their commitment does not violate general moral 
requirement for others. But this would be a requirement for any admirable person’s story. One 
may admit the possibility of admirable immorality, but that possibility does not undermine 
point here.  
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4.2.2. Is it a Distinctive Kind of Virtue? 
 
Let me address the challenge from a different side. Assuming that relational 
virtue is a virtue, someone might still wonder if it is a distinctive kind of virtue that 
merits a separate inquiry. My answer is yes. A good justification for a claim that a 
certain quality of character is a virtue of a distinctive category that merits its own name 
would be to show how such a separate treatment can enhance our understanding of it. 
I am proposing the category of virtues called relational virtue because in that way we 
can better understand the ethical importance and remarkable characteristics of the 
virtues in this category. For example, I believe we can enhance our understanding of 
filial piety by seeing how it is different from virtues in other categories such as 
benevolence, kindness, and justice. Thus, let me focus on highlighting the distinctive 
features of a relational virtue, rather than on offering some metaphysical ground that 
separates it from other kinds of virtues. In fact, for those who are committed to the 
thesis of the unity of virtue—i.e., the thesis that if you have one virtue you have all the 
others—any categorization or individuation of virtue would have no metaphysical 
grounds. While I remain neutral with respect to the thesis of the unity of virtue, I 
would like to emphasize that introducing the category of relational virtue has a 
meaningful theoretical advantage. 
It would be helpful to begin by considering the familiar distinction between 
self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. A self-regarding virtue like temperance 
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neither requires any other person as its intentional object nor implies benefiting 
someone else in any way. By contrast, an other-regarding virtue like generosity 
conceptually requires some other person as its intentional object, and the success in 
exercising this sort of virtue depends on how the target person is affected. While 
relational virtues can be seen as a kind of other-regarding virtue, not all other-
regarding virtues are relational in my sense. Interestingly, what I call ‘other-regarding 
virtues’ fits the description of what Shirong Luo calls ‘relational virtues’ in the context 
of comparing the ethics of care and Confucian ethics (Luo 2007, 102-107). So it would 
be helpful for clarifying my conception of relational virtue to compare it with the one 
Luo uses. He understands a ‘relational virtue’ as one that requires someone else as its 
intentional object. Thus, it cannot be fully understood without reference to another 
person(s) and cannot be properly cultivated or exercised without their existence. For 
example, generosity requires someone else who needs a certain kind of good and thus 
one cannot have the virtue of generosity without any potential recipient of good that 
one gives.  
By contrast, I reserve the term ‘relational virtues’ to refer to a distinct 
subcategory of other-regarding virtues. Unlike such unilateral other-regarding virtues, 
relational virtues presuppose particular intimate relationships between the virtue-
agent—i.e., one who exercises the virtue—and the virtue-patient—i.e., the intentional 
object of the virtue. Relational virtues in my sense require more than the minimal 
relation of virtue-agent and virtue-patient as its target. They are appropriate for certain 
intimate relationships, such as parent-children relationship or friendship, and cannot 
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be fully understood without reference to particular relationships and can be properly 
cultivated or exercised only within those relationships. So understood, relational 
virtues form a subcategory of virtue that is significantly different from both self-
regarding virtues and other sorts of other-regarding virtues. 
Relational virtues can also be distinguished from general virtues. By general 
virtues, I roughly mean the virtues that concern the disposition in relation to people 
in general—such as benevolence or generosity—as opposed to particular people. The 
distinctiveness between being virtuous to people in general and being relationally 
virtuous or virtuous to one’s intimates is supported by the observation of familiar 
examples around us. It is not hard to find people who are virtuous in relation to people 
in general but not in relation to their intimates, or those who are virtuous to their 
intimates but not to others. We can imagine someone who is very selfish and callous 
to strangers but very altruistic and caring in relation to her own family and friends. 
Don Vito Corleone in the movie, The Godfather, is one example of such a person. While 
he is quite caring and just within his ‘family,’ he is callous and even cruel outside of 
this narrow circle. On the other hand, it is also not hard to find the case where someone 
is very generous and altruistic to strangers but not very nice and kind to one’s own 
intimates. For example, Mahatma Gandhi, who is widely admired as a sage-like figure 
by his country and even by the world, was known to be a bad father to his own son.   
These and other similar cases show that being relationally virtuous is not the 
same as being a good person in relation to people in general. If so, an adequate ethical 
theory should be able to distinguish the virtue in relation to one’s intimates from 
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general virtues and explain the distinctive feature of the former. This is, I believe, a 
part of the reason why the discussion of relational virtues, as opposed to general 
virtues, can make a new contribution to ethics. Especially insofar as such cases are 
prevailing around our everyday life, we need some conceptual tool to shed light on 
the distinctive nature and value of the virtue that a good intimate has. I am proposing 
the relational virtue as such a conceptual tool.  
 
4.2.3. Characteristic Features of Relational Virtue 
 
I have argued that relational virtues are virtues and that they are meaningfully 
different from other types of virtue. There are some further features of relational 
virtues that are not shared by other sorts of virtue. Many of these features are to be 
understood in terms of the characteristic features that good intimate relationships have. 
In this section, I highlight some such features of relational virtues by examining what 
constitutes a good intimate relationship and what a relationally virtuous person would 
be like.  
Some characteristic features of relational virtue can be understood in terms of 
particularity. Being relationally virtuous involves acting, desiring, and feeling 
appropriately with regard to particular persons to whom you bear the relevant 
intimate relationship. In this sense, one’s relational virtue is ‘indexed’ to a particular 
person or persons who hold the intimate relationship in question—we can call them 
‘intimates.’ Laurence Blum makes a similar point about friendship: “What we do for 
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our friends is very particular to our relationship to them, both in the sense of being 
particular to friendship as a type of friendship, and in being particular to a particular 
relationship with a particular person” (Blum 1980, 56). This point shows the sense in 
which cultivation and exercise of relational virtues presuppose particular relationships 
with particular individuals. In contrast, general virtues like generosity can be 
cultivated and exercised in relation to any other person in need, no matter whether 
that person is your parent, friend, stranger, or enemy.46 
Above I mentioned that a relational virtue, like other virtues, is a stable 
disposition. For example, a filial person would help and support her parents even 
when it requires a substantial amount of time and efforts from her side, not just when 
it is to her own advantage or when she is in a good mood. However, a relational virtue 
like filial piety does not require—at least not directly—stability across various targets 
since it is ‘indexed’ to a particular person or persons. Thus, for example, filial piety 
itself does not demand the agent to treat a stranger with love and gratitude.  
The next characteristic feature of relational virtue is specialness. A relational 
virtue demands the agent to regard and treat the intimates in question as someone 
special, that is, as someone who shares a special relationship with the agent herself. A 
relational virtue involves having a special kind of emotional and motivational 
attitudes toward the intimate in question. For example, parents want filial love from 
their child, as opposed to impartial altruistic care, which she can have towards any 
                                           
46 David Solomon also hints the possibility of a virtue with exclusive object: “A virtue must be 
somewhat general, but this generality need not entail that the virtue be impersonal, much less 
dispassionate, nor need it preclude exclusivity with regard to its object” (Solomon 2005, 87; 
emphasis added). 
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other person.47 Suppose that Alicia takes care of her sick father from a merely altruistic 
motivation—that is, that she serves him purely for his own sake without ulterior 
motives. But insofar as this benevolent act is done out of general human sympathy and 
compassion for him merely as another human being in need, not as her own father who 
is special to her, there seems to be something missing in her motivation as a filial 
person.48 I believe one merit of introducing the concept of relational virtue is that it 
helps us to capture the admirability of character traits in those who are regarded as, 
say, good friends or good children, which is distinct from being benevolent or 
generous in a general sense. If, for example, we understand Alicia’s hearty care for her 
sick father as just another case of benevolence, we would miss the distinctive 
admirability involved in her filial piety.  
There seems to be something distinctively valuable in this special kind of 
motivation. If the agent does something in favor of the object not because she takes 
him or her as someone special to her (e.g., father or friend), but because of some 
impartial considerations, then this specialness would evaporate. Take Michael Stocker’s 
famous example. If you visit your friend in the hospital not because you think of her 
as your friend (i.e., as someone special to you) but because you think that it would be 
the best way to maximize the general happiness or to fulfill your moral duty, then your 
friend would be rightly disappointed by your motivation to visit her (see Stocker 1976).  
                                           
47 Lawrence Blum makes a similar point about friendship: “In friendship one desires and acts 
for the good of the friend, not simply because he is another human being but precisely because 
he is one’s friend.” (Blum 1980, 44) 
48  There may seem nothing lacking from a ‘moral’ point of view, where ‘morality’ is 
understood as involving other-regarding concern, there something lacking from an ‘ethical’ 
point of view, which includes all important things concerning ‘how to live’. 
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Other distinctive features of relational virtue concern its dependency. Part of 
what makes a relational virtue a virtue is the fact that it is constitutive of virtuous 
relational activities in intimate relationships. By relational activities, I roughly mean 
interactivity between intimates qua intimates, broadly construed—such as exchanging 
gifts, helping each other when either is in need, and so on. Without other participants, 
however, one cannot even engage in any relational activity at all, let alone a virtuous 
one. Moreover, the mere existence of intimates is not sufficient to engage in a virtuous 
relational activity; the excellence or ‘virtuousness’ of a relational activity also depends 
on how relationally virtuous the participants are. If the other participant lacks 
relational virtue, one’s being relationally virtuous would not be sufficient to make the 
relationship an ideal one. 
To show these points more clearly, let me use a soccer analogy. An excellent 
soccer player is one who has the ability to make her team more likely to win. First, one 
cannot even play soccer at all, let alone winning the game, without other team 
members to play in the game. But if she is the only one who plays well and other 
players are far below her in their skills, her individual skills may not be sufficient to 
make the team win the game. Of course, she alone may be able to show impressive 
individual performance. But that would be pointless for her as a soccer player insofar as 
it is not sufficient for the aim of winning the game.49 
Similarly, without the other participant, we cannot engage in any relational 
                                           
49 Note that, by contrast, if she were a tricks-soccer player, whose internal aim is performing 
exquisite soccer tricks for entertainment, her individual skills would be sufficient for achieving 
that aim. 
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activity at all and the excellence of the relational activity is partly determined by that 
other participant. If virtuous activities are constitutive of human flourishing and 
virtuous relational activities are an important part of them, it implies that an important 
aspect of human flourishing is fragile in a distinctive way. That is, the flourishing of a 
participant in the relational activity is dependent on and thus vulnerable to the other 
participant’s character and agency in a significant way. For example, if your parents 
are abusive, cruel, and indifferent to you, you will be deprived of an important 
opportunity to engage in virtuous relational activities with your parents.  
Note that a virtuous relational activity in a good intimate relationship is 
neither one-sided nor based on a prudential give-and-take mentality. First, a one-sided 
relationship is at least less desirable than its reciprocal version. Thus, for example, 
unrequited love is not sufficient for virtuous relational activity. One-sided love is not 
enough for an excellent relational activity, and this point is confirmed by the very fact 
that what the person in one-sided love wants is precisely to have a reciprocal loving 
relationship with the one she loves.  
Second, a prudent give-and-take mentality does not constitute a virtuous 
relational activity, either. Although relationships based on such a mentality involve 
some sort of reciprocity and interactivity, that is not enough to make an ideal intimate 
relationship. In particular, such relationships would not be intimate, perhaps not even 
personal. Consider a business partnership. What is going on between business 
partners is the calculation of gain and loss and interaction based on it. It may be 
possible that two persons are business partners and friends at the same time. But what 
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makes their relationship go beyond business partners to reach friendship is precisely 
that their interaction involves more than mere prudent give-and-take.  
 
 4.2.4. Possible Objections Against the Idea of Relational Virtue 
 
I have argued that a relational virtue is a virtue and that it is of a distinctive 
kind. Some might claim that what I have introduced is not really a new category of 
virtues but something that is already familiar to us, namely, loyalty. Let us take the 
concept of loyalty suggested as its working definition in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy:  
 
[Loyalty is] a practical disposition to persist in an intrinsically valued (though 
not necessarily valuable) associational attachment, where that involves a 
potentially costly commitment to secure or at least not to jeopardize the interests 
or well-being of the object of loyalty. For the most part, an association that we 
come to value for its own sake is also one with which we come to identify (as 
mine or ours). (Kleinig 2017, sec. 2.) 
 
One might argue that loyalty understood in this way can capture a number of 
properties I offered as characteristic features of a relational virtue such as particularity 
and specialness. However, I believe that a relational virtue is different from loyalty in 
several important aspects. 
First of all, one can be loyal to almost anything one can be attached or 
committed to—from persons or personal collectives such as social groups to non-
persons such as principles or causes. In contrast, the target of a relational virtue is 
persons exclusively. Even if we focus on loyalty to persons, loyalty is different from a 
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relational virtue in that it can be unilateral and does not presuppose an interactive 
relationship between the persons in question. For example, one can be loyal to a pop 
star while that pop star is not even aware of one’s existence. In this sense, loyalty would 
be appropriately categorized as a unilateral other-regarding virtue rather than a 
relational virtue.  
Because of this unilateral nature, nor does loyalty adequately capture the 
properties of dependency I ascribed to a relational virtue above. One might worry that 
these features of a relational virtue make our ability to engage in virtuous activities a 
matter of luck to a greater extent than we should feel comfortable with. Although I do 
understand the ‘vertigo’ one might feel when one realizes how big a role luck plays in 
our lives, I think this is just a reality that we need to admit, and an adequate ethical 
theory should be able to embrace it. That is, I believe that important aspects of human 
flourishing are vulnerable to the element of luck and the introduction of a relational 
virtue shows how.  
A relational virtue is also different from loyalty understood as a character trait, 
that is, as “a tendency to form particular bonds of loyalty and act in their light” (Keller 
2007, 155).  When we say someone is a “loyal” person in a general sense, what we 
usually mean is that loyalty plays a significant role in her life. However, loyalty 
understood this way is significantly different from a relational virtue. First of all, I have 
said that a relational virtue is ‘indexed’ to particular individuals and thus in this sense 
local. In contrast, loyalty as a character trait is general in that it describes a general 
tendency to be loyal to the targets who happen to build a special relationship to the 
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agent herself. Thus, it neither presupposes a special intimate relationship nor is 
indexed to particular persons.  
Moreover, there are reasons to think that loyalty as a character trait is not a 
virtue. Simon Keller, for example, denies that loyalty understood in this way is a virtue 
for the following reasons. First, according to him, we would not want our child to have 
this character trait since it may incline the child to be “too quick to commit herself 
emotionally to projects or individuals that she would be better to avoid” and become 
someone who is undiscriminating (Keller 2007, 157). Another reason why loyalty is not 
a virtue is that a complete lack of it does not seem to be a legitimate ground to blame 
the person who lacks it. We would rather pity the person who lacks this trait for lacking 
important human goods such as genuine friendship rather than having a “distinctively 
moral complaint” against her (Keller 2007, 159).  
In contrast, a relational virtue is clear of such worries. First, there would be 
only a few, if any, parents who would not want their child to have filial piety as a 
character trait. In fact, I believe most parents would be glad to find that their child is 
filial not necessarily for the prudential reason that it is good for themselves to have a 
filial child, but because their child has grown up as someone who knows how to return, 
say, love and gratitude for what they have received. Moreover, when one shares an 
intimate relationship with someone, lacking the corresponding relational virtue would 
be morally condemnable. For example, if a person does not take care of her parents in 
their old age, given that they have been at least decent parents, would be a good reason 
to morally blame her. Thus, a relational virtue, unlike loyalty as a character trait, seems 
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to pass Keller’s two ‘tests’ for a virtue.  
 
4.3. Filial Piety as a Relational Virtue 
 
With this new concept of relational virtue at hand, let me propose my own 
version of the virtue-centered theory of filial piety, which I call the relational virtue 
theory. As the name suggests, my theory understands filial piety as a paradigmatic 
example of relational virtue. It fits the description of what a relational virtue is. Filial 
piety is a virtue required for a child as the participant of her parent-child relationship. 
It cannot be fully understood without reference to the parent-child relationship and 
can be properly cultivated or exercised only within this relationship. The child can be 
filial only in relation to her parents, not others. A desirable parent-child relationship is 
one in which the child is filial, and the parent is parental (or parentally virtuous). If the 
child is not filial, then the parent-child relationship in question is defective in that 
regard. I think my theory has an advantage in capturing the relational aspect between 
the parents’ parental virtue and the child’s filial piety. It can avoid, I submit, the main 
difficulties with the existing theories of filial piety. 
 
4.3.1. Parental Virtue and Filial Piety 
 
So far, it has been assumed that the parents in question deserve their child’s 
filial piety. One may ask, what if the parents are not ‘good enough’ parents, and thus 
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do not deserve to have a filial child? It seems unreasonable to claim that a child should 
have love, gratitude, and respect, no matter how terrible her parents are. My relational 
virtue theory, which emphasizes the reciprocal nature of filial piety, does not impose 
such an unconditional requirement on a filial child. According to my theory, a child’s 
being filial is required as an appropriate response to the parent’s being parental. In 
other words, the normative ground for the requirements of filial piety is the relational 
virtuousness of one’s parents.  
 One might think that my theory thus recommends us to refrain from being 
filial to the extent that the parents are defective as parents, keeping the exact 
proportionality between parental virtue and filial piety. This is not what my theory 
implies, however. It only suggests that the requirements of being filial can vary 
depending on the degree of the parents’ relational virtuousness and the relationship 
between the child and the parents and that one would have a reasonable excuse for 
not being filial if one’s parents are extremely vicious as parents. It is true that most 
parents in the real world are neither exemplary nor despicable as parents. It is also 
true that my top-down approach focuses on describing ideal cases, where the parents 
are parentally virtuous and the child is filial. However, my theory has rich resources 
to give answers or at least guidance to questions concerning the normative ground of 
filial piety in non-ideal cases, where parents are not perfectly parental.  
To begin, a relational virtue as I understand it involves reasonable forbearance 
that enables the agent to keep caring about the intimate in question even if the 
intimate’s character is defective in some respect. This implies that a truly filial child 
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would try to care about her parents even if they are not perfect as parents. Such 
forbearance would be an important part of filial piety in a non-ideal parent-child 
relationship. First, it is needed in the process of forming the intimate relationship 
between the child and parents. Second, as far as the parents are not extremely vicious 
as parents, such forbearance would play an important role in helping them to become 
more parental. Given that the goal of filial piety as a relational virtue is to have a good 
relationship with parents and engage in virtuous relational activities with them, and 
that such activities require both participants to have corresponding relational virtues, 
it would be reasonable to hold that filial piety involves reasonable forbearance in 
relation to one’s parents at least in a non-ideal case where the parents are not fully 
parental.  
 In addition, my relational virtue theory is compatible with other possible 
reasons—perhaps the reasons that do not directly stem from the demand of filial 
piety—to be filial to one’s parents even if they are defective as parents. For example, 
suppose that Dan’s parents provided him with material and financial support 
motivated by self-interest, not by love for him. In this case, Dan has a reason to repay 
what he has received from his parents, say, by providing material and financial 
support when they become old and infirm, just as a truly filial child would do to her 
loving and caring parents. However, his reason to support his parents derives from the 
general principle that we ought to pay back what we owe to someone, not from filial 
piety in particular. In this sense, Dan’s supporting his parents is not an expression of 
the virtue of filial piety but just fulfilling the general duty to repay to one’s creditor. 
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Still, it gives him a reason to act as a filial person would do to her loving and caring 
parents, although Dan’s reason for doing so would differ from hers. 
Also, consider the case of Chan. Although his parents have not been extremely 
abusive or cruel, they did not offer adequate protection, nurturance, and support to 
him. It is not because they are in financial difficulty or physically incapable, but just 
because they care more about their enjoying luxurious leisure time than taking care of 
their son. That is, they failed to act parentally due to the defect in their character. 
However, Chan may have a reason to act filially to his parents as if they have been 
fully parental to him. He may act filially—e.g., pay for his parents’ hospital expenses 
and contact them frequently—just because he felt a general feeling of sympathy for 
someone in need or because he wanted to set a good example of filial piety to his own 
daughter. Although these reasons may not be properly called the reasons of filial piety 
in a strict sense, it is compatible with my theory to recommend to act as a filial person 
would act for such reasons.  
Of course, according to my theory, a truly filial person is one who acts filially 
out of gratitude or love, not merely for reasons external to filial piety. In an ideal case, 
the parents would be parentally virtuous, and the child would be filial. Thus, in non-
ideal cases—where parents lack parental virtues—it would be hard to realize a 
desirable parent-child relationship just based on the efforts from the child’s side. Still, 
it is one thing to say that the failure of being filial to imperfect parents is excusable, 
and it is another to say that being or trying to be filial even to such parents is not 
morally recommendable or praiseworthy. My theory can acknowledge that it is 
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morally recommendable or even admirable for the child to keep trying to be filial to 
her parents even if they do not fully deserve it.  
 
 4.3.2. Avoiding Difficulties 
 
I believe my theory can avoid the main difficulties of the existing theories of 
filial piety. One challenge against the gratitude theory of filial piety is to make sense 
of why we owe gratitude to our parents for what they have done to us even if we were 
too young to request or agree to receive them. This challenge assumes that only 
something that is received by the agent’s request or choice can be an appropriate object 
of gratitude. My relational virtue theory can avoid this challenge because it holds that 
the kind of gratitude appropriate for a filial child is the gratitude to her parents for 
being caring parents, rather than just for what they have done or given to her. Sharing 
an intimate relationship with someone is not simply a matter of request or choice; 
rather, it is what happens as a result of a substantial history of favorable and 
meaningful interactivities.  
Moreover, my theory does not have to explain why we owe gratitude to our 
parents if our parents were just fulfilling their duties as parents. In my view, being a 
good parent is a matter of cultivating and exercising parental virtue in relation to one’s 
child, not just a matter of fulfilling their duties—e.g., providing protection, support, 
and education. Thus, filial piety requires some sort of reciprocity between the relational 
virtues in question—i.e., parental virtue and filial piety—rather than that between 
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goods or favors exchanged. If so, since being a good parent is not just a matter of 
fulfilling one’s duty, my theory can avoid the challenge that there is no reason to be 
grateful to someone when she is just fulfilling her duties.  
What about the challenge that the degree of the parents’ sacrifice does not 
seem to affect filial duties while it does affect the gratitude we owe to them (see Keller 
2006)? The issue is this. It seems that a child has more duty of gratitude toward her 
parents when they have sacrificed a great deal and put a lot of efforts in raising her, 
than when they did not sacrifice as much and even enjoyed much in raising her. 
However, the requirement of filial piety to look after one’s parents when they become 
old and infirm does not seem to be mitigated just because they have enjoyed parenting 
or has made less sacrifice.  
I believe my relational virtue theory can address this issue. First, according to 
my theory, the goods, efforts, and sacrifice the child owes to her parents is not fully 
determined by the goods, efforts, and sacrifice from the parent’s side. Rather, what is 
importantly relevant in terms of the requirement of filial piety is how parentally virtuous 
the parents are; that is, the child should be filial to her parents at least to a degree 
insofar as they are or have been reasonably decent parents. Thus, on my theory, 
whether and how a child should be filial is not simply determined by the amount or 
quality of goods given or the efforts and sacrifice made by the parents. It implies that, 
if parents are reasonably virtuous as parents, even if they have actually provided only 
a few goods to the child, the child may be required to be filial to them. If the parents 
are or have been abusive or violent as parents, on the other hand, then the child may 
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not owe to be a filial child to them at least in some extreme cases.  
Even if some parents fail to give their children a decent upbringing, however, 
this fact does not directly imply that the child is thereby mitigated in or exempted from 
the requirement of filial piety. We should ask the reasons why the parents failed to give 
a decent upbringing. For example, if it is due to the poor social arrangement or lack of 
sufficient materials through no fault of the parents’ own, it does not by itself make 
them vicious as parents. On the other hand, if the reason for the poor upbringing is the 
parents’ vicious character as parents—e.g., abusive, derelict, or oppressive—then it 
can provide the child with a reasonable excuse not to be filial to them. What is 
important here is whether the parents in question tried hard enough to offer the goods 
their children need in the given situation and whether they are parentally virtuous 
such that they would have provided the child the goods if the situation allowed.50 If the 
parents are sufficiently virtuous as parents, then the child in question would be 
legitimately expected to be filial to her parents and offer them the goods they need.  
A similar point can be made about parents’ efforts or sacrifice. Suppose that 
Hak in our story was rich enough to raise Chung without great efforts and sacrifice 
from his part. Other things being equal, does Chung owe less gratitude to this 
‘effortless’ father than she would to the ‘sacrificing’ father? Again, what matters here 
is whether Hak is sufficiently virtuous as her parent. This can be gauged by 
                                           
50 In a similar vein, Richards claims that the measure of the gratitude we owe them, should not 
be the sacrifice your parent actually makes for you, but “the sacrifices he would make for your 
sake if he were called upon to make” (Richards 2010, 232; emphasis added). However, my view 
is different from his because, while this counterfactual consideration in my view is to evidence 
the parent’s parental virtue, in his view, it is to indicate the place the child has in her parents’ 
affections.  
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considering whether he would have sacrificed for Chung if the circumstance were 
unfavorable, not necessarily by considering whether he actually made the sacrifice. 
Then, at least to that extent, Chung would be legitimately expected to be filial to Hak 
and offer him the goods he needs in the situation that is actually given.  
People who support the duty-centered approach on filial piety may try to 
accommodate the intuition in this response by appealing to the concept of 
counterfactual or hypothetical duties.51 However, I am not sure if this kind of duty makes 
sense. For example, while an actual promise generates a duty to keep the promise, a 
merely hypothetical promise does not. Similarly, while the actual sacrifices of parents 
for the child may generate a duty of gratitude, merely hypothetical sacrifices do not. 
At least, it seems hard to explain the sense in which it is a duty. In contrast, my 
relational virtue theory can make a better sense of why the parents who did not actually 
provide certain goods or make sacrifice still deserve their child’s filial piety—including 
gratitude. This is because what it requires of the parents is their having and exercising 
parental virtue appropriately in the given context, rather than performing specific kind 
of actions or providing specific kind of goods.52 Note that being virtuous as parents 
does not necessarily require particular types of action unless the situation calls for 
                                           
51 Mark R. Wicclair mentions the possibility of these sorts of duties (or obligations): “For 
example, although I did not have polio as a child, since my mother would have been willing to 
make substantial sacrifices to help me if I did, it might be claimed that I should be willing to 
make substantial sacrifices for her if she were to develop Alzheimer's. If there are such 
obligations, they cannot plausibly be construed as duties (of gratitude) that are generated by 
(actual) past parental sacrifices, and they are therefore beyond the scope of this paper” (Wicclair 
1990, 188, note 24). 
52 See Christopher Wellman (1999) for a view that gratitude in general is better understood as 
a virtue rather than as a source of duties or obligations.  
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them, just as a courageous person would still be a courageous person even if she had 
hardly any opportunity to express it because the world has been ‘too’ peaceful. 
Moreover, my relational virtue theory also avoids the main challenges against 
the friendship theory of filial piety. One challenge against the friendship theory is that 
it implies that there is nothing the child ought to do to her parents when the loving 
relationship between is gone, which makes it too easy to be exempted from the ‘burden’ 
of filial piety. According to my theory, as far as the parents have been parental to the 
child, she cannot become free from the requirement to be (or at least try to be) filial 
just by choosing to leave the relationship. The existence of the current loving 
relationship per se is not necessary for filial piety in my theory. At least insofar as the 
parents have been parental, the requirement of filial piety cannot be avoided simply 
by choosing to leave the relationship since the child is required to be or at least strive 
to be filial to them in response to their virtuousness as parents. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have argued that relational virtue is a distinctive kind of 
virtue that has an ethical significance and introduced some characteristic features of 
relational virtue. Then I have proposed my own relational virtue theory of filial piety, 
according to which we should be filial to our parents at least to the degree that they 
are or have been virtuous as parents. I have also shown how my theory can avoid some 
main challenges against the existing theories of filial piety. In the next chapter, I 
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introduce some important aspects of filial piety that are emphasized in the Confucian 
tradition while neglected in Western culture. I also attempt to show how my relational 
virtue theory can accommodate those aspects as important elements of filial piety.  
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Chapter 5. Confucian Filial Piety and Relational Virtue 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I examine the Confucian conception of filial piety, which 
heavily influenced my own view, since it has particularly rich resources on this issue. 
After briefly introducing the Confucian view of filial piety, I discuss several aspects of 
filial piety that are emphasized in the Confucian tradition but not in contemporary 
Western literature on filial piety. Then I show how my relational virtue theory can 
defend and make sense of them as an important part of filial piety. Lastly, I show how 
my relational virtue theory is different from the Confucian view on filial piety, or at 
least a version of it.  
 
5.2. Confucian Filial Piety  
  
Early Confucians regarded filial piety (xiao; 孝) as a cardinal virtue that is 
crucial in cultivating one’s character and growing into an exemplary person (junzi; 
君子), not merely as a collection of duties we have toward our parents. In Analects 1.2, 
Confucius even says, “filial piety and respect for elders constitute the root of 
humaneness (or ren; 仁)” (Confucius 2003; emphasis added),53 and The Classic of Filial 
                                           
53  In Confucianism, ren—which is also translated as benevolence, compassion, or perfect 
goodness—refers to a comprehensive virtue characterized by a strong sense of compassion and 
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Piety introduces filial piety as “the root of virtue and all [ethical] teaching grows out of 
it” (Legge 2004, Ch.1; emphasis added). 
Confucians put great emphasis on the virtue of filial piety mainly because they 
believed that the family plays a crucial role in forming foundational moral emotions 
and moral capacities. They understand family as the place where one’s basic ethical 
character begins to be cultivated through the experience of building meaningful 
relationships with the immediate family members, especially with one’s parents: “We 
cultivate ourselves through reinforcing and expanding our human-relatedness, and 
our human relatedness starts with our relationship with our parents” (Li 1997, 223-4). 
Through the practice of filial piety, according to Confucians, one can go beyond the 
self-centeredness and develop moral feelings such as genuine love, care, and gratitude. 
This is why filial piety is regarded as the ‘root’ of becoming a virtuous human being. 
In this sense, as Tu Wei-Ming aptly points out, the purpose of filial piety as Confucians 
see it is human flourishing and “an essential way of learning to be human” (Tu 1998, 13). 
Moreover, filial piety is not a mere means to cultivate the more general virtue of 
humaneness or ren; rather, it is its central constituent. Mencius says, for example, “The 
most authentic expression of humaneness is serving one’s parents” (Mencius 4A27).54 
In other words, in Confucian ethics, being filial is at the heart of being a good human 
being in general, and serving one’s parents well is an essential part of living a good 
human life. In this sense, successful cultivation and exercise of filial piety is an 
                                           
empathy with other people. 
54 In citing Mencius, I used Irene Bloom’s translation as the base and made some modification 
of my own. 
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important part of human flourishing.  
Thus understood, the Confucian conception of filial piety provides a rich 
resource to shed light on important aspects of being a good child that have not received 
much attention in the Western tradition. Although some aspects of filial piety 
emphasized in the Confucian tradition might be viewed as outdated and unfit for 
contemporary societies, among them are important aspects that deserve our refreshed 
attention and further defense, or so I believe. Here I focus on three such aspects 
Confucian filial piety: filial piety in childhood, the close relationship between self-
cultivation and filial piety, and filial piety after the parents’ death. I then suggest how 
to make sense of them based on my conception of filial piety as a relational virtue.  
 
5.2.1. Early Filial Piety 
 
 It is noticeable that contemporary Western duty-centered theories of filial 
piety mostly focus on adult children’s filial piety to their old parents.55 The parent-
child relationship holds even between a young or immature dependent child and parents, 
not just between an adult child and parents. By ‘young children,’ I roughly mean, 
following Mullin, “children who are in the process of moral development and who 
have not yet reached moral maturity” (Mullin 2010, 152).56 We may call the filial piety 
                                           
55 Amy Mullin (2010) is one of few notable exceptions. In her paper, she discusses the filial 
responsibilities of dependent children.  
56  Of course, we may have to discuss parent-infant relationship separately, since such a 
relationship is better understood as a unilateral nurturing relationship, rather than a full-
fledged personal relationship. To the extent that the child is incapable of functioning as a person, 
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of young children early filial piety.  
Most contemporary theories of filial piety focus on adult children’s filial 
duties and do not address the issue of early filial piety. There are several possible 
reasons for this neglect. First, some of those theories do not have adequate conceptual 
resources to deal with young children’s filial piety due to the overly rationalistic 
conception of duty—mostly influenced by a Kantian conception of duty. It is hard for 
them to make sense of young children’s duties to their parents in a proper sense since 
young children are not equipped with the rational agency, material resources, or 
independence, which are required to be subject to full-fledged moral duties. For 
example, in arguing against the idea of children’s duty of obedience, Michael Slote 
denies the possibility of any duty for young children:  
 
“[I]t is difficult to believe that one has any moral duty to show gratitude for benefits 
one has not requested…. [I]t seems entirely gratuitous to suppose that very young 
children have any moral obligations at all, even to their parents. Such obligations, it would 
seem, exist, if at all, only when moral concepts are firmly implanted…. Young 
children seem to be too young to have any obligations or duties of obedience or 
anything else” (Slote 1979, 320; emphasis added). 
 
Second, even assuming that young children can have moral duties or 
obligations, they may not yet be able to appreciate how much of gratitude their parents 
deserve from them and to express it properly. Immaturity is the hallmark of childhood, 
rather than its aberrant defect. If someone seriously claims that young children have 
duties to express their gratitude to their parents, it would be too rigorous a demand 
for them given their age and capacity. Nor are they old enough to be bound with their 
                                           
it is hard to call this relationship a personal relationship in a strict sense.  
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parents by so-called ‘duties of friendship,’ which typically hold among equals. It is hard 
to deny that there exists dramatic asymmetry in status, power, and abilities between 
parents and young children, which undermines the idea that they can share friendship 
(see, e.g., Kupfer 1990, Ivanhoe 2007).  
I believe early filial piety should be treated as an important part of filial piety. 
It is usually when we are young and dependent that we spend the most time 
interacting with our parents. Also, the ‘sprouts’ for adult’s full-fledged filial piety are 
cultivated and shaped during this early childhood, which is one important reason why 
early filial piety has been taken very seriously in the Confucian tradition. Although 
young children lack full autonomy, independence, and rationality, it seems 
meaningful to talk about filial piety of young children, given that they are reasonably 
competent agents who can make at least some kind of choices based on their own ends. 
Let me show how a virtue-centered approach—especially my version of it, the 
relational virtue theory—can make sense of early filial piety and its importance.  
First, early childhood is an important period of time in which one can develop 
the emotional and motivational aspects of filial piety toward one’s parents who are 
reasonably virtuous as parents. Mencius said, “There are no young children who do 
not know enough to love their parents” (Mencius 7A15), suggesting that people can 
begin to develop loving affection for their parents even in early childhood. Moreover, 
given that our emotional disposition is largely formed during early childhood and 
more plastic during that period, it is crucial for the child to acquire filial emotional and 
affective disposition from early childhood. Thus, early filial piety importantly involves 
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the cultivation of a loving and caring attitude toward one’s parents.57 The attitude of 
loving one’s parents as someone special is an especially important part of filial piety 
as a relational virtue.  
Early filial piety also involves behavioral requirements. It is likely that young 
children are not yet equipped with the appropriate inner attitude such as gratitude 
and love, which are required for full virtue of filial piety. In this sense, what those 
immature children do to their parents may not qualify as exercise or expression of the 
virtue of filial piety. However, early filial piety can require young children to perform 
filial actions—i.e., what a truly filial person would do to her parents—despite their 
immature filial piety. For young children’s filial actions help them develop or cultivate 
their virtue of filial piety. We can reasonably claim that, following Aristotle, that just 
as a person becomes just by performing just actions (Aristotle 1999, 1103b1-2), so 
becomes a child filial by performing filial actions. In this sense, although young 
children may not have filial duties in a proper sense, they are indirectly required—in 
an evaluative sense—to perform filial actions by the virtue of filial piety.  
There is another sense in which filial actions in childhood can contribute to 
one’s process of becoming filial. That is, what the young children do for and feel about 
their parents can be understood as a process of building the on-going intimate 
relationship between them. This is especially important in cultivating filial piety as a 
relational virtue since relational virtues presuppose such intimate relationships. In 
                                           
57 Given the child’s young age, it is also an important part of parental virtue to help her young 
child to cultivate inner attitudes appropriate for filial piety.  
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other words, those ‘filial’ actions, which sufficiently resemble what a truly filial person 
would do, themselves give rise to the intimate parent-child relationship which serves 
as the basis of the corresponding relational virtues—i.e., parental virtue and filial piety. 
Thus understood, they are part of the process that opens the ‘channel of intimacy’ 
between the parent and the child. Furthermore, although the young children may not 
have sufficient abilities and resources to have filial duties, we can plausibly say they 
have filial responsibilities in a weaker sense to “strive to contribute to forming a 
positive relationship with their caregivers,” rather than “accepting devotion to their 
own needs and interests as their due” (Mullin 2010, 164).  
 
5.2.2. Self-Cultivation and Filial Piety 
 
Another important aspect of the Confucian conception of filial piety is that it 
is closely related to self-cultivation in important senses. The self-cultivation in question 
here is not limited to the cultivation of the disposition to do for and feel about one’s 
parents in an appropriate way. It also involves becoming an overall virtuous person, 
which is a crucial part of filial piety. First of all, as mentioned above, Confucians regard 
the virtue of filial piety not only as the ‘root’ of general virtuousness (ren) but also as 
itself an important virtue central to becoming an exemplary or virtuous person. In this 
sense, in the Confucian tradition, becoming a filial person is an essential part of self-
cultivation.  
There is another important sense in which self-cultivation is closely related to 
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filial piety, however. That is, cultivation of one’s character can itself be understood as 
an important part of filial piety. Insofar as good parents wish their children well in all 
respects, it seems reasonable to say that they would be concerned with their moral well-
being—i.e., being virtuous—not just with their physical or mental well-being. The idea 
that being good parents involves concern for one’s children’s having virtue can find 
support in the Confucian tradition.58 Concerning filial piety, for example, Confucius 
says in Analects 2.6, “Give your parents no cause for anxiety other than the possibility 
that they might fall ill” (Confucius 2003). Although there can be various interpretations 
of this passage, many scholars take it to mean that a child should not cause her parents 
to have undue worry by maintaining her moral, mental, and physical well-being 
except in the situation of illness, which is out of her control. Yong Huang, for example, 
reads this passage as suggesting the following:  
 
According to Analects 2.6, since parents are happy if their children are doing well 
but will worry when do not do well, a filial son ought to avoid doing anything 
that his parents will be ashamed of and do only things that his parents can feel 
proud of…. [F]or Confucius, to be virtuous person oneself is also an important aspect 
of filial piety, because parents all wish their children well in all aspects. (Huang 
2013, 128; emphasis added) 
 
                                           
58  Noticeably, we can also find a similar idea in the Western virtue-ethicist Rosalind 
Hursthouse’s view: “Good parents have their children's interests at heart. They want to do what 
is best or good for them, the individual children, to enable them to live well, be happy, make a 
success of their lives. But, having their children's interests at heart, it does not occur to most of 
them to bring them up to be entirely self-interested and immoral. On the contrary, they see the 
natural childish impulses to self-gratification and self-indulgence as impulses that need to be 
modified and redirected, and their natural impulses to love and generosity and fairness as 
impulses that need to be developed; they see the naturally self-centred perspective of children 
as something that has to be enlarged—for the child's own sake” (Hursthouse 1999, 175). 
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He adds: 
 
The reason that filial piety is connected with all these virtues is precisely that 
parents desire their children to be virtuous, and children’s being virtuous brings 
honor to their parents, while their being vicious brings disgrace to them. Thus 
an important task of a filial person is to go through self-cultivation to become a virtuous 
person. (Huang 2013, 131; emphasis added) 
 
This point can be further supported by my relational virtue theory, which 
understands being filial as the appropriate response to the parent’s virtuousness as 
parents. If being virtuous as parents involves being concerned with the child’s being 
virtuous, and if being filial involves making sure to realize what the parent is 
(reasonably) concerned about her, then it would be plausible to claim that being 
virtuous, as well as being happy, is an important part of filial piety. The Confucian 
conception of an ideal parent-child relationship puts emphasis on parents and children 
making each other morally better persons. In such a relationship, if one participant 
does not care about the other’s moral character, this indifference would make her 
defective as a parent or as a child.59 Therefore, filial piety as a (relational) virtue 
involves self-cultivation with respect to overall virtuousness.  
 We can find what can be called the reflexive structure of concern for well-being 
involved in parental virtue and filial piety. That is, doing what is good for oneself is 
part of doing what is good for one’s parents, that is, of exercising filial piety. I think it 
reveals a very important feature constituting desirable intimate relationships like a 
                                           
59 In this sense, Confucian partiality does not necessarily go against the impartial or ‘inclusive’ 
morality. 
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parent-child relationship. They are not relationships in which each participant’s 
interests are to be considered separately; for intimates, the interest of each is part of 
that of the other. In other words, insofar as the intimate relationship maintains, one’s 
own interests affect the others, so self-interests and those of others are not sharply 
divided. This is part of the reason why I think the idea of owing or ‘debt’ to one’s 
parents fails to make sense of the nature of filial piety.  
Let me draw an analogy from a self-to-self relationship. Suppose, for example, 
that Liam at the age of twenty-five (call him Liam25) works very hard to make money 
to enjoy a comfortable life in his old age. As a result, Liam at the age of 65 (call him 
Liam65) leads a very comfortable and relaxed life. Here it would be absurd to say 
Liam65 owes anything to Liam25. It is not just because Liam25—who is supposed to be 
the recipient of the repayment—no longer exists and thus it is impossible to repay; 
rather, it is because what Liam25 did was in a sense for his own sake.  
Similarly, suppose that Hak in our story works very hard to promote the well-
being of his daughter, Chung. If he is a parentally virtuous father, he would do so not 
only for her sake but also for his own sake. Hak would deserve Chung’s gratitude, all 
the more for the fact that he enjoyed and became happier by taking care of her. What 
he did for her is not in the prospect of getting repaid by her—in which case it faces the 
problem of indebtedness—or from a sense of duty—in which case it is hard to explain 
why he merits gratitude from her. A parentally virtuous father should be appreciated 
for his special love and care for his child that transform the purely altruistic act of 
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helping another person into a partly self-interested act at the same time.60 In this sense, 
if Hak lacks love for Chung and her well-being does not make him happier, and raise 
her primarily from a sense of duty or purely selfish motives, then it means that he is 
not fully virtuous as a parent. If so, it makes more sense to talk about Chung’s repaying 
a debt to her father, since what benefits her and what benefits him diverge from each 
other in this case. In that case, however, the intimacy that distinguishes intimate 
relationships—like a parent-child relationship—from other relationships would be 
gone. We would end up talking about a benefactor-beneficiary relationship. 
Harry Frankfurt touches on a similar idea when he discusses the apparent 
paradox that love is supposed to be disinterested and self-interested at the same time. On 
the one hand, he claims that love is supposed to be disinterested in that a lover “desires 
the well-being of his beloved for its own sake rather than only for the sake of ways in 
which it might support or promote other interests” (Frankfurt 1998, 4-5; emphasis 
added). On the other, love is self-interested given that the activity of loving makes the 
lover’s life worthwhile in a crucial aspect and a life without it will be “miserably 
deprived” (Frankfurt 1998, 7). How are we to solve this paradox, if it is one? Frankfurt 
argues that this appearance of conflict will disappear once we understand that “what 
serves the self-interest of the lover is, precisely, the fact that his love is disinterest. The 
benefit of loving accrues to him only if he is genuinely selfless. He fulfills his own need 
only because in loving he forgets himself” (Frankfurt 1998, 8).  
                                           
60 In Nicomachean Ethics VIII. 12., Aristotle makes a similar point: “A parent…loves his children 
as [he loves] himself” (Aristotle 1999, 1161b17-18).  
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I generally agree with Frankfurt’s analysis of what loving someone is like. But 
I would like to add that what makes a lover’s life more worthwhile is the loving 
relationship and the relational activities involved, rather than just the activity of loving, 
which might be understood in a one-sided sense. This point gets clearer if we consider 
that every lover prefers being loved back by the beloved to just engaging in unrequited 
love. If someone prefers unrequited love, we may rightly suspect that it is a case of 
fetish, not love.  
Given this reflexive structure, it makes sense to say that a child’s taking good 
care of oneself and trying to become a child who makes her parents proud is part of 
being filial. As the line in Analects 2.6 suggests, not becoming or not acting like a 
vicious person is also part of being filial, since a parentally virtuous parent would not 
want her child to be a vicious person. In this sense, both the parents who take 
advantage of their child for their own self-interest and those who try to promote their 
child’s well-being even if that involves her becoming vicious, lack full parental virtue. 
 
5.2.3. Postmortem Filial Piety 
 
The last remarkable feature of Confucian filial piety is that it considers acting 
and feeling in an appropriate way after one’s parents pass away as a very important part 
of being filial. This aspect of filial piety, which we can call postmortem filial piety, has 
been heavily emphasized in the Confucian tradition. The following are the passages 
from Analects that shows the emphasis on postmortem filial piety:  
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1.11 “When someone’s father is still alive, observe his intentions; after his father 
has passed away, observe his conduct. If for three years he does not alter the ways 
of his father, he may be called a filial son.” (See also 4.20) 
 
2.5 “When your parents are alive, serve them in accordance with the rites; when 
they pass away, bury them in accordance with the rites and sacrifice to them in 
accordance with the rites.” 
 
17.21 “When the gentleman is in mourning [for his parents], he gets no pleasure 
from eating sweet foods, finds no joy in listening to music, and feels no comfort 
in his place of dwelling. This is why he gives up these things.” (Confucius 2003; 
emphasis added) 
 
The Classics of Filial Piety also describes what a proper postmortem filial piety 
would be like in more detail:  
 
The Master said, “When a filial son is mourning for a parent, he wails, but not 
with a prolonged sobbing; in the movements of ceremony he pays no attention 
to his appearance; his words are without elegance of phrase; he cannot bear to 
wear fine clothes; when he bears music, he feels no delight; when he eats a 
delicacy, he is not conscious of its flavour—such is the nature of grief and sorrow. 
After three days he may partake of food; for thus the people are taught that 
the living should not be injured on account of the dead, and that emaciation 
must not be carried to the extinction of life—such is the rule of the sages. The 
period of mourning does not go beyond three years, to show the people that it 
must have an end. 
An inner and outer coffin are made; the grave-clothes also are put on, and 
the shroud; and (the body) is lifted (into the coffin). The sacrificial vessels, round 
and square, are (regularly) set forth, and (the sight of them) fills (the mourners) 
with (fresh) distress'. The women beat their breasts, and the men stamp with 
their feet, wailing and weeping, while they sorrowfully escort the coffin to the 
grave. They consult the tortoise-shell to determine the grave and the ground 
about it, and there they lay the body in peace. They prepare the ancestral temple 
(to receive the tablet of the departed), and their present offerings to the 
disembodied spirit. In spring and autumn they offer sacrifices, thinking of the 
deceased as the seasons come around. 
The services of love and reverence to parents when alive, and those of grief 
and sorrow to them when dead—these completely discharge the fundamental duty 
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of living men. The righteous claims of life and death are all satisfied, and the filial 
son’s service of his parents is completed. (Legge 2004, Ch. 18; emphasis added) 
 
Although some specific suggestions—e.g., a three-year mourning period or 
specific manners of conducting the ceremony—may sound outdated or unfit for 
certain cultures, at least the basic idea that filial piety requires expressing sorrow, 
longing, gratitude, and respect for one’s deceased parents does not sound implausible. 
Even if someone supports and takes care of her parents when they are alive, we would 
have a good reason to doubt her filial piety if she does nothing that manifests her 
sorrow, longing, or gratitude, when they pass away. If filial piety involves appropriate 
inner attitudes toward one’s parents, there would be filial and unfilial ways to cherish 
or express them even when they no longer exist. In this sense, what one does and feels 
when one’s parents pass away—not just when they are alive—is a very important 
aspect of filial piety.  
One might argue that, insofar as the point of being filial is a matter of benefiting 
one’s parents, postmortem filial piety does not make sense since, when they pass away, 
people who are supposed to be benefited by the filial actions will be gone as well. This 
might be the reason why contemporary Western theories of filial piety rarely address 
postmortem filial piety, narrowly focusing on what the child ought to do for her 
parents while they are alive. However, for the following reasons, I believe filial piety 
can still be meaningful even when the parents no longer exist.  
First, even if the parents as beneficiaries of filial actions are no longer alive, 
cherishing and expressing appropriate filial inner attitudes—such as sorrow and longing 
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for the parents—can be part of what filial piety as a virtue requires. Some possible 
ways to do so includes trying to live in a way parents wished us to live, participating 
in a memorial service for them, or feeling sad about the fact that they no longer exist 
beside us. Of course, it may hard to say that those activities benefit the parents 
themselves in a strict sense since the people for whom those activities are supposed to 
be good no longer exist. However, insofar as being filial is not just about the parents 
but also partly about the child’s being a good person, filial piety can still be meaningful 
even if the parents—the potential beneficiary of filial piety—no longer exist. For 
example, insofar as cultivating one’s virtue is to live as one’s parental parents wish one 
to live, to keep striving to become more virtuous even after the parents’ death can also 
be understood as part of being filial. It can also be a way of bringing honor to one’s 
deceased parents or fulfilling the desire to be remembered and cherished they had 
when they were alive. 
 Moreover, the general idea of postmortem morality, where the target of moral 
action or attitude is not alive, is already familiar to us since we are often required to 
do something for someone even if she does not exist anymore. During Memorial Day, 
for example, people express their gratitude to the soldiers who died for their own 
country through a moment of silent prayer. Suppose that someone shouts, in the 
middle of the silence, “What’s the whole point of this ceremony? There is no one left 
to feel honored by this ceremony of silence. Let’s just stop it now!” People would 
rightly blame this person for her ingratitude or some other inappropriate attitude.61 
                                           
61 One might argue that the actual point of such a ceremony is impact on those who are alive—
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Such a ceremony may not be productive or beneficial since it does not promote the 
good of those who are being commemorated, but it can be meaningful at least as an 
act that expresses the participant’s virtuous inner attitudes—in this case, the respect 
and gratitude for those who made the sacrifice for their country.  
 Some might still argue against the normative significance of postmortem filial 
piety on the grounds that, when the parents pass away, the parent-child relationship will 
be gone as well. Given that filial piety as a relational virtue presupposes a parent-child 
relationship, this argument seems to have a point. However, as Kathryn Norlock 
convincingly argues, “the relationships bereaved persons may maintain with the dead 
are meaningful even when they are no longer reciprocal, and not merely limited to 
past impressions” (Norlock, 342). For example, “fulfilling the wishes of the dead or 
forgiving the dead” can be regarded as important aspects of an ongoing relationship 
(Norlock 2017, 343-344). Sometimes a personal relationship can meaningfully persist 
even after one of its participants passes away, insofar as it continues to influence the 
living participant in a way that is sufficiently similar to the way a relationship with a 
living person would do. Thus, if there can be a meaningful and ‘real’ relationship 
between live children and dead parents as she argues, the idea of postmortem filial 
piety would mean more than mere self-consolation or pursuit of fantasy. 
 
                                           
say, the effect of fostering patriotism of the next generation—rather than expression of 
gratitude. However, if people have such external considerations in their mind while 
participating in the ceremony, we may doubt whether they have genuine inner attitude toward 
the target of the memorial ceremony.  
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5.3. Confucianism vs. The Relational Virtue Theory 
 
My relational virtue theory shares some aspects of the Confucian view of filial 
piety. Like the Confucian view, the relational virtue theory regards filial piety as a 
virtue, emphasizes the close connection between self-cultivation and filial piety, and 
acknowledges the importance of postmortem filial piety. However, there are 
important differences that distinguish my theory from the Confucian view. For 
example, while Confucianism emphasizes the biological relationship between the 
parents and the child, my theory puts more emphasis on substantial social 
relationships. Also, while Confucianism views the child’s self-abnegation or self-
sacrifice as an important part of filial piety, my theory does not require the child’s 
sacrifice per se, insofar as the circumstances are favorable enough to allow her to 
express special love and gratitude to her parents without suffering genuine loss. 
Another difference is that Confucianism emphasizes the filial person’s reverence and 
respect toward her parents, while my theory puts more emphasis on spontaneous 
favorable emotions such as love.  
Let me finish this chapter by discussing what I take to be the most important 
difference between Confucianism and my relational virtue theory. While 
Confucianism, or at least a version of it, attaches normative requirements on the family 
role such as the role of father and son, my theory focuses more on the particular 
individuals who occupy those roles and the particular relationship they have. As 
Roger Ames and Jr. Henry Rosemont observes, “Confucian normativity is defined by 
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living one’s family roles to maximum effect” (Ames and Henry Jr 2011, 19). 
Confucianism assigns specific roles to the members of the society—family included—
and specifies what is legitimately expected from the person who occupies the 
particular kind of role. For example, in Analects 12.11., when Confucius is asked about 
governing, he says, “Let the king be kingly, the ministers ministerial, the fathers 
fatherly, and the sons son-like” (Confucius 2003). This remark emphasizes the point 
that the society will function well when its members play their social roles in a proper 
way. The virtue of filial piety in Confucianism, then, is to be understood as particular 
character traits which should be held by an individual insofar as she occupies the role 
of someone’s child in order to flourish within that particular role.  
However, on a version of the Confucian conception, any child is required to 
strive to live as a filial child “irrespective of the contingent particularities of the family” 
(Wee 2014, 91), regardless of how relationally virtuous her parents are to her or 
whether the parents are in a good relationship with her. Such an aspect of Confucian 
filial piety can be found in the story of the sage-king Shun, who is admired as an 
exemplary filial person in the Confucian tradition (see Mencius 5A1-2). Shun’s parents 
were far from being virtuous as parents; they not only hated Shun but even attempted 
to kill him multiple times by burning the granary when he was on its roof and by 
asking him to dig a well and then covering it over. Even though Shun’s parents were 
despicable and more than abusive to him, he kept acting filially to them and tried to 
please then even when he was fifty, and “he did not even hold a grudge against them, 
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although he suffered [from his parents’ hatred] (lao er bu yuan 勞而不怨)”62 (Mencius 
5A1).  
In contrast, as already mentioned, my relational virtue theory understands a 
child’s being filial is required as an appropriate response to the parents’ being parental. My 
view is more flexible than Confucianism in that the requirement of a relational virtue, 
say filial piety, may vary with the particular qualities of the intimate in question. In 
particular, the requirement of filial piety on a child can vary depending especially on 
how parentally virtuous the parents are. Therefore, on my theory, given that his 
parents are vicious as parents, Shun has a reasonable excuse to be less filial to his 
parents than those whose parents are more parental. 
Thus, according to the relational virtue theory, if the parents are extremely 
vicious as parents—e.g., abusive, derelict or oppressive—then the child would be at 
least allowed to be less than fully filial to her parents. For example, if Shun had decided 
not to take care of his parents after their multiple attempts to kill him, it would have 
been morally permissible and not blameworthy, according to the relational virtue 
theory. In contrast, Confucian role ethics, which specifies what the role—say, the role 
of being someone’s child—requires without knowing about the particular individual 
occupying the role in question, may blame Shun despite his parents’ cruelty if he does 
not support and care for his parents for failing to fulfill his role as their child, that is, for 
failing to act as a filial child.  
Note that this aspect of my theory does not imply that a person who is or tries 
                                           
62 The phrase “lao er bu yuan 勞而不怨” is also found in Analects 4.18. 
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to be filial even to the parents who do not deserve it is not praiseworthy or admirable 
for that. Such a person is admirable in the similar sense that a victim who forgives and 
embraces the assailant even if she has a good reason not to do so—that is, the fact that 
the latter harmed the former. The point here is just that, on my theory, the requirement 
of filial piety can be alleviated if one’s parents are sufficiently vicious as parents. In an 
extreme case like Shun’s, demanding him to love, thank, and revere such vicious 
parents can amount to demanding him to commit himself to servility and abandon his 
own self-respect. My theory does not make such a demand. 
 
5.4. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have discussed some important aspects of Confucian filial 
piety. I have argued that filial piety is meaningful and important when the child is 
young and dependent and even when the parents pass away, as well as that filial piety 
should be understood as closely related to self-cultivation. I have also discussed how 
my relational virtue theory can lend support to those filial practices that have been 
emphasized in the Confucian tradition. Although there can be controversy over the 
issue of which particular attitudes and behaviors are manded by postmortem filial 
piety, we can make sense of filial piety even after parents pass away, especially when 
filial piety is understood as a virtue. When understood as a virtue, especially as a 
relational virtue, filial piety’s relation to other aspects of our ethical life can be 
understood more clearly.  
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Insofar as the parent-child relationship is one of the most important personal 
relationships in human life, how to become a good child to one’s parents and why is a 
very important ethical issue. I have attempted to suggest a new insight into the issue 
of filial piety so that we can see the importance and richness of parent-child 
relationship better. I hope my suggestion can contribute to understanding this 
complex yet significant realm of morality.   
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Chapter 6. Friendship and Relational Virtue 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In previous chapters, I introduced the idea of relational virtue and explained 
how we can understand filial piety as a paradigmatic example of relational virtue. This 
chapter introduces the virtue of friendship as another important example of relational 
virtue. The introduction of the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue has two aims. 
First, it helps us to see that the idea of relational virtue does not only apply to a parent-
child relationship but also to other kinds of intimate relationships such as a close 
friendship. I chose friendship because it is meaningfully different from a parent-child 
relationship. Second, the virtue of friendship shows how we can better understand 
some of the philosophical puzzles concerning friendship.  
I focus on showing how friendship and the virtue of friendship are related to 
morality or moral virtues in general. First, I show that the virtue of friendship is 
significantly different from virtues involved in a parent-child relationship such as filial 
piety or parental virtue. Next, I argue that being virtuous to people in general is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for being virtuous as a friend. Then I argue that friendship is 
not inherently in conflict with morality and that the virtue of friendship should be 
weighed against other moral virtues on the same ethical scale. 
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6.2. Friendship vs. Parent-Child Relationship 
 
Friendship and a parent-child relationship are both paradigmatic examples of 
intimate relationships. They share central features of an intimate relationship such as 
mutual caring, closeness, and shared activities. In both relationships, each participant 
is supposed to have concern for the other for her own sake and care about her as a 
particular person and as someone special. Despite such similarities, there are 
meaningful differences that warrant the separate scrutiny on friendship and related 
virtues. A parent-child relationship and friendship differ in at least two important 
aspects: hierarchy and voluntariness.  
First, while the relationship between children and parents is hierarchical, 
friends are related to each other as equals.63 Children are physically and mentally 
dependent on—and thus unequal to—their parents at least for many years. Until the 
children grow up to become independent adults, they need to be protected, nourished, 
cared for, and educated by their parents. Parents give to the children something that 
children cannot pay back. For example, the children can never give birth to their 
parents or give them an educational opportunity that will form their identity in the 
way their parents have given to them. As P. J. Ivanhoe emphasizes, parents “play a 
critical and decisive role in the formation of the child’s character, values, and 
                                           
63  Although I use the term ‘friendship’ broadly enough to cover many different types of 
relationships—such as romantic partnership and intimate relationships between siblings—I 
take it to be a relationship between equals. Thus, at least in my usage, it is inappropriate to use 
the term ‘friendship’ to refer to a hierarchical relationship such as a master-slave relationship 
or a teacher-student relationship.  
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sensibilities” (Ivanhoe 2007, 307). According to Ivanhoe, filial piety “is partially 
constituted by the sense that the kindness one has received was done by someone who 
was dramatically more powerful than oneself and who sacrificed substantial goods of 
their own in order to care for one in these ways” (Ivanhoe 2007, 307). Thus, a child 
begins the parent-child relationship with the sense of ‘owing’ something, which 
grounds the asymmetry in the relationship from the beginning.  
In contrast, “friendship characteristically exists between equals or at least 
between people similar in status, power, and abilities” (Ivanhoe 2007, 307). Except for 
some special cases, friends are on equal status to each other and they are in a position 
to give something or some favor back whenever they can do so. In the case of 
friendship, when one of the friends is always on the giving side and the other is always 
in the receiving side, there is a danger of transforming the relationship from friendship 
to the relationship of servility or other deteriorate kind of relationship. Suppose that 
Aiden always tells his friend Britney about what to do, meddles in all the important 
affairs, and tries to educate her, as if he is her parent. In this relationship, Aiden would 
be appropriately charged for his paternalism, and it would be a case of an ‘unhealthy’ 
friendship, if it is one at all.64  
This asymmetry and the dependent relationship give the parents superior 
status and power at least for a substantial time, which makes it difficult for parents 
and child to form the relationship of equals. The charge of paternalism does not apply 
                                           
64 Note that I am not arguing for strict symmetry in friendship. I tend to agree with Norvin 
Richards’ claim that “every friendship has its own shape, and the shape need not be 
symmetrical” (Richards 1989, 239). My point is just that even the degree of asymmetry that is 
normal in a parent-child relationship can be appropriately regarded as a defect in friendship.  
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to the relationship between parents and young children. In this sense, the relationship 
between parents and children is vertical. In contrast, friendship is horizontal in that the 
relationship between friends is more or less equal.  
The second feature that distinguishes friendship from the parent-child 
relationship is voluntariness. We never choose our parents. A parent-child relationship 
is formed without any choice from the children’s side, and usually not with any 
meaningful choice on the parents’ side either (certainly not as to the particulars). The 
children happen to be born and raised by the given parents and one day they just find 
themselves being some particular individuals’ children. We cannot decide to have 
different parents even though, in rare cases, we may be able to leave the parent-child 
relationship. In contrast, friendship involves more voluntariness in the formation of 
the relationship. Hardly anyone can be forced to be a friend to a particular individual. 
If someone is actually forced to do so and if that is the only reason why someone is a 
friend to someone else, then that seems to be a good reason to doubt that they have 
formed a genuine friendship from the beginning.  
By saying that friendship is a matter of choice, I do not mean to claim that 
friendship is generally formed when both parties consciously decide to be friends at a 
particular moment. Unlike making a contract, friendship is usually formed gradually 
over time as the people involved interact with each other. Moreover, friendship may 
be seen as a result of natural sentiments and emotions, which are not usually within 
our rational control. Thus, entering into friendship may not as voluntary as it first 
seems. However, a genuine friendship is a matter of choice in the moderate sense that 
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there should be at least an implicit agreement or lack of disagreement on both parties’ 
being friends. No one simply happens to find herself in friendship with someone she 
hates to be friends with.  
Making a friend is also a matter of choice in the significant sense that there is 
a real exit option, which is also symmetrical as between the friends. In other words, 
there is more freedom in leaving a friendship than in leaving a parent-child 
relationship. In normal cases, parents have a duty to take care of their child at least 
until the child becomes an independent adult. Parents’ negligence towards their child 
is often appropriately blamed. It is also not free for a child to break the parent-child 
relationship with her parents, especially considering what her parents have offered 
her from her birth. This is one of the main problems with Jane English’s friendship 
view on filial duty, according to which parent-child relationship should be understood 
as a form of friendship (see English 1992). 
In contrast, there is no comparable binding force in friendship. Friendship is 
formed or at least maintained based on each friend’s voluntary—possibly implicit—
agreement to be friends. For example, if John decides to break his friendship with Jane 
for some reason, she cannot maintain it just because, say, she likes him, needs him, or 
gave many good things to him. As Simon Keller points out, “an important aspect of 
the value of friendship is its being freely entered into and maintained; one thing that 
is essential to the good of having friends is their being your friends not out of duty, 
but because that is what they want” (Keller 2007, 130). One cannot beg or force 
someone else to be or continue to be one’s friend since such lack of voluntariness 
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disqualifies that relationship as a friendship.  
 
6.3. Friendship and Virtue 
 
 As we have seen that friendship is significantly different from a parent-child 
relationship, we are now in a position to examine the virtue of friendship as a relational 
virtue that is distinct from both filial piety and parental virtue. The virtue of friendship 
is, roughly put, is a disposition to act, feel, and think appropriately as someone’s friend. 
Note that it is to be distinguished from friendliness, which is a disposition to make 
friends or become friends with other people easily or to be nice and ‘friendly’ to people 
in general. Such a character trait would be described more precisely as affability or 
amiability. In contrast, having the virtue of friendship is a matter of being a good 
friend in an existing friendship. The virtue of friendship presupposes a friendship with 
a particular individual and concerns the disposition in relation to that individual. Not 
all cases of friendship are equal. Some friendships are not desirable or worth having, 
while others are going very well and greatly contribute to each participant’s 
flourishing. In my view, a friendship is good to the extent that each participant 
possesses and exercises the virtue of friendship in relation to the other. In other words, 
the virtue of friendship is the disposition of the friends in question that make the given 
friendship go well as friendship.   
 Before analyzing the virtue of friendship further, it would be helpful to briefly 
discuss what I think makes a friendship good qua friendship. Although there can be 
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various good-making features of friendship, let me introduce just a few of them that 
are particularly relevant to the current discussion. First, in a good friendship, one cares 
about the other for her own sake in the way one would not in relation to a non-friend. 
Thus, if one regards one’s friend as a mere instrument to one’s own well-being or if 
one treats her in the same way one treats a stranger, then the friendship in question 
would be less than ideal to that extent. Relatedly, a good friendship gives a special 
sense of belonging through each participant’s love, care, and trust for the other. This 
sense of belonging typically contributes to alleviating the participants’ loneliness and 
heightening their sense of self-worth. A good friendship also tends to complement the 
defects and flaws that its participants have as individuals. Moreover, a good friendship 
helps its participants become better people or remain to be good people if they are 
already perfect. Although an individual person’s virtuous character may not be a 
good-making feature of friendship, the friendship’s tendency to have a positive impact 
on its participants’ character can be regarded as an important factor that makes a given 
friendship good as friendship.  
 Now let us discuss how the virtue of friendship is connected to a good 
friendship. Aristotle hinted the idea of the virtue of friendship as a virtue required for 
a good friend when he said, “[friendship] is a virtue; or it involves virtue” (Aristotle 
1999, 1155a4). However, he does not make it clear whether he understands friendship 
as a virtue or something accompanied by a virtue such as a passion, a relationship, or 
a set of activities. He seems to use ‘friendship’ in different senses in different contexts. 
But as Kristján Kristjánsson points out, Aristotle does not adequately explain what 
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friendship as a virtue would be like.65 One important goal of my introducing the 
concept of the virtue of friendship is to explain what friendship as a virtue would be 
like, although the specific contents of this virtue may not be the same as what Aristotle 
himself had in his mind.66  
I believe this understanding can help us solve many puzzles with regard to 
friendship, especially the relationship between friendship and virtue. In what follows, 
I would like to make two points to show how my idea of the virtue of friendship helps 
us view friendship in a new light. First, being virtuous to people in general is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for being virtuous as a friend. Second, the virtue of friendship 
is not inherently in conflict with morality.  
 
 6.3.1. Being Generally Virtuous is Not Necessary for Being Virtuous as a Friend  
 
Let me begin with the relationship between being a generally virtuous person 
and being virtuous as a friend. Not all friendships are equally good. Some of our 
friends are better friends than others. I believe a good friendship is one between people 
                                           
65 “Aristotle does not provide the standard description of friendship qua virtue in terms of a 
golden mean between two extreme forms of excess and deficiency” (Kristjánsson 2018, 16, note 
2). 
66 In explaining Aristotle’s view on friendship, Kristjánsson seems to have in mind something 
similar to what I call the virtue friendship: Aristotle understands [friendship] simultaneously 
as ‘a virtue’ or a relation between people that ‘involves virtue’ (1985, p. 207 [1155a1–2])….The 
capacity to give and receive (a particular kind of) love regularly and in the right way (by both 
loving and being loved, see 1985, p. 222 [1159a27–29]) would thus constitute a trait-like 
personal quality, potentially representing a virtue” (Kristjánsson 2018, 2; emphasis added). 
However, Kristjánsson focuses on friendship as a relation and does not further discuss what 
friendship as a virtue would be like.  
142 
 
who are virtuous as friends in relation to each other. Some philosophers, most notably 
Aristotle, believe that being virtuous, independently of the friendship in question, is 
necessary for a friend to form an ideal friendship. I admit that a generally virtuous 
person—or a person who is virtuous to people in general—is more likely to make good 
friends and be herself a good friend to them. I also admit that the friendship between 
generally virtuous individuals is likely to flourish and last longer than one between 
vicious individuals. However, one does not necessarily have to be a generally virtuous 
person in order to be virtuous as a friend to someone. It is a myth that the best 
friendship is one between the best individuals.  
Aristotle famously argues that the best form of friendship is a friendship of 
virtue or “virtue friendship.” The friendship of virtue, which he takes to be an ideal 
form of friendship, is possible only between virtuous individuals. It implies that the best 
form of friendship is impossible if all the participants are already virtuous individuals. 
This view has some plausibility. At least, I agree with a more moderate claim that 
“thoroughly bad people cannot be good friends…all things being equal” (Elder 2014, 
87). An extremely selfish, unkind, and ungrateful person may not be able to form a 
good friendship with anyone else, although she may be able to take advantage of other 
people who she calls ‘friends.’ If Julia Driver is right to claim that “there is a duty to 
not love someone as a fitting response to that person’s bad qualities” (Driver 2014, 5), 
then we may have a good reason—perhaps even a duty—to leave a friendship with an 
extremely vicious person. 
However, it does not mean that one has to be a generally virtuous (e.g., 
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benevolent, honest, caring, etc.) person to form a good friendship with a particular 
person. For it seems possible and even plausible for someone to be concerned about 
and kind to a particular friend while lacking general virtues such as benevolence or 
kindness. In other words, being virtuous to a particular individual does not require 
being virtuous to people in general. What is necessary for being virtuous as a friend is 
what Gopal Sreenivasan calls minimal moral decency, which indicates “a certain 
minimum standard of general moral performance before any specific disposition of 
[the agent] is dignified with the title of ‘virtue’’’ (Sreenivasan 2009, 207). Thus, for 
example, an agent who reliably acts in a compassionate way would not count as 
having the moral virtue of compassion if she otherwise fails to show minimal moral 
decency. This standard can exclude courageous serial killers while permitting 
compassionate pick-pockets (Sreenivasan 2009, 208). If we accept this idea, a person 
who fails to have minimal moral decency would not count as having the virtue of 
friendship. For example, a psychopath cannot be a good friend of anyone while an 
intemperate person can be.  
While my conception of good friendship requires the participants to have 
minimal moral decency, it does not require them to be generally virtuous as an 
individual independently of the friendship. In my conception, what goodness of 
friendship qua friendship requires is that the participants have the relevant relational 
virtues in relation to one another, rather than a virtue in general. Being a good friend 
is possible at least to some extent even for a person who is not, say, generally 
benevolent or courageous. In other words, a good friendship is one in which each 
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participant has the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue, not necessarily a 
friendship of virtue in Aristotle’s sense.  
Moreover, it seems too quick to claim that friendship between generally 
virtuous persons is simply better qua friendship than one between less-than-fully-
virtuous persons just because the participants are better or more virtuous qua 
individuals.67 To make this claim would be to commit a fallacy of composition. That is, 
we cannot simply claim—at least not without a separate argument—that the 
friendship in which perfectly virtuous individuals engage in virtuous activities 
together is better qua friendship than the friendship in which decent individuals 
embrace and complement each other’s imperfection and help one another to become 
a better person. This is at least partly because there are activities characteristic of a 
good friendship that are not possible within a friendship between perfectly virtuous 
individuals.  
First, forbearing and embracing the imperfection of one’s friend at least to a 
reasonable degree is an important part of good friendship. If a person harshly criticizes 
or even break her relationship with her friend for the friend’s trivial blemishes—e.g., 
a moderate degree of laziness, irascibleness, or rashness—then the former would be 
even more defective as a friend than the latter. We may call an attitude of having an 
excessively high (moral) standard for other people moral fastidiousness. More generally, 
I think being generous about other people’s defects is an important part of virtue for 
                                           
67 Blum seems to express a similar idea when he says, “a friendship in which the friend’s moral 
virtue is the grounds of the friendship [is not] necessarily a morally superior form of friendship. 
Such a grounding does not seem to me what we mean by ‘caring for another for his own sake’” 
(Blum 1980, 216).  
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human beings, who are, almost by nature, imperfect in many respects. Moral 
fastidiousness is undesirable in general, and it is an especially bad quality to have as a 
friend. It seems that being virtuous as a friend involves trying to understand and 
embrace the friend’s defects or faults even if other people in the world condemn her. 
Therefore, to forbear and to embrace the friend’s imperfection to a reasonable degree 
is an important aspect of a good friendship.  
This aspect can be understood as a special case of the general requirement 
imposed by any virtue. In general, a virtuous person responds to the situation in an 
appropriate way no matter how unfavorable the given situation is, rather than acting 
appropriately only in favorable situations. For example, a virtuous person in a 
battlefield would cope with the given unfavorable situation most appropriately (say, 
courageously). To use an analogy, a virtuous person is more like an artisan who makes 
the most out of whatever tools she has than one who works only with excellent tools.  
This point can be applied to a person who is virtuous as a friend since 
sometimes the friend’s qualities (e.g., character or personality) may be the factor that 
makes the circumstance ‘unfavorable.’ In this sense, the virtue of friendship involves 
a disposition to forbear and embrace the defects and flaws of one’s friend and perhaps 
those of the friendship itself. For example, a relationally virtuous friend is different 
from a ‘fair-weather’ friend in that she has a reasonable degree of robustness in her 
attitude toward her friend.68 Insofar as the friend’s defects or flaws do not go beyond 
                                           
68 There might be some cases where the flaw or vice of the intimate in question is beyond any 
reasonable forbearance. For example, it may be reasonable or appropriate for me to end the 
friendship if my friend carries on with my spouse. In such extreme cases, I believe, the virtue 
of friendship would not demand me to forbear, embrace, or forgive that friend for what he did 
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a reasonable degree, a relationally virtuous person would remain as such in relation 
to the given friend despite their defects or flaws. Blum hints on this point when he says 
as follows:  
 
One does not need to regard someone as a virtuous person in order to care 
for him as a friend; nor in caring for him for his own sake need one focus 
primarily on whatever morally virtuous qualities he has. (Blum 1980, 82) 
 
For example, if your friend breaks off the friendship with you upon 
discovering that you do not have the perfection they expected, it would be reasonable 
to say that she lacks the virtue of friendship to that extent. Given that the character of 
one’s friend is at least reasonably virtuous, other defects do not necessarily seem to 
constitute the reason to think that she is defective as her friend. Thus, the forbearance 
to sustain the friendship in the face of some flaws is an important part of the virtue of 
friendship as a relational virtue.  
Another important aspect of the virtue of friendship is the disposition to help 
one’s friend to become a better person. A relationally virtuous person does not stop at 
merely forbearing and embracing her friend’s defects. If appropriate, she would try 
her best to help the friend overcome the defects and become a better person while 
forbearing and embracing her just the way she currently is. Insofar as one cares about 
one’s friend in a similar way that one cares about oneself, one would care about and 
act for the good of one’s friend for her own sake. If so, insofar as it is better for the 
                                           
and who he is. 
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friend to overcome or correct her defects, it would be natural to expect her good friend 
to put efforts to lead her to become a better or more virtuous person by doing so. For 
example, the virtue of friendship would require one to give objective and accurate 
advice to one’s friend in a right context or even to criticize her in a reasonable way 
insofar as that is helpful for the friend’s own good.  
One might suspect that embracing a friend’s defects is in tension with helping 
her correct them. But they are compatible. Embracing the friend’s defects means to 
love and care for her even if she does not change herself in a positive direction. On the 
other hand, helping one’s friend to correct her defects is to do so for the friend’s own 
sake in the belief that such an improvement will be good for the friend herself. Of 
course, one should not go far enough to the level of paternalism in helping one’s friend 
correct her flaws and improve her character. For example, if someone strongly resists 
correcting her defects, it would be paternalistic for her friend to force her to change 
them, even if it is better for the person’s own sake to correct them. It is a matter of 
respecting the given person’s autonomy or the ability to determine her own life. Still, 
the virtue of friendship would demand one to help one’s friend correct her defects 
insofar as it does not reach the level of paternalism. 
I believe there is something distinctively valuable in the friendship in which 
each participant embraces and helps correct the other’s defects. We are imperfect 
creatures after all. That is why we need friendship more than perfect beings like gods 
or angels do. Then an important inherent function of a good friendship would be to 
embrace and improve the character of each participant, thereby helping each other to 
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lead a more flourishing life in a way that would not have been possible without the 
friendship.  
Such value, which is characteristic of a good friendship, is not found in a 
friendship of virtue or one between perfectly virtuous individuals since it presupposes 
the friend’s defects and flaws as an individual. In other words, if the participants of 
friendship are perfectly virtuous individuals, then there is no room for mutual 
forbearance, embracement, or improvement. Of course, there would be a value in a 
perfectly virtuous person’s engaging in virtuous activities together with another 
virtuous person. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that such activities 
are more valuable than the activities of forbearance, embracement, and improvement 
in the friendship among imperfect individuals. In this sense, the friendship between 
perfectly virtuous persons may not be simply better qua friendship than one between 
persons who are not. Sometimes a friendship can be more beautiful when it embraces, 
complement, and improve the imperfection of the individuals involved in the 
relationship.  
 
 6.3.2. Being Generally Virtuous is Not Sufficient for Being Virtuous as a Friend 
 
I have argued that being generally virtuous is not necessary for being virtuous 
as a friend insofar as one has minimal moral decency and that some distinctively 
valuable activities within the friendship presuppose the imperfection of the friend as 
an individual. Now let me show that being generally virtuous is not sufficient for being 
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virtuous as a friend either.  
One might claim that being virtuous as a friend amounts to possessing general 
virtues—e.g., benevolence, honesty, and kindness—and exercising them in relation to 
one’s friend. However, there are reasons to believe that being generally virtuous in this 
sense is not sufficient for being virtuous as a friend and therefore that the virtue of 
friendship is a virtue that is distinct from other virtues. First of all, the virtue of 
friendship involves having a special attitude in relation to the friend in question. As 
Aristotle acknowledges, goodwill understood as general altruism is not sufficient for 
friendship. Nancy Sherman puts this point clearly when she explains Aristotle’s view 
as follows:  
 
Thus, friendship goes beyond goodwill, insofar as it is directed toward a 
specific person, not easily substituted by others (cf. [Nicomachean Ethics] NE 
IX.5). So I may have a well-cultivated sense of altruism or even be a friendly 
sort of person and one who tends to treat my friends well, but the exercise of 
those virtuous states does not itself secure for me the good of friendship. For 
that, I have to become attached to a particular person, and another person to 
me, in a way that displays mutual regard and affection ([NE] 1155b28-56a5) 
as well as a history of shared activities. (Sherman 1987, 602) 
 
Sherman emphasizes that, in Aristotle’s view, altruistic sentiments such as goodwill 
and kindness are different from the sentiment involved in friendship because the 
former involves what she calls “a kind of anonymity” in the sense that, “in acting out 
of kindness, our sympathy goes out to an individual because of the circumstances he 
happens to find himself in, and not because of who the specific individual happens to 
be” (Sherman 1987, 601). In friendship, in contrast, we “act out of a more specific 
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concern for a particular person, and because it is that person who is in need (and not 
another), what we can do and are willing to do, and what others count on us to do, is 
often greater (cf. NE IX.8 1169a18-34)” (Sherman 1987, 601).   
This is an insightful distinction between particularized and general altruistic 
sentiments or emotions (or in her term “attachment and wider altruism”) that Sherman 
finds in Aristotle. These are two distinct kinds of emotion as one does not imply the 
other. General altruistic emotions such as goodwill or kindness do not capture the 
special love and personal attachment that are an important part of being virtuous as a 
friend. As Aristotle acknowledges, such general altruistic emotions, which are 
constitutive of general virtues such as generosity or benevolence, do not constitute the 
characteristic attitude of a good friend, although they may be “a beginning of 
friendship” (Aristotle 1999, 1166a4). Goodwill and kindness—which are characteristic 
of general virtues such as generosity and benevolence—are not sufficient for 
friendship: “Goodwill…is not friendship. For it arises even toward people we do not 
know, and without their noticing it, whereas friendship does not” (Aristotle 1999, 
1166b30-32).  
Being a good friend requires particularized care and concern. If one’s attitude 
toward one’s friend is not different from the general kind of goodwill or kindness, then 
it is hard to see why we should say that they are friends from the beginning. This is one 
reason to think that being virtuous as a friend is meaningfully different from being 
virtuous in relation to people in general. I am curious why Aristotle did not go on to 
discuss the virtue that is characteristic of a good friend, which I call the virtue of 
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friendship. Such a virtue would be distinct from other general virtues such as 
generosity or benevolence, as they do not involve particularized altruistic emotions 
that are characteristic of a good friend. Regardless of why Aristotle did not examine 
the virtue of friendship among the virtues he discusses in Nicomachean Ethics, I believe 
it is a distinctive virtue that merits separate discussion.      
Another reason why being generally virtuous is not sufficient for being 
virtuous as a friend is that the virtue of friendship presupposes the existence of 
friendship. To form a friendship with someone, one needs to engage in substantial 
interactions with that particular individual. If so, even a person who is generally 
benevolent, honest, and compassionate may fail to possess or exercise the virtue of 
friendship if she had no opportunity to develop a friendship with anyone. In this sense, 
we cannot say that a person has the virtue of friendship unless she is engaged in an 
actual friendship. This is the case even if she is potentially virtuous as a friend—i.e., she 
would have been a great friend if she has had any friend. This is different from the 
potentiality of a person who has the virtue of courage but fails to exercise it because 
she has been living in a very peaceful town. If a person never had any friend, she 
cannot even be said to have this virtue, let alone exercising it, no matter how virtuous 
she is in other respects.  
I have argued that being generally virtuous is not sufficient for being virtuous 
as a friend because the latter involves special kind of attitude—e.g., particularized 
altruistic sentiments—to the given friend and presupposes existing friendship. If I am 
right, it would be reasonable to understand the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue, 
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as opposed to a general virtue. For it is characteristic features of a relational virtue to 
involve a special kind of attitude to particular individuals with whom the agent shares 
an intimate relationship. I believe the idea of relational virtue serves as a conceptual 
tool that is particularly useful for analyzing what it takes to be virtuous as a friend.  
 
6.4. Friendship and Morality 
 
Some people might doubt that the virtue of friendship is a moral virtue at all. 
First, they might believe that being a good friend is just a matter of personal and 
private life and is not a matter of morality. This is not true. Insofar as friendship 
involves at least one other person, being virtuous as a friend affects the flourishing of 
the friend in question, not just one’s own. As Lawrence Blum puts, “acts of friendship 
are morally good insofar as they involve acting from regard for another person for his own 
sake” (Blum 1980, 67; emphasis added). The altruistic nature of care for one’s friend 
highlights its moral significance:  
 
[F]riendship (or, anyway, most genuine friendship) involves a substantial 
concern for the good of the friend for his own sake, and a disposition to act 
to foster that good, simply because the other is one’s friend. In this sense 
friendship is an altruistic phenomenon, and a locus of the altruistic emotions. 
(Blum 1980, 43; emphasis added) 
 
The moral significance of being a good friend becomes clearer if we 
understand how great an impact we can give to our friends, especially to close ones. 
Friendship is generally founded based on special love, trust, and closeness, among 
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others. Imagine that you happen to find your best friend speaking ill of you in front of 
other people. You would feel not just insulted but also feel very disappointed and even 
betrayed in the way you would not feel if that person was a stranger. On the other 
hand, your friend can console and comfort you when you are in despair, in the way 
that no stranger can do for you. As these examples illustrate, being a good friend is 
very important for the flourishing of both oneself and the friend in question. 
Moreover, it is hard to deny that having and exercising those virtuous features 
only to a particular set of people—i.e., friends—have a moral value of its own, 
independently of whether she is virtuous to other people as well. Insofar as an 
altruistic attitude has moral value, we can say genuine care and concern for others’ 
well-being also have moral value even if they are limited within a narrow circle of 
friendship. In gangster movies (and indeed in reality), we often can find people who 
are generally ruthless and cruel and yet nice and caring in relation to their family or 
friends. Their virtuous disposition in relation to their friends is, considered 
independently, not morally criticizable; to the contrary, they are rather fine and 
praiseworthy. What they are criticizable for is their viciousness or lack of virtuousness 
in relation to those who are not their friends—including strangers and their enemies. 
Thus, other things being equal, people would say someone who is nice and caring at 
least to one’s own friends would be more virtuous and morally better compared to 
those who are not nice or caring to anyone. 
Others might worry that the virtue of friendship clashes with what other 
moral virtues or morality requires. For examples, Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett 
154 
 
worry that “our interest in our close friends can run directly counter to accepted moral 
requirements” (Cocking and Kennett 2000, 278). The following popular ‘joke’ 
illustrates this worry: “A friend will help you move, but a good friend will help you 
move a body.” To address this issue, we should distinguish what the virtue of 
friendship requires from what morality in general requires. For example, suppose that 
your friend stole someone’s bicycle. What the virtue of friendship demands you would 
not be to judge that what she did is right or to encourage her to commit the same crime 
again. Rather, what you need to do as a good friend is to be sympathetic with her and 
try to convince her to give the bicycle back to the owner or at least not to steal again. 
If what the friend did does not violate minimal moral decency, and thus you still are 
a friend of hers, you should try to be with her as her friend.   
Consider another case. Suppose that Cian confesses his close friend Diane 
about the plan to murder someone for a trivial reason and asks her to be an accomplice. 
She sees no justifying reason for the murder he is planning and is surprised and 
disappointed by his commitment to such a horrendous crime. Minimal moral decency 
would require Diane not to help Cian in killing an innocent person, and thus she 
would be disqualified for the virtue of friendship if she joins in his crime. But not 
joining him only satisfies the minimal negative criterion of the virtue of friendship—
i.e., minimal moral decency. If she is truly virtuous as his friend, she would try to 
convince him to give up his plan. If he remains stubborn and refuses to change his 
plan, then the virtue of friendship would demand her to say something like, “If you 
put that plan into practice, we will no longer be friends!” In such a situation, ironically, 
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threatening to break the friendship may be the last thing she can and should to as a 
good friend. If Cian ends up committing the planned murder, thereby revealing his 
vicious character, then the fitting response from Diane’s side would be to break the 
friendship. This is because of Cian’s failure to satisfy minimal moral decency prevents 
him from being virtuous as a friend.  
The concern about the conflict between the virtue of friendship and morality 
is structurally not very different from the concern about the conflict between other 
virtues such as honesty and compassion. For example, there can be a situation in which 
one should lie to save an innocent person’s life. If so, at first glance, compassion seems 
to be in conflict with another virtue, namely, honesty. Although honesty is widely 
accepted as a virtue, we should use practical wisdom to weigh the demands of 
different virtues that pull us to different directions in the given situation. The same 
applies to the case where the virtue of friendship conflicts with morality. If it is morally 
wrong to murder an innocent person for a trivial reason, one should not join it just 
because one’s friend asks. It does not imply that what I call the virtue of friendship is 
not a moral virtue, just as honesty can still be considered a moral virtue even if there 
are some situations where the right thing to do involves lying.   
My main point here is that the demand of the virtue of friendship should be 
weighed against other virtues such as honesty on the same ethical scale. In weighing 
some competing demands of different moral virtues, for example, compassion and 
honesty, we should use practical wisdom to make a correct judgment in the given 
particular situation. This point also applies to the case of the virtue of friendship. Note 
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that the competition between being virtuous as a friend and being otherwise virtuous 
is not one between personal preference and moral demand—as in the case where one 
decides whether to watch a movie or to help a person bleeding in from the box office—
but one between two different moral demands. A similar point is nicely illustrated in 
Blum’s remark:  
 
What the presence of the friend does to the moral configuration of this 
situation is not so much to undercut this moral quasi-demand of attention to 
the weal and woe of others, but to bring into play another consideration 
against which it is to be balanced. (Blum 1980, 50) 
 
 
In other words, this is not a matter of demandingness. Just like the case of other virtues, 
we should weigh the demands of the virtue of friendship with the demands of other 
virtues. My point is that we should not see this as weighing one’s non-moral personal 
inclination against what morality in general requires, since friendship, too, is an 
important sphere of ethical value. That is, the point is not that a moral theory that 
demands one to sacrifice one’s friendship is too demanding. Thus, insofar as the 
friendship is still maintained—which implies that the friend in question has minimal 
moral decency—what the virtue of friendship requires should be weighed against 
what other moral virtues requires, just as when we weigh the demands of honesty and 
those of compassion. The virtue of friendship is an important moral virtue and thus 
should be taken into account together with other virtues in considering what is the 
right thing to do in the given situation.  
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6.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I introduced the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue to 
shed light on the philosophical puzzles concerning the relationship between 
friendship and virtue. I have argued that the virtue of friendship is a distinctive virtue 
that is not simply reduced to general virtues by showing cases in which being virtuous 
as a friend diverges from being virtuous in a general sense. I have also argued that 
being virtuous as a friend does not inherently conflict with morality and that the virtue 
of friendship is an important moral virtue that should be weighed against other moral 
virtues on the same ethical scale. “What is a good human life?” is a central question in 
the field of ethics. Being a good friend is surely a crucial aspect of a good human life, 
insofar as friendship is an important ethical sphere where distinctive values are 
created and preserved. I believe the virtue of friendship can help us better understand 
what a good friend is like and how to establish a good friendship.  
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Chapter 7. Relational Activity View on Partiality 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
So far, we have examined filial piety and the virtue of friendship as relational 
virtues. In this chapter, I will develop a view on partiality towards our intimates in 
general, which I call the ‘relational activity view,’ based on my previous analysis of 
relational virtue. It seems reasonable to claim that we should, or at least may, treat 
those who are near and dear to us in a special way. If someone asks you why you help 
your parents when their house is burned down, saying “They are my parents” seems 
to offer a good explanation for what you do. According to the prevailing modern 
conception of morality, however, each person is equally valuable and thus deserves 
equal treatment.  
So here comes what Simon Keller calls the puzzle of partiality: “Why should 
the fact that someone happens to share some relationship with you make a difference 
to how you ought to treat her, or how you may permissibly treat her?” (Keller 2013, 5) 
He introduces three views that attempt to resolve this puzzle: the projects view, the 
relationships view, and the individuals view. After examining and rejecting the first 
two, he argues that the individuals view offers the best solution. In this paper, first, I 
introduce how Keller criticizes his rival views and defends his own view, and then 
raise some worries about his view in dealing with the puzzle of the partiality. In the 
end, I suggest and argue for my own relational activity view as an alternative.   
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7.2. The Projects View 
 
The projects view, according to Keller, holds that the reasons of partiality arise 
from the deepest commitment of the agent whose reasons they are (Keller 2013, Ch. 2). 
Bernard Williams, for example, grounds the reasons to give special treatment to those 
who are in special relationships to us in the fact that our commitment to them is part 
of our ‘ground projects,’ which is constitutive of the agent’s personal identity 
(Williams 1981, 12-18). Keller also attributes this view to Susan Wolf, Sarah Stroud, 
and communitarian political philosophers (Wolf 1992, Stroud 2010). The distinctive 
feature of the projects view, says Keller, is that it explains why we have reasons of 
partiality by referring to the agent’s own self-constituting commitments.  
The strength of the projects view lies in the fact that the agent-relativity of the 
reasons of partiality it generates can explain why we have reasons to give special 
treatment to our own intimates (i.e., those who are in special relationships to us) 
although other people have equal intrinsic value. That is, according to the projects 
view, I have reasons to treat my friend in a special way while you don’t have such 
reasons because the commitment to my friend is constitutive of my personal identity 
but not of yours. Likewise, I do not have special reasons to treat your friend 
preferentially, even if my friend and your friend are equal in their objective or intrinsic 
value. If so, it seems that the projects view can give its own answer to the puzzle of 
partiality: “I have reasons to treat my intimates preferentially because the 
commitments to them are constitutive of my personal identity.”  
160 
 
Despite its strength, Keller does not endorse the projects view for the 
following reasons. First, he says, the projects view fails to capture the duties that arise 
from special relationships. Special relationships seem to generate not only special 
reasons for preferential treatment but also certain kinds of special duties. For example, 
the fact that I am my parents’ son seems to impose on me the duties, say, to take care 
of them in their old age. But our ground projects, Keller argues, do not generate such 
duties in a comparable way. “No matter how great your investment in a project,” he 
says, “it would seem, your investment itself cannot bind you morally to the project” 
(Keller 2013, 36-37). 
Keller considers and rejects two possible responses by appealing to the 
following example.  
 
A woman learns that she has inherited a sum of money, and she decides that 
when the money arrives, she will donate it to a foundation that builds eye clinics 
in impoverished parts of the world, providing cheap cures for blindness to 
people who would otherwise not be treated. She informs the administrator of 
the foundation that she intends to donate the money. Then, her two-year-old 
son begins to have recurring episodes of breathing difficulty, and he is 
diagnosed with severe asthma, which will greatly detract from his quality of life. 
There are things the woman can do to decrease the impact of her son’s asthma 
and the likelihood that he will be harmed by a serious attack—she can take out 
private insurance that will give him access to better treatment, she can move 
somewhere where he will not be so exposed to environmental triggers, she can 
buy emergency equipment and medication to keep at home—but to do these 
things will be expensive. Given her other financial restrictions, if she is to give 
her son what he needs to prevent his asthma from being a constant source of 
suffering and danger, then she will need to use the money from the inheritance 
and go back on her plan to donate it to the foundation. (Keller 2013, 37-38) 
 
First, he says, the duty of partiality here cannot be explained by its being a joint project, 
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as opposed to personal one, since the baby is “too young to have a self-defining 
commitment to participating in his own upbringing” (Keller 2013, 38). Second, pace 
Wolf, the woman’s special duty here cannot be accounted for by impartial 
consideration that she is better placed to benefit and protect her son than other 
children, because “she is equally well placed to provide greater benefits for the several 
people who could, if she donates the money, receive treatment for blindness from the 
foundation” (Keller 2013, 39). 
Keller also argues that the projects view fails to do justice to the 
phenomenology of partiality or “What it is like to be partial” (Keller 2013, 25). His 
point is that the experience of being motivated by thoughts of your ground projects is 
quite different from that of being motivated by the thoughts of your intimates. That is, 
when you think of your own projects, you think about yourself; but when you think of 
your intimates, you think about them. If the reasons of partiality the projects view 
offers cannot be taken as motives to act partially, according to Keller, it would lose 
much of its attraction. Such discordance between reasons and motives of partiality 
would render this view revisionist, which undermines its intuitive appeal. 
 
7.3. The Relationships View 
 
Next, Keller examines the relationships view as the second candidate (Keller 
2013, Ch. 3). The value-based version of this view claims that our special personal 
relationships bear a special kind of value, which is the source of our reasons of 
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partiality. Proponents of this view ascribe different sorts of value to special 
relationships (e.g. Joseph Raz (1989): intrinsic value; Samuel Scheffler (2001, 2004): 
noninstrumental value; Niko Kolodny (2003): final value), but the point they share is 
that the special relationships themselves hold a sort of value that is not derived from 
something else. That is, according to them, we should value those relationships for 
their own sake, not because of the good things they provide. The reason-based 
relationships view, on the other hand, claims that the fact that a certain special 
relationship holds between me and some other people itself can count as a reason for 
me to treat them preferentially. Proponents of this version, such as Diane Jeske and 
Thomas Scanlon, take facts about the special relationships as themselves fundamental 
reasons, which defy any further explanation by more basic terms (Jeske 2008, Scanlon 
1998).  
Keller’s examination focuses on the generic version of value-based 
relationships view, according to which “special relationships are intrinsically valuable, 
and the intrinsic value of special relationships explains why they generate reasons of 
partiality” (Keller 2013, 49). One of the main reasons he opposes to the relationships 
view is that relationships do not have any intrinsic value. Let me introduce two of the 
arguments he offers to support his point.  
One of Keller’s arguments is based on the view that a “relationship that is no 
good for anyone is no good at all” (Keller 2013, 57). According to him, there is nothing 
valuable in a relationship deprived of all its extrinsic values. He asks us to imagine a 
case of dysfunctional or destructive friendship which “produces nothing but misery 
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and that it makes everyone involved worse off” and claims that “there is nothing to 
recommend the relationship” (Keller 2013, 56). I think it is insightful of Keller to take 
the example of dysfunctional69 special relationships, which “lack the extrinsic value 
that relationships of their type ordinarily possess” (Keller 2013, 56). However, the 
proponents of the relationships view may not hold that any relationship of certain 
types (e.g. friendship and family relationships) have intrinsic value on their own. They 
may argue that at least minimally decent relationships have intrinsic value. For example, 
they might say, only decent friendships have intrinsic value, and ‘dysfunctional’ ones 
do not.  
This is analogous to the value of an action. One may claim that an action 
performed from a genuinely admirable motive may have intrinsic value on its own, 
independently of what it produces. But it does not mean that every action has such 
intrinsic value. An evil action out of ill will would even have a negative intrinsic value 
or disvalue. Thus, Keller’s argument against the thought, “At least it’s a relationship,” 
does not seem fair to the relationships view. What the proponents of this view can say 
is, rather, “At least it’s a decent relationship.” The evaluative property, goodness or 
badness of a relationship, does not have to be decided only by its extrinsic value.  
Keller may reply that this argument implies that the value then rests in 
whatever makes the relationships decent (e.g., that friends wish each other well for the 
other’s own sake or that they enjoy each other’s company.) But insofar as these 
                                           
69 The term ‘dysfunctional’ relationship seems to assume the view that relationships have 
certain intrinsic function, which implicitly incline us toward the view that their value is only 
extrinsic. To avoid this surreptitious impact, we may use, say, ‘defective’ relationship instead.  
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decentness-makers are constitutive of a decent relationship, their value can be 
understood as constituting the intrinsic value of the relationship. I think it is a mistake 
to understand the goods associated with close personal relationships solely in terms 
of a means-end relationship. Keller seems to presuppose that relationships are mere 
instruments which produce the well-being (or whatever constitutive of it) of persons 
involved. But there can be an alternative picture of well-being or flourishing that takes 
intimate relationships or the activities in such relationships as part of what constitutes 
the well-being or flourishing itself.  
Keller’s other argument against the relationships view makes an appeal to the 
phenomenology of partiality, just as his argument against the projects view did (Keller 
2013, 62-64). That is, according to him, the thoughts of our relationships themselves are 
not what characteristically motivate us when we act on the reasons of partiality. He 
further points out that one who is motivated by the thoughts of relationships would 
not be the one we want as our family or friend. For example, if a person saves his wife 
motivated by the thought, “It’s my marriage!” (Keller 2013, 63), it certainly does not 
seem to be an appropriate motivation for a good husband.  
However, I am not sure if Keller is being fair to the relationships view in 
suggesting that this view implies a thought like “It’s my marriage!” as a man’s 
motivation in saving his drowning wife. Instead, consider the thought, “It’s my wife!” 
which does seem to be an appropriate motivation for a good husband. This thought is 
distinguished from thoughts like “It’s a human being!” or “It’s Sandra!” in that it 
presupposes or implies a certain relationship between the subject and object of the 
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thought, namely, a marital relationship. In contrast, the thought “It’s a human being” 
at best implies the relationship among fellow human beings, and the thought “It’s 
Sandra” does not say anything about the relationship unless something more is said 
about Sandra and her relationship to the agent (i.e., that she is his wife). Thus, insofar 
as the thought about the relationship between the agent and the intentional object is 
playing its motivating role in this way, the proponents of relationships view do not 
have to suggest some thoughts like “It’s my marriage” as the motivating thought in 
saving one’s wife. “It’s my wife!” will do.  
In fact, Keller makes a qualification in making his point about the motivation 
that the relationships view would suggest: 
 
[F]acts like “They are my parents” and “It is my wife” do not usually serve as 
our motivations for acting well within special relationships, if they are read as 
directing us to the relationships themselves. It is not the thought of your parent-
child relationship that moves you to rush off to comfort your parents after the fire, 
and it is not the thought of his marriage that moves the husband to jump in and 
save his wife from drowning. (Keller 2013, 70-71; emphasis added) 
 
Here Keller seems to assume that relationships in question as either mere socially 
binding norms or abstract entities.  
 To value a relationship with someone involves regarding that particular 
person as someone special to oneself. The thoughts like “They are my parents” or “It 
is my wife” are to be understood as thoughts of the particular individuals in question 
as special and precious in the light of the relationship. I believe this is what people 
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usually mean when they say something like “It is my wife.”70 Suppose that Harry 
saves his wife motivated by the thought of his marriage merely as a socially binding 
institution or a legal relationship. If so, this would not be an ideal husband’s 
motivation and surely his wife will be rightly disappointed by him as his wife if she 
finds his motivation. On the other hand, Mason saves his wife moved by the thoughts 
such as what she means to his life and how much he loves her, which characterize a 
good marriage. I would like to suggest that Mason’s motivation, not Harry’s, is the 
motivation of one who truly values his relationship with his wife.  
 
7.4. The Individuals View 
 
After criticizing other views, Keller introduces his own individuals view (Keller 
2013, Ch. 4). This view holds that the reasons of partiality arise from facts about the 
ethical importance of the individuals who share special relationships with us. The gist 
of this view is that the individual person is the only thing that really matters. Keller 
claims that the individuals view can best capture the phenomenology of partiality. To 
show this, he invites us to consider two famous examples independently offered by 
Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker. The first is Williams’s “Saving Wife” case 
(Williams 1981). A man is at the pier and sees two people are drowning. One is his 
wife and the other is a stranger, and he can save only one. It seems to be a “thought 
                                           
70  I believe Keller added a qualification—i.e., “if they are read as directing us to the 
relationships themselves” (Keller 2013, 71)—because he is also aware of this fact. 
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too many” for the man to think about something like general utility or moral principles 
in saving his wife. The second is Stocker’s “Hospital Visit” case (Stocker 1976). In this 
example, you have your friend’s surprise visit when you are hospitalized. Stocker 
points out that, when you ask her about her motivation, the answer you may rightly 
expect is something like, “I came here because you are my friend!” rather than 
“Because it promotes general happiness” or “Because it is my moral duty.” 
The point Williams and Stocker are trying to make in these examples is that 
the thoughts like “It’s my wife” or “You are my friend” should be enough to motivate 
the agents to act as they do and that the references to any impartial consideration such 
as general utility or moral principles would be inappropriate as a motive in such a 
situation. What is objectionable in these examples, according to Keller, is that the story 
offered about reasons to act here seem to conflict with what we actually experience 
when we act well within special relationships.  
To illustrate how his individuals view can capture our reasons of partiality as 
we experience them, Keller introduces a modified version of Williams’s example, 
which he calls “Two-Leveled Pier” case (Keller 2013, 90-92). This example is 
specifically designed to show what kind of knowledge is required for a motive of 
partiality to be “fully shaped.”71 In this example, you are on the lower level of the pier 
and I am on its upper level. I am in a better position to gather information about the 
person drowning, while you are in a better position to save that person by throwing 
                                           
71 According to Keller, a motive is “fully shaped” when the motive fully “grips on” to the 
reason for performing the act. Thus, if the agent acts in a certain way while lacking full 
knowledge of what reason she has for performing that act, her motive to act so is not “fully 
shaped” (see Keller 2013, 87-89). 
168 
 
the life preserver. So you are motivated to save the person in question according to the 
information I provide. At this imaginary pier, I offer you further information piece by 
piece, increasing the level of its specificity:  
 
(1) “You have a good reason to throw the life preserver!” 
(2) “There is someone drowning in the water!”  
(3) “Someone you care about is drowning in the water!”  
(4) “A good friend of yours is drowning in the water!”  
(5) “Donald is drowning in the water!”  
[Suppose you have exactly one good friend called Donald.] 
(6) “Donald is drowning by inhaling water through his nose, not his mouth!” 
 
Keller claims that your motive is fully shaped or “grips on” to the reason for 
saving him at stage (5), that is, when you discover which particular friend of yours is 
drowning (i.e., Donald). Here your motive to save Donald is your concern for him, and 
any further information (e.g. one that offered at stage (6)) would be irrelevant insofar 
as this motive is concerned. Based on this thought experiment, Keller concludes, “It is 
only when we can think directly of the person for whom we act that we can have a 
clear sense of why we act. So far as our motives of partiality are concerned, then, our 
reasons of partiality make essential reference to particular, specified individuals” (Keller 
2013, 94; emphasis added). 
 
7.5. Response to Keller’s Individuals View 
 
I am not sure, however, that the ‘Two-Leveled Pier’ case successfully defends 
Keller’s individuals view. First, he says that this example’s point is “to show that a 
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motive of partiality becomes fully shaped only when we are aware of the identity of 
the individual for whom we are performing the act in question” (Keller 2013, 94; 
emphasis added). However, if this were his point, the example should have involved 
at least two potential victims: one who is your friend (i.e., Donald) and one who is not. 
And the question should be at which stage your motive to save one over the other is 
fully shaped. Otherwise, the example only shows the degree of vividness or 
concreteness of your motivation to save the given person. 
According to Keller’s individuals view, “Your reason to give special treatment 
to a friend is grounded in the ethical significance of your friend” (Keller 2013, 98). 
However, although the ethical significance of the individual himself may ground your 
reason to treat your friend well, it does not ground the reason to treat him in a special 
or partial way, that is, in the way you would not treat strangers. The fact that the 
individual in question is a person with intrinsic value would not explain this reason 
for special or partial treatment since it does not distinguish her from other similarly 
situated individuals, insofar as they are also persons with equal intrinsic value.  
In fact, in Keller’s original example, your act of saving the victim can be 
adequately explained with the information given at the stage (2): “There is someone 
drowning in the water!” And the information added would increase at best the degree 
of vividness or concreteness of your motivation to save the given person. Even in the 
modified ‘comparative’ example, your preferential treatment for your friend Donald 
over a stranger would be fully explained by the information of (3) (“Someone you care 
about is drowning in the water!”), and even that of (4) (“A good friend of yours is 
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drowning in the water!”) would not be required.  
I believe what actually explains your special or partial treatment, as opposed to 
a mere good treatment, to Donald in Keller’s example is the fact that he is your friend 
or someone you especially care about. It is crucial to note that, at the stage (5) in the 
two-leveled pier case, Keller does not just say, “Donald is drowning in the water!” but 
also adds, “(Suppose you have exactly one good friend called Donald.)” (Keller 2013, 
91). Without the information that Donald is your friend, the fact that Donald is 
drowning would not add anything to your motivating reason. Again, it seems that the 
only role this particular information seems to play is just to make the motivation more 
vivid and more concrete. Similarly, when someone asks you why you help your 
parents when their house is burned down, saying “They are Bill and Mary!” would 
not be a good explanation of your motivation unless you add, “And they are my 
parents!”  
It might be objected that the information that it is Donald, not some other 
friend of yours, can make your motivational reason stronger, not just more vivid. This 
would be plausible, for example, if Donald is one of the closest friends, not just one 
among many friends. But even in this case, what generates the stronger motivational 
reason for the partial treatment is the fact about the relationship between you and 
Donald, namely, that he is your close friend, rather than any non-relational fact about 
Donald himself as a particular individual.  
Furthermore, I do not think Keller’s strategy successfully meets the main 
challenge against the individuals view. The challenge is to explain why we have 
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stronger reasons to do what is good for those who share special relationships with us 
than to do what is good for those who do not, given that all those individuals have 
equal intrinsic value and thus equally deserve the good you are to provide. Keller 
makes an appeal to Jonathan Dancy’s conceptual distinction between a favorer and an 
enabler to defend his individuals view (Keller 2013, 133-136). According to Dancy, a 
favorer is a fact that provides with reasons for the given action, while an enabler is a 
fact that enables another fact to give a reason without being itself a reason-giving fact 
(Dancy 2004, 38-40). For example, the fact that you promised me to give me a ride to 
the airport is a favorer that gives you a reason for giving me a ride to the airport, and 
the fact that your promise is not made under duress is the enabler that enables this 
favorer to give a reason to do so.  
Keller applies this conceptual distinction to the case of reasons of partiality, 
aiming to “explain why you should have reasons that others lack, just because you 
participate in certain special relationships” (Keller 2013, 18). According to him, only 
the facts about the value of individuals serve as favorers, while the facts about the 
relationship are mere enablers. He says, “[W]hen you give special treatment within a 
special relationship your reason for acting is that your act would be good for the 
person with whom your relationship is shared,” and the fact that “you share a 
relationship with someone is not itself a reason of partiality, but it enables other facts to 
be reasons of partiality” (Keller 2013, 135; emphasis added). By categorizing them as 
mere enablers, as opposed to favorers or ‘reason-giving facts,’ he seems to aim to 
explain the reasons of partiality in terms of something other than the special 
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relationships themselves. If this move is successful, he would be able to hold onto the 
individuals view, according to which reasons of partiality are explained only by the 
facts about individuals’ value, without appealing to any fact about relationships.  
I am not sure, however, that the distinction between a favorer and an enabler 
would enable him to achieve this aim. The main worry is that the facts about the special 
relationships seem to play a central role in making sense of one’s partial actions toward 
those who share such relationships. Suppose that you helped your friend fix her car, 
and someone asks you, “Why did you help her fix her car?” You may answer by 
referring to some facts about the value of this individual: “Because she is valuable and 
my helping her is good for her.” But suppose that the questioner further asks, “Okay. 
But why did you do that only for her, and not for someone else in a similar situation? 
Aren’t they equally valuable human beings?” To give an adequate answer to this 
question, you would need to refer to some facts about the special relationship you 
share with her. You would need to say, for example, “Because she is my friend,” which 
amounts to saying that you share friendship with her. In fact, it seems the second 
question (i.e., “Why her, not others?”) that demands what Keller calls reasons of 
partiality. For the puzzle of partiality is not about why we do good things to any 
individual at all, but about why we give partial treatment to those with whom we share 
special relationships. The fact that she is your friend in this example is a consideration 
that counts in favor of your treating her in a partial way. At least, this fact is what you 
normally perceive as a reason to prioritize fixing her car over fixing a similarly situated 
stranger’s car. Thus, in this and similar cases, the reference to facts about the special 
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relationships shared seems essential for rationalizing partial treatment.  
In fact, Dancy’s own conception of enabler does not suggest that enablers play 
such a crucial role in explaining or justifying the action in question, at least not in 
normal circumstances. Take Dancy’s own examples of enablers (Dancy 2004, 38-40). 
What makes sense of, say, your giving someone a ride to the airport is that you 
promised to do so, which is a favorer. Dancy says enablers—such as that your promise 
was not given under duress, that you are able to do so, or that there is no greater reason 
not to do so—do not give you any additional reason to the given person a ride to the 
airport, and thus does not play a significant role in rationalizing our action. This 
suggests that the role of an enabler is to clear up the ground so that the favorer can 
play its normal role of rationalizing. The name ‘enabler’ in this sense is somewhat 
misleading. The existence of enabler is usually better described negatively as the 
absence of disabler. In explaining or justifying what one did, the default seems to talk 
only about favorers, unless the possibility of the existence of a particular disabler 
happens to be salient in the given context. For example, if someone asks you why did 
you help your neighbor to move, to say “Because I promised” would help her make 
sense of what you did, but it would not help to add “And I was not under duress” 
unless she is particularly curious about whether you were under duress. Nor do other 
sorts of enablers Dancy mentions—e.g., “I am able to do it” or “There is no greater 
reason not to do it”—seem to help us to make sense of the actions in question.  
By contrast, in Keller’s application, enablers play a crucial role in making 
sense of the given action. While Keller takes the fact that the person involved is your 
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friend as a mere enabler, this fact plays an important role in explaining and justifying 
your partial treatment toward that person. What his individuals view suggests as 
favorers or reason-giving facts of partial treatment are facts about the value of 
individuals, namely, that “your act would be good for the person with whom your 
relationship is shared” (Keller 2013, 135). But offering only the facts of this sort is 
inadequate for explaining or justifying the partial treatment unless we also refer to 
some facts about the special relationship shared. If the facts about relationships are 
indispensable for explaining or justifying our partial treatment towards those who 
share special relationships with us, it seems more reasonable to regard them as 
favorers or reason-giving facts, rather than as mere enablers.  
Moreover, as Errol Lord points out, Keller’s account has the counterintuitive 
implication that “the value of individuals that I happen to not stand in a special 
relationship with fails to provide me with reasons” (Lord 2015a, 1308). Lord suggests 
that the facts about special relationships are better understood as intensifiers rather 
than enablers. Note that Dancy himself introduces intensifying as another role that a 
relevant consideration can play other than favoring or enabling (Dancy 2004, 41-42). 
Intensifiers, like enablers, affect reasons without being reasons themselves. Here is 
Dancy’s own example: (1) She is in trouble and needs help; (2) I am the only other 
person around; (3) So: I help her (Dancy 2004, 41). Here, according to him, (2) is the 
intensifier that makes the reason given by (1) stronger. It is different from an enabler 
because (1) would still favor my helping her even if there were others around.72 
                                           
72 Interestingly, in a parenthetical paragraph, Keller does mention the possibility that “the fact 
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Although I am more sympathetic to Lord’s strategy than to Keller’s, it seems 
to have its own challenges. One important challenge is that it is hard to make sense of 
the combination of agent-neutral reasons with agent-relative intensifiers. On the one hand, 
the value of each individual person gives agent-neutral reasons since it is supposed to 
provide a reason to benefit her regardless of who the agent is. On the other hand, the 
fact that you share a special relationship with her is an agent-relative intensifier, since 
it intensifies only your reason to benefit her, but not strangers’ reason to benefit her. 
For Lord’s alternative strategy to work, it should be able to explain both how reasons 
of partiality are not agent-relative and why the facts about special relationships play 
such a differential intensifying role.   
 
7.6. The Relational Activity View 
 
Let me now introduce a sketch of my own view on the ethics of partiality, 
which I call the relational activity view.73 This view offers an Aristotelian picture of the 
relationship between intimate relationships and human flourishing in that it 
understands virtuous activities among intimates as special cases of virtuous activities 
that are constitutive of human flourishing. Virtuous relational activities are exercises 
                                           
that you share a certain relationship with someone serves as an intensifier, rather than an 
enabler, on the particularist version of the individuals view” (Keller 2013, 136). As Lord 
complains, however, Keller still assigns facts about special relationships an enabling role, rather 
than an intensifying role (Lord 2015b, 1309) 
73 My relational activity view focuses on the partiality in intimate relationships such as parent-
child relationship or close friendship rather than partiality in general.  
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or expressions of what I call relational virtues, by which I roughly mean the virtues 
required for each participant of intimate relationships such as filial piety and the virtue 
of friendship.  
To begin with, like the projects view, the relational activity view holds that the 
reasons of partiality arise from the deepest commitment of the agent whose reasons 
they are, which is the commitment to living a flourishing human life. This explains the 
agent-relativity of reasons of partiality. Unlike the projects view, on the other hand, 
the relational activity view can capture the duties or requirements of special 
relationships. For example, parental virtue understood as the virtue of a good parent 
demands the agent to take good care of one’s child. Thus, while engaging in a parental 
activity is the agent’s own project, it is in some sense what she is morally demanded to 
do in relation to her child. Nor does it appeal to the idea of the joint project to explain 
the requirements involved, since the reason to be a good parent does not rely on her 
child’s being able to undertake any joint project together. Also, my view does not 
necessarily fly in the face of the phenomenology of partiality, since it does not imply 
that the focus in benefiting the parent’s child is mainly on the agent herself or the 
relationship itself. For it is constitutive of being a good parent to have genuine care 
and concern and pay enough attention to the child for her own sake.  
Second, like relationships view, the relational activity view regards intimate 
relationships as a source of our reasons of partiality. Recall that one of Keller’s main 
objections against the relationships view is based on his assumption that relationship 
has no intrinsic value. Although I think there is some truth in this assumption, I suspect 
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that Keller’s view on relationships and value is not sufficiently sophisticated. The main 
issue between Keller and the proponents of the relationships view is whether a 
relationship would still be valuable even when it is deprived of all the extrinsic values 
it produces. But I think value associated with personal relationships deserves more 
careful consideration.  
Let me suggest a way of understanding the value of intimate relationships and 
its relation to human flourishing. A good is not the same good when it is given through 
intimate relationships since it becomes special. Suppose that Jayden gets a gorilla doll 
as a Christmas present from his father. It is more than just a toy that he can play with. 
It is also an expression of his father’s love for him. He spent a lot of time thinking about 
what Jayden would like and put efforts to work to afford the gorilla doll. Suppose, on 
the other hand, Alice gets the same gorilla doll from an anonymous benefactor and 
that she is as interested in having this type of gorilla doll as Jayden is. But she is not in 
any special relationship with the benefactor and does not even know who that 
benefactor is.74 While the same objects are distributed to Jayden and Alice, only Jayden 
gets it through a special relationship.  
The love and concern involved in this case of present-giving are what make 
the present itself so special. It is about how to give the present, not just what to give. To 
Jayden, the gorilla doll that his father gave to him is never the same as other dolls. It 
can be even more valuable to him than other more expensive and fancier toys. And 
                                           
74 I’m assuming here that the benefactor is not someone like ‘Daddy-long-legs,’ in that he or 
she also does not know who the beneficiary of the gift will be. 
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one who shares no loving relationship with anyone cannot get a present in the way 
Jayden gets. What is exchanged through a genuine loving relationship is given and 
taken with love. In a sense, this is how love itself is exchanged. Since love itself is not an 
object that can be exchanged in a visible way, love is exchanged through something 
more tangible such as gifts. While one may give a loaf of bread to a person in need of 
it, one cannot give love—especially special love as opposed to general love for 
humanity—to someone just because she needs it.  
So understood, love cannot be exchanged among people in no special 
relationship with each other, as in the case of Alice and her anonymous benefactor. 
Similarly, no stranger’s visit can have the same meaning to you as your dear friend’s 
visit. Thus, intimate relationships transform the goods exchanged through those 
relationships into the kind of goods that are hardly found anywhere else. No matter 
how valuable a certain good is, independently considered, it cannot simply replace the 
good exchanged through an intimate relationship with love. The exchange of goods 
among intimates in this way constitutes virtuous relational activities.  
Then, how are we to understand the value of an intimate relationship? On the 
one hand, it may be hard to say intimate relationships themselves are intrinsically 
valuable, since it may not be valuable when it is stripped of its function of transforming 
goods into a special kind. In this sense, the value of intimate relationships relies on the 
goods exchanged through such relationships. It may be right to say that its value is 
derived from other more fundamental value, that is, the value of the virtuous relational 
activities. On the other hand, however, it would be a mistake to say that intimate 
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relationships are mere means for the flourishing of those involved in them. I believe 
the view that intimate relationships have value in themselves is motivated by the 
thought that it is inappropriate to see them as a mere means to other things that are 
external to the relationships themselves. For example, if I take such relationships 
merely as an instrument for my own flourishing, the way I take the relationships does 
not seem appropriate.  
I think we can avoid this problem by adopting an Aristotelian picture of the 
relationship between intimate relationships and human flourishing: the activities of 
virtues required in intimate relationships are constitutive of human flourishing. In the 
Aristotelian picture, one’s virtuous activities constitute one’s own flourishing. 
Activities of relational virtues, like those of non-relational virtues such as courage and 
temperance, are constative of human flourishing. It is not as if those activities are 
exploited as a means for something called ‘well-being’ or ‘flourishing’ which is 
external to those activities. These activities constitute the flourishing in question. Thus, 
according to the relational activity view, an intimate relationship owes its value to its 
being part of the relational activity. This is why it is hard to capture the value of an 
intimate relationship with the conceptual dichotomy between intrinsic versus 
instrumental or extrinsic values.  
I have argued that the virtuous relational activities in intimate relationships 
are constitutive of human flourishing. However, one might argue that it would be too 
self-centered if the reason we should treat our intimates preferentially is that it is 
necessary for our flourishing. We can see this is not necessarily the case if we carefully 
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consider how persons in a genuine loving relationship would think of each other. One 
who is in a genuine intimate relationship takes the good of one’s intimate as part of one’s 
own good. To put it in another way, her attitude is like, “What is good for you is also 
good for me” or “Making you happy makes me happy.” 
It reminds us of a familiar argument against altruism, according to which 
altruism is reduced to egoism if one enjoys altruistic activities too much. Consider 
Harold, a rich philanthropist who enjoys donating money to Oxfam. Whenever he 
donates, he feels very good about himself. But the problem is that he does not even 
care who is benefited by the money he gives. In this case, the primary reason for his 
donating is egoistic rather than altruistic. The beneficiaries are likely to be 
disappointed if they discover Harold’s real reasons for his donation. They may be 
grateful to him, just in the way they feel grateful to rain that relieves from drought, but 
no more than that. But things are different in the case of benefiting our intimates. It is 
true that, for example, making my wife happy makes me happy. The crucial difference 
is that my wife herself, who is the beneficiary of my activities, would want me to feel 
that way as well. That is, as a person who shares a loving intimate relationship with me, 
as opposed to a simple benefactor-beneficiary relationship, she would rather be 
disappointed if she discovers that my contributing to her well-being is not part of my 
self-interest at the same time.  
Thus, again, the fact that I enjoy making her happy is part of what makes her 
happier. In other words, in a loving relationship, it is desirable, if not required, that my 
other-regarding activities toward the intimate are at least partly self-regarding at the same time. 
181 
 
In this way, it is hard to draw a sharp line between self-regarding and other-regarding 
concerns when it comes to intimates. One important sort of intimate relationship that 
is constitutive of human flourishing would be one that unifies self-regarding and 
other-regarding in this way.  
 
7.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined possible ways of solving the puzzle of 
partiality. I have sketched the way Keller categorizes and evaluates three different 
accounts of reasons of partiality and argued that some of his criticisms against the 
projects view and the relationships view are mistaken, while others retain their critical 
power. I have also argued that Keller’s defense of the individuals view ultimately fails 
because it does not adequately address the puzzle of partiality. I believe that the value 
of individuals, considered independently, offers at best a partial story of reasons of 
partiality. As an alternative, I have sketched my own relational activity view, which 
suggests a new way of understanding intimate relationships and their value. I hope I 
have shown at least a step toward giving an adequate solution to the puzzle of 
partiality.  
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Conclusion 
 
In my dissertation, I have introduced new conceptual tools—such as 
relational virtue, gratitude for being, and relational activity—to better capture the 
nature and value of intimate personal relationships such as parent-child 
relationship and friendship. Despite the importance of our relationship with family 
members and close friends, we did not have adequate conceptual tools to make 
sense of the distinctive value that exists in a ‘healthy’ intimate relationship. I have 
argued that a virtue-ethical approach based on the idea of relational virtue can 
better capture the normative significance of filial love and the distinctive nature of 
gratitude for our caring parents.  
Filial piety and the virtue of friendship have been introduced as 
paradigmatic examples of relational virtue. I have focused on showing how they 
are different from general virtues such as benevolence and compassion and how 
they help us see what it takes to have a good parent-child relationship and 
friendship. In particular, I have examined the ways in which my relational virtue 
view of filial piety is similar to and different from the traditional Confucian 
conception of filial piety.  
Moreover, I have explored the relationship between relational virtues and 
morality in general. An impartial conception of morality has been prevailing in the 
contemporary Western moral theories. My research has important implications on 
how partial values such as filial love, gratitude, and friendship can be harmonized 
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with the demand of morality in general. In particular, I have suggested my own 
relational activity view of partiality to solve the puzzle of partiality in moral theory.  
Human lives are woven together. Most, if not all, of us have someone near 
and dear to us. Being virtuous in relation to them is an important part of living a 
flourishing and ethical life. I believe my work here can serve as the stepping stone 
for future research on this important yet relatively neglected realm of ethics.  
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